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Abstract
Prior research on organizational misconduct within intercollegiate athletics focuses on the
penalties administered by the NCAA and types of violations committed by member institutions,
rather than the engagement of misconduct and the role of the NCAA as a social-control agent.
Consequently, the purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the relationship between socialcontrol agents and potential wrongdoers (i.e., organizations), in addition to how the relationship
affects the evolving line separating right from wrong. A three-paper multiple method
examination has been conducted, including a historical analysis of NCAA enforcement, a
qualitative framing analysis on the detailing of NCAA major infractions to the public, and a
quantitative analysis on the likelihood of sanctions as a result of engaging in organizational
misconduct. The historical chapter advances literature on social-control agents by investigating
the concept of organizational layering which takes place when third-party regulators examine
cases of organizational misconduct. The qualitative chapter expands literature on framing theory,
specifically the analysis on the different framing techniques utilized by social control agents and
media members when present cases of organizational misconduct to the public. The quantitative
chapter consists of a two-stage probit regression model which found evidence that the type of
violations committed in major violation cases are significant in determining the likelihood of
sanctions. This study will contribute to intercollegiate athletic administration by providing an
opportunity to better comprehend NCAA enforcement procedures, along with utilizing the
findings to discover how the NCAA functions as a social-control agent.
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION
Within society, there are many stories which report on the misconduct by individuals and
organizations; yet, how an individual or a collective defines misconduct varies. Greve, Palmer,
and Pozner (2010) defined organizational misconduct is “behavior in or by an organization that a
social-control agent judges to transgress a line separating right from wrong; where such a line
can separate legal, ethical, and social responsible behavior from their antithesis” (p. 56). In
comparison, Barnett (2012) defined misconduct as “any publicized disclosed firm action that,
under some set of conditions, a stakeholder would deem illegal, unethical, or socially
irresponsible and take action to punish” (p. 7). Comparing the two definitions, one notes two
major similarities. The first is the activities that constitute misconduct are disclosed to some
broader public. A broader public could be a particularly industry, society, or some other
governing body. The second is the subjective nature of what constitutes misconduct. Barnett
(2012) for example notes that stakeholders identify action(s) by an individual/organization as
misconduct; while Greve et al. (2010) specifies that a social-control agent is the individual/entity
that judges an action to be misconduct. This second similarity is the focus of the dissertation, in
particular, the notion of how social-control agent identifies, assesses, and enforces organizational
misconduct.
Social-control agents are known as “an actor that represents a collectivity and that can
impose sanctions on that collectivity’s behalf” (Greve et al., 2010, p. 56). The root of socialcontrol agent is within social control theory, which suggests some individuals in a social group
have the ability to control themselves and others with rules and regulations. Early research by
Mead (1925) noted social control depends on the behavior of others and the willingness to work
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together as a society. Later research by Janowitz (1975) and Gibbs (1994) noted that social
control was imperative to have within society in order increase or decrease actions by individuals
deemed desirable/undesirable. However, the previous implementation of social control theory led
to conceptual disconnect between community members and those who enforced social control
(Janowitz, 1975). For instance, considering that many organizations and governing bodies have
differing opinions of what misconduct entails and that definitions of misconduct are not always
clearly articulated, there may be an opportunity for an offender to take advantage of specific
situations through risk-reward analysis or fail to understand how some behaviors are misconduct
(Thorpe, 2011). In addition, failure for the social-control agent to articulate misconduct or
punish effectively could de-legitimize regulatory behavior of the social-control agent itself and
impose significant tangible and intangible consequences for organizations or individuals within
society (i.e., institutional level or general society).
The purpose of the present dissertation is to explore the behavior of social-control agents
not only in defining what action(s) constitute misconduct but also how misconduct is punished
and regulated. To answer this question, the present dissertation explores at the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) as a social-control agent as part of their third-party
regulator function. Palmer (2012) noted the examination of the role of social-control agents is
important to comprehensively understand the causes of organizational wrongdoing. Thus, by
focusing the present dissertation on the social-control agent, one also begins to understand the
causes of organization misconduct.
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is the one of governing bodies that
presides over intercollegiate athletics in the United States. Some of the regulations that the
NCAA oversees include: recruiting, institutional control, eligibility, amateurism, and student-
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athlete compensation (Koch, 1973). Originally, the NCAA was developed in order to promote
safety for college athletics, chiefly football, in the early 1900’s (Koch, 1973). However, vast
literature demonstrated many activities shown by the NCAA serve to maximize profits for the
Association and member institutions (DeSchriver & Stotlar, 1996; Fleisher, Goff, & Tollison,
1992; Kahn, 2007). For instance, Kahn (2007) presented the NCAA as an economic cartel
because the organization attempts to control the inputs (i.e., athletes) that come into
intercollegiate athletics and attempts to maximize profits from the institution. Humphreys (2012)
stated that, in the NCAA, the cartel arrangement is established when the NCAA member
institutions are competing for the commitment of athletes; however, the institutions have not
agreed to compete in regards to the pricing (e.g., scholarship amount).
The NCAA uses mandates to regulate behavior by member institutions and attempt to
create uniformity at all levels (Sawyer, Bodey, & Judge, 2008). Mandates are “the fundamental
policy instrument utilized in the NCAA and determine which of the policy instruments are
permissible” (Clark, 2010, p. 52). The mandates used by the NCAA attempt to create cohesion
with the other rules of the governing organization, which is common from organizations that
function as cartels (Fleisher et al., 1992; Grant, Leadley, & Zygmont, 2008). These mandates
also provide the legitimate authority to the formal social-control agents. In this setting, the
social-control agent is the NCAA, broadly speaking. More specifically within the NCAA
governance, a current social-control agent is the Committee on Infractions (COI).
Dissertation Chapters
This dissertation explores how the social-control agent (NCAA) defines, regulates, and
punishes misconduct by member universities. In order to further understand social-control agents
within a collective, the present dissertation incorporates multiple methods in the form of
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historical, qualitative, and quantitative. Through primary documents provided publicly by the
NCAA and secondary documents through the media and other scholarly works, the present
dissertation is able to better understand the role, functions and behavior of the social-control
agent.
The following is a summary of each of the three research papers that are present within
the dissertation to fulfill the dissertation requirements of the Graduate Faculty. Using historical
methods, Chapter 2 analyzes how multiple organizational layers emerged from misconduct
occurring within various eras of Presidents/Executive Directors of the NCAA from the 1953 to
2016. Chapter 2 also investigates the type of infractions committed by NCAA member
institutions and the resulting sanctions distributed to violators as a result. Chapter 3 compared the
framing strategies implemented by the NCAA administration and media outlets regarding
Division-I major infraction cases using qualitative comparative framing analysis. Using
statistical techniques, Chapter 4 examines the likelihood of the social-control agent punishments
controlling for a number of factors related to the specific misconduct, organization
characteristics, prior behavior of the social-control agent, and role of the informal social-control
agent. Those three chapters build on the literature of social control that can be used for future
research. Chapter 5 presents a summary of the results of the three chapters, the working theory of
social control, and the role of social-control agents, which can be expanded in the future by
researchers examining the role of governing bodies within the community.
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CHAPTER 2.

A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF NCAA ENFORCEMENT
Introduction
Misconduct is defined as “behavior in or by an organization that a social-control agent
judges to transgress a line separating right from wrong” (Greve, Palmer, & Pozner, 2010, p. 56).
When misconduct occurs, the resulting sanctions (e.g., fines, suspension, expulsion, probation,
and public reprimand) from social-control agents set the foundation of how that specific act of
wrongdoing will be subsequently assessed and enforced. Social-control agents are groups that
hold the responsibility of labeling behaviors as misconduct and disciplining those in a population
or institutional field who participate in wrongdoing (Greve et al., 2010; Palmer & Yankey,
2015). Pollock, Mishina, and Seo (2016) suggested social-control agents “include various entities
that differ in the formality of their constitutions, the breadth of their jurisdiction, and the severity
of the punishments” (p. 240). McCarthy, McPhail, and Crist (1999) noted “[s]ocial control
agents, whether civilian, military, or parliamentary, are by definition responsible for maintaining
the status quo social order in general, and the public order in particular” (p. 71).
Studies on social-control agents primarily examined the relationship between informal
and formal agents (Martin, Wright & Steiner, 2016) and their culture and community stereotypes
(Mears, Stewart, Warren, & Simons, 2017). Little attention has been formally paid to socialcontrol agents as a central feature of organizational misconduct (Greve et al., 2010; Greve &
Teh, 2016; Palmer & Yankey, 2015). Further, minimal consideration has been given to the
organizational layering that social-control agents create as a third-party regulator to address
wrongdoing (Carter, 2016). A third-party regulator is a group that supervises and assesses
relationships and/or behaviors with external parties they enjoy a contractual or non-contractual
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relationship with to understand risk to the greater group and individual members (Carter, 2016).
The present study focuses on the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and
cases of organizational misconduct from 1953 to 2016 as a theoretical sample to examine
evidence of organizational layering created by social-control agents (i.e., third-party regulator).
The NCAA, like other intercollegiate governing bodies (e.g., National Association of
Intercollegiate Athletics- NAIA and National Junior College Athletic Association- NJCAA)
establishes and enforces rules and regulations for member institutions “to ensure that athletics
are part of the educational process and to retain a clear line of demarcation between
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports” (Weston, 2011, p. 559). Occurrences of
wrongdoing (e.g., illegal recruiting and academic fraud) and the possible impact such
misconduct can impose on an organization in the NCAA (e.g., decreased brand image and
reputation) are often publicly documented (Davis & Hairston, 2013; Ribock, 2011-2012;
Weston, 2011). Furthermore, the process of disciplining athletic departments is often
characterized as a complex procedure or process (Davis & Hairston, 2013; Ribock, 2011-2012).
Yet, the aforementioned scholarly works and those offered by others (e.g., Smith & Cho, 2017;
Winfree & McCluskey, 2008) do not empirically connect the impact of wrongdoing to structure.
In this point, the NCAA has regularly reevaluated and adjusted its enforcement standards
and procedures to respond to the dynamic landscape of its growing membership’s preferences
(Davis & Hairston, 2013; Weston, 2011). Through its evolution, the NCAA created committees
of individuals and layers of enforcement charged with creating rules and investigating, assessing,
and punishing members who violate policies developed by the association. Within, it is also
likely that individual social-control agents (e.g., Committee Chairs and Directors) used their
position of authority to communicate their vision of wrongdoing to determine, impose, and
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enforce punishments. Further, they may have been provided that office to achieve such a
mission. Overall, the possibility of layering and individual influence of social-control agent
should be studied, which the present research does by asking:
1. Does organizational misconduct lead to future changes by a third-party regulator
with respect to changes in policy and personnel?
2. What impact does an individual social-control agent have on future organizational
policies and member behavior?
3. How do member organizations behave with respect to changes made by third-party
regulators? Are instances of organizational misconduct deterred by sanctions in the
future?
The present study offers the following contributions. First, literature on social-control
agents is advanced from the focus on organizational layering that may take place when socialcontrol agents try to establish, evaluate, and enforce rules influenced by wrongdoing. Within, the
present research features the emergent layering under each executive director/president of the
NCAA and explores their impact on wrongdoing. Second, the present study employs applied
history as a unique research approach because “it generates debate and additional discussion
about the prospects of knowledge or theory building” (Seifried, Katz, & Tutka, 2017, p. 4).
Applied history encompasses research on events, identification of patterns or trends, and
tries to appreciate how circumstances or environments of the past can assist practitioners and
scholars of the present to be more efficient and productive with their practical and conceptual
work (Brophy, 2013; Neustadt & May, 1986; Tosh, 2006; Wood, 2008). Trend assessment,
particularly when conditions are similar, may offer the chance for practitioners and scholars to
defend, validate, or ignore a specific decision or course of action in the present (Brophy, 2013;
Neustadt & May, 1986; Tosh, 2006). Overall, the rich and diverse sources made available by or
on the NCAA helps evade narrow points of view regarding the role of social-control agents in
organizational misconduct and recognizes the likelihood of layering as an entity grows in size.
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Theoretical Framework
This study utilizes the theoretical construct of social control in order to comprehend the
following of norms, rules, and legislation set by social-control agents. Gibbs (1994) and Deflam
(2015) defined social control as an individual’s informal or formal power over another person or
group to increase or decrease more or less desirable behaviors. Elsewhere, Goode (2015)
similarly positioned social control as the effort by leaders to ensure conformity to the norms.
Informal social control includes internal self-discipline and external smiles, ridicule, sarcasm,
and disapproval displayed by individuals and groups within a community to promote conformity
to norms and laws or to communicate disapproval (Hollinger & Clark, 2005). Formal social
controls emerge when informal social controls are not adequate to assure conforming to the
society’s norms. In this case, social-control agents or third-party regulators emerge to enforce
formally established rules and regulations of a society (Hollinger & Clark, 2005).
Goode (2015) suggested social-control agents are necessary because society is not selfregulating; thus, governing bodies and enforcement groups exist as formal social-control agents
to ensure that members of society avoid wrongdoing. Other study on social-control agents
presented them as capable of imposing sanctions on a “collectivity’s behalf” for wrongdoing
(Greve et al., 2010, p. 56). As an example, Greve et al. (2010) submitted several examples of
third-party regulators such as: international governing bodies (e.g., International Olympic
Committee), national governing bodies (e.g., United States Olympic Committee), local
governing bodies (e.g., Louisiana High School Athletic Association), and professional
associations (e.g., American Football Coaches Association) charged with this responsibility.
The discussion of social-control agents at the organizational-level is critical in analyzing
misconduct to determine who should be held accountable for wrongdoing and how the
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assessment process or sanctioning should be defined (Greve et al, 2010; Palmer, 2012). Similar
to previous literature, the present study assumes that enforcement decisions, concerning
misconduct, are decided by social-control agents (Greve et al., 2010; Palmer, 2012). However,
the literature on social control presents notable contrasts on this point. For instance, individual
social-control agents may offer a sole definition of wrongdoing for a membership or society;
thus, the exactness of wrongdoing may be an expression of leader opinions and can change
quickly. Next, social-control agents may be just as “responsible for creating wrongdoing as are
the perpetrators of wrongdoing, albeit in a fundamentally different way than the perpetrators of
wrongdoing create wrongdoing” (Palmer, 2012, p. 33). Within this point, the present research
contends that the current management literature (e.g., Greve et al., 2010; Palmer, 2012) neglects
to acknowledge the various layers of social control created for the assessing and enforcing of
wrongdoing and whether they frame later behavior (i.e., type of wrongdoing and frequency).
Organizational Structuring
The present study assumes that determining the severity of the violations and distribution
of potential sanctions depends greatly on the organizational structure and the quality of the
communication process. Carpenter and Sanders (2009) defined organizational structure as “the
relatively stable arrangement and division of responsibilities, tasks, and people within an
organization” (p. 367). Within this point, Carpenter and Sanders argued for the possibility of
wrongdoing influencing organizational layering by suggesting that organizational structures
involve the use of systems, processes, rewards, punishments, and people as the implementation
and social control arms of organizations to control and/or manage behavior. O’Brien and
Gowthrop (2016) similarly speculated organizational layering occurs because organizational
structure has two specific purposes: “1) facilitating control; and 2) enabling the coordination of
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information, decisions and activities of organizational members at all hierarchical levels” (p. 39).
Organizational layering is constructed through the synergy of complexity, formalization,
and centralization (Slack & Parent, 2006). Complexity focuses on how organizations are
separated into various departments. The notion of complexity can be presented through three
paths. First, horizontal differentiation can influence complexity through the creation and
maintenance of functionally separate and specialized departments that operate with their own
goals or responsibilities. Regarding specialization, O’Brien and Gowthrop (2016) argued the
development and/or growth of unique departments will likely involve increasingly complex
communication and coordination efforts. Second, vertical differentiation defines the number of
subsystems (e.g., institutional, managerial, and technical) an organization supports to manage
behaviors and business activities (Slack & Parent, 2006). Vertical differentiation is frequently
related to horizontal differentiation in that as one grows so does the other (Slack & Parent, 2006).
Institutional subsystems establish the mission, goals, and objectives of the organization,
which in turn provides the opportunity for them to hire and assess managers (Chelladurai, 2014).
Managerial subsystems implement and supervise the agenda of the institutional leaders through
enforcement and creating the technical subsystem (Chelladurai, 2014). The technical subsystem
reflects the services and products (e.g., rules and regulations) associated with the nature of the
sport organization (Chelladurai, 2014). Finally, spatial differentiation can be calculated by
measuring the power gap between various vertical levels and horizontal subunits (Slack &
Parent, 2006). Spatial differentiation may also refer to actual geographic distance between
organizational members and offices supported by various vertical and horizontal groups. With
over 1,100 members across three divisions, the NCAA is high-spatially differentiated and thus
potentially complex to manage. Further, increased horizontal and vertical task differentiation
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may create different expectations with respect to power, communication, and coordination.
Formalization builds upon complexity and involves the creation of rules and regulations
to create a “formalized workplace” so that individual power does not ascend in importance over
the collective group and that product and service expectations can be viewed similarly by
internal and external stakeholders (O’Brien & Gowthrop, 2016, p. 42). Amis and Slack (1996)
and Slack and Parent (2006) specifically described formalization as involving the establishment
of behavioral expectations for organizational members or employees via written information
(e.g., rules, policies, reports, and regulations) or through reoccurring events that are legitimized,
even wrongdoing, by organizational members. Importantly for the present research, Bradish
(2003) suggested formalization can be measured in some capacity through rules observation (i.e.,
how often rules are broken) and may create additional layers when rules are broken in order to
improve behavior or reduce wrongdoing. Bradish further argued that formalization “is best
prescribed for an organization when there is a need for consistent expectations, to maintain and
monitor employee behavior, and in particular, when employees are less professionalized” (p. 17).
Centralization refers to the decision-making process that takes place within numerous
levels of an organization (O’Brien & Gowthrop, 2016). Implicit in the notion of centralization is
the level of involvement by specific authority figures or the concentration of power (Bradish,
2003; Slack & Parent, 2006). When institutional subsystem is the primary decision-maker in an
organization, for example, the firm is classified as “centralized” and less complex (O’Brien &
Gowthrop, 2016, p. 45). In contrast, a de-centralized organization, featuring task differentiation,
is likely to be more complex because decision-making powers are spread across various levels of
a managerial subsystem (Bradish, 2003; O’Brien & Gowthrop, 2016). A de-centralized type of
structure is typical when the institutional subsystem prefers to focus more on policy development
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and enhancing communication (Slack & Parent, 2006). However, such an approach requires
more formalization and subsequently a larger technical subsystem to make sure subdivisions
communicate effectively and understand each other’s roles (Bradish, 2003).
Punishments
In the development of an organization, the synergy of complexity, formalization, and
centralization creates the need for stability and to address potential wrongdoing that is not
representative of the firm (O’Brien & Gowthrop, 2016). Organizational research on the NCAA
reviewed various forms of punishment (e.g., fines, probation, and corporate incapacitation) as a
source of stability to determine their effectiveness in reducing the amount of wrongdoing
committed by employees or members (Porto, 2014; Weston, 2011; Winfree & McCluskey,
2008). Further, the threat of punishment, vicarious punishment, and actual punishment has been
studied as possible deterrents (Cullen, Latessa, & Jonson, 2012; Davis & Hairston, 2013).
The usage of fines is common when organizations receive sanctions for participating in
wrongful behavior. Previous research has expressed that fines, though common, are frequently
ineffective in deterring misconduct, particularly when the size of fines tend to be small (Davis &
Hairston, 2013; Trevino & White, n.d.). For fines to be effective, they must match the level of
harm created (Davis & Hairston, 2013; Weston, 2011). Along with fines, the presentation of
wrongful acts to the public is also quite common. Third-party regulators assign fines and
publicize acts of misconduct to potentially embarrass and shame the organization for engaging in
wrongdoing and to deter other organizations from participating in illegal behavior (Cullen, et al.,
2012). Previous study on the financial impact of negative publicity and fining suggests they are
small; however, intangible resources such as prestige, reputation, and morale may be adversely
affected by public notice of wrongdoing (Kihl & Richardson, 2009).
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Probation is also applied by third-party regulators to hold organizations accountable for
their actions. When NCAA organizations receive probation, they lose their autonomy for a
specified period of time under which they must adhere to specific guidelines and/or accept
special conditions to reduce the likelihood of future wrongdoing (Porto, 2014; Trevino & White,
n.d.; Weston, 2011). When organizations are placed under probation, there is an expectation for
the institutional subsystems to review existing rule compliance structures and determine whether
adjustments need to occur so misconduct can be reduced (Porto, 2014). Such activity generally
emerges from consent decrees which request strong oversight by managerial subsystems and the
possible creation of technical subsystems to report progress and contracts fulfilled.
The final type of punishment used by third-party regulators is corporate incapacitation,
which addresses serious or continuous wrongdoing. Corporate incapacitation could involve a ban
or removal of an organization from an association for a certain amount of time with the specific
intention to also diminish their legitimacy and deter wrongdoing by others (Trevino & White,
n.d.). For example, when the NCAA assigned the “death penalty” to Southern Methodist
University’s football program for the 1987 season (NCAA, 1987), the school’s football program
and the league (i.e. Southwest Conference- SWC) experienced irreparable harm. Fines,
probation, and public reprimand given to SMU in 1958, 1965, 1974, 1976, 1981, and 1985 were
not enough to deter continued wrongdoing (e.g., impermissible recruiting violations and
maintenance of a slush fund). During and after the corporate incapacitation, attendance at SWC
football games decreased roughly 50% from the early 1970s, SMU achieved one winning season
over the next 20 years, and the SWC dissolved as a league (Seifried & Tutka, 2016).
Methodology
Many management researchers (e.g., Seifried & Katz, 2015; Seifried, et al., 2017;
Suddaby, Foster, & Mills, 2014) recently argued the interpretation of events, actors, and
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everyday behaviors and individual/leader decision-making within an organization can be
improved through historical study. However, the need to be impartial when evaluating the
influence of events, actors, and behaviors within an organization is critical for historians to
produce legitimate discussion (Rowlinson, Hassard, & Decker, 2014; Seifried, 2010). To address
this concern for objectivism, the present study adhered to the steps of Seifried (2010).
The initial step of this historical research required the gathering of primary and secondary
evidence essential to understanding the time from 1953, the first documented cases of major
violations by NCAA, through 2016. Primary documents assembled from an NCAA archival visit
[e.g., NCAA public use documents (letters, memos, and reports), NCAA Executive Director
reports, and NCAA official meeting minutes regarding infractions enforcement] provide insight
into the role of the NCAA at the organizational-level as a social-control agent and perspective
about the individuals leaders of the NCAA. The NCAA’s own Legislative Services Database
(LSDbi) is another primary source because it contains specific information regarding the major
infractions committed by member institutions. Additional information included the meeting
minutes and memos from Executive Directors and committees regarding decisions on impending
sanctions and appeal letters from institutions. Various NCAA handbooks collected from the
NCAA archives also provided additional and specific details regarding violations. Secondary
sources utilized in this research comprised of an assortment of history books, scholarly peerreviewed journal articles, and newspaper articles from media outlets including The New York
Times, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, Kansas City Star, and
Indianapolis Star. Newspapers and other publications gathered from media sources were utilized
to gain perspective regarding how the media communicated infraction and sanctioning news to
the public (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008).
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Table 1 Sources of Data for the Historical Method
Data Type

Amount and Range

Use in Analysis

Organization Publications
NCAA News

54 Articles: Date Range:
1953-2016
(accessed NCAA News
Archives and online)

Providing factual account (e.g.,
information pertaining to violations and
impending sanctions presented to member
institutions)

Organization Documents
NCAA Proposals

15: Range: 1960-2016
(accessed via NCAA
LSDbi Database)

Providing factual account (e.g., possible
alterations to the current rules and
regulations designated in the NCAA
Handbook)

NCAA Legislations

13: (accessed via NCAA
LSDbi Database)

Providing factual account (e.g., details
regarding past and present regulations
accepted by the NCAA Council.)

NCAA and other
Organization Reports

7: Date Range: 1966-1996
(accessed via NCAA
Archives)

Providing factual account (e.g., Reports
which detail the new strategies
implemented by the NCAA in order to
keep rules updated)

NCAA Public Reports

753: Date Range: 19532016 (accessed via NCAA
LSDbi Database)

Providing factual account (e.g., Specific
details regarding the participation in major
infractions including violation type, date,
and number of occurrences)

Secondary Data
History/Scholarly books

7: Date range 1893-2016

Providing interpretation (e.g., Impact of
Prop 48 on recruiting violations)

Academic articles

63: Date range 1979-2016

Providing interpretation (e.g., Navigating
the bylaw maze in NCAA major
infractions cases).

NCAA Websites

1 (accessed online)

Providing factual account (e.g.,NCAA.org
infraction detail, including incident press
releases)

Newspaper Articles (e.g.,
The New York Times,
Washington Post, and Los
Angeles Times)

34 articles/6 different
newspapers (accessed
online)

Providing interpretation (e.g., infraction
perspective)

Primary Data

For example, analysis of how an institution committed acts of misconduct could differ
between local newspapers and the publications administered from the NCAA, such as the NCAA
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News and general public reports. The most outstanding works of historical study incorporate a
variety of primary documents and secondary sources because collectively they offer context that
is important to understand how decisions were made by organizations and individuals (Kippling,
Wadwani, & Bucheli, 2014; Seifried, 2010). The present study recognized both primary and
secondary sources are not immune from bias; however, when combined, they impart descriptions
historians argue are data (Seifried, 2010).
In the second step of the historical research method, researchers test the authenticity of
the sources used and analyze the observations through conducting a source or historical criticism
(Seifried, 2010). Through testing the authenticity of the sources, the second step of the historical
method allows for the researcher to reach precise conclusions regarding their findings (Booth,
2005; Seifried, 2010). Criticizing resources internally and externally allows for the validity of
sources to be determined, which also helps to eliminate selection bias or partiality towards a
particular point-of-view (Rowlinson et al., 2014; Seifried, 2010).
Internally, key points of analysis involve examining documents for the intended audience
and whether or not the author was an expert (Golder, 2000; Seifried, 2010). External validation
of the sources requires historical researchers to ensure each obtained resource was not falsified
(Seifried, 2010). For example, questions asked in this part of the process sought to determine the
authorship of the document, the relationship of the author to the data, and the methodology used
to collect data (Golder, 2000; Seifried, 2010). Routine examinations for dependability also
transpired through chronologically listing the dates of events and taking note of the arrangement
of events detailed in memos, public reports, spreadsheets, letters, and meeting minutes (Booth,
2005; Seifried, 2010). For the documents to be considered reliable, certain components of each
document were investigated, such as the time span between events, and eliminated if there were
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any bias due to social, economic, religious, and/or political settings (Seifried, 2010).
The third step of this historical research involved the analysis and interpretation of the
collected data as a means to establish a relationship between wrongdoing and social control
themes. The goal of this step is the prevention of an inadequate inquiry through the classification
and triangulation of data (Seifried, 2010). To assure the data is properly classified, a detailed
timeline and spreadsheet was created to organize, compare, and contrast the linked themes that
surfaced from the document analysis to produce an authentic and detailed narrative (Rowlinson
et al., 2014; Seifried, 2010). The development of the timeline and spreadsheet was essential to
compare details provided from NCAA sources to media reports. To conclude, the use of
triangulation assisted with the overall organization of the data (Booth, 2005; Seifried, 2010).
Examples of data collected from the LSDbi database include the subdivision (i.e.,
Division I, II, III), type of penalty received (e.g., television and postseason ban, probation,
reduction in financial aid, recruiting limitations, show cause action, and vacation of record), type
of sports, and rule violation broken (e.g., Improper Administration of Financial Aid, Unethical
Conduct, etc.). Additional information from the LSDbi database and other sources include: the
institution name, the dates of the penalty, whether the institution received a public reprimand,
number of years of probation and/or a postseason ban, number of years with a television ban, and
amount fined.
Results
The present research determined there were five eras of the executive directors/presidents
overseeing 783 major infractions committed from 1953 through 2016 and acknowledges the
impact of new leader agendas and increasing complexity (i.e., vertical, horizontal, and spatial
differentiation), formalization, and de-centralization as the NCAA membership grew. Since the
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redevelopment of the enforcement structure in 1948, there have been 11 different committees or
groups created to develop and assess rules and enforce policies of the NCAA (e.g.,
Constitutional Compliance Committee, Membership Committee, Committee of Infractions, and
Enforcement Working Group). Next, it should be noted that there were 11.75 major infractions
per year across several areas such as: extra benefits (270 cases), improper financial aid (221
cases), improper recruiting inducements (212 cases), unethical conduct (151 cases), and
institutional control (141 cases). Administered sanctions typically involved a reduction in
financial aid (291 cases), two-year probation (267 cases), show cause penalties (240 cases),
recruiting limitations (229 cases), one-year postseason bans (203 cases), one-year probation (196
cases), and three-year probation (130 cases) (Table 2). The distribution of violations by
classification included 618 violations for Division-I, 102 for Division-II, and 63 for Division-III.
Lastly, the top five sports with cases of major infractions include men’s basketball (368 cases),
football (349 cases), women’s basketball (91 cases), outdoor men’s track (69 cases), and indoor
men’s track (68).

19

Table 2 Timeline of NCAA Executive Directors Table
NCAA
President
(years
serving)
Walter Byers
(1951 – 1988)

# of
infraction
cases (per
year)
355 (9.4)

# of violations

# of punishments

Enforcement Committees
Created

Strength of Complexity, Formalization, and
Centralization

Imp. Rec. Ind. – 150 Cases
Imp. Rec. Tran. – 143
Cases
Imp. Fin. Aid. – 134 Cases
Imp. Rec. Ent. – 109 Cases
Ex. Benefits – 100 Cases

One-Yr Prob – 146 Cases
One-Yr Post – 111 Cases
Two-Yr Prob – 96 Cases
Two-Yr Post – 63 Cases
Red. Fin. Aid – 59 Cases

Constitutional Compliance;
Membership Committee;
Subcommittee of
Infractions;
Committee of Infractions;
Special Committee on
Enforcement and
Reorganization

Complexity: Vertical (Strong), Horizontal
(Emergent and Developing), Spatial
(Prominent)
Formalization: High
Centralization: High centralized executive
power but gradual de-centralization of
enforcement through committee

Dick Schultz
(1989 - 1993)

63 (13.0)

Ex. Benefits – 39 Cases
Instit. Cont. – 36 Cases
Imp. Rec. Tran. – 31 Cases
Imp. Rec. Ind. – 28 Cases
Imp. Transport. – 27 Cases

Show Cause – 44 Cases
Red. Fin. Aid – 41 Cases
Recruiting – 32 Cases
Two-Yr Prob – 30 Cases
One-Yr Post – 27 Cases

Presidents Commission

Cedric
Dempsey
(1994 – 2002)

108 (10.7)

Uneth. Cond. – 67 Cases
Instit. Cont. – 63 Cases
Ex. Benefits – 59 Cases
Imp. Fin. Aid. – 37 Cases
Acad. Inelig. – 34 Cases

Red. Fin. Aid – 80 Cases
Recruiting – 68 Cases
Show Cause – 59 Cases
Two-Yr Prob – 40 Cases
One-Yr Post – 28 Cases

Special Committee on
NCAA Enforcement and
Infraction Process; Special
Committee on Academic
Standards;

Myles Brand
(2003 - 2010)

139 (18.1)

119 (19.8)

Red. Fin. Aid – 68 Cases
Show Cause - 64 Cases
Two-Yr Prob – 58 Cases
Recruiting – 49 Cases
Three-Yr Prob – 40 Cases
Show Cause – 40 Cases
Red. Fin. Aid – 31 Cases
Two-Yr Prob.- 28 Cases
Recruiting – 27 Cases
Three-Yr Prob – 18 Cases

Division I Committee on
Academic Performance

Mark Emmert
(2011 – 2016)

Uneth. Cond. – 62 Cases
Ex. Benefits – 54 Cases
Instit. Cont. – 42 Cases
Imp. Fin. Aid. – 38 Cases
Eligibility – 29 Cases
Uneth. Cond. – 22 Cases
Ex. Benefits – 18 Cases
Imp. Fin. Aid – 12 Cases
Eligibility – 11 Cases
Imp. Rec. Con. – 11 Cases

Complexity: Vertical (Transparent),
Horizontal (Limited), Spatial (Present)
Formalization: Low
Centralization: Medium centralized
executive power and maintain status quo on
committee decentralization
Complexity: Vertical (Transparent),
Horizontal (Specialized), Spatial (Present)
Formalization: High
Centralization: Medium centralized
executive power and temporary
decentralization
Complexity: Vertical (Culture Changing)
Horizontal (Focused), Spatial (Present)
Formalization: Medium
Centralization: High centralized executive
power and limited de-centralization
Complexity: Vertical (Broad Reaching)
Horizontal (Revisionary), Spatial (Present)
Formalization: Medium
Centralization: Medium centralized
executive power and high decentralization
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Rules Working Group;
Enforcement Working
Group

NCAA Wrongdoing and Sanctioning Background
Shortly after the institutional subsystem of the NCAA was established in 1906, the 38
member institutions agreed to police themselves for wrongdoing under what was called the
‘home rule’ (“Chronology…”. 2013). In this system, there was little formalization but significant
corruption (e.g., Savage, 1933, Savage, Bentley, McGovern, & Smiley 1933) in the absence of a
managerial and well-defined technical subsystem; thus, a substantial lack of trust between
members of the NCAA emerged because of its incapacity to police members and enforce rules
(“On Influences,” 1936). As an example, in 1937, Gallico provided a contemptuous opinion on
the nearly 200 members that made up the NCAA with a special emphasis on football “as the
leader in the field of double-dealing, deception, sham, cant and organized hypocrisy” (p. 208).
Specifically, Gallico argued football degenerated into “the biggest and dirtiest sports racket the
country has ever known …” and characterized college athletics’ amateur status as a joke (p. 11).
In 1940, the NCAA’s Executive Committee (i.e., pre-existing managerial subsystem) was
given powers to investigate after data from a survey of university presidents suggested violations
were rampant despite claims their own institutions were clean. One Executive Committee
member said, “We are now confronted with the problem as to whether the college presidents
have been fooled by the conditions of their own institutions or whether [they] intend that the
code should be interpreted differently than most of us understand it …” (“Problems in
Connection,” 1940, p. 128-129). The power to enforce was still missing by the mid-1940s and
gambling surfaced as a major concern with a membership (n=216) despite the fact that the
NCAA half-heartedly condemned the activity in 1945. Suggesting it was more of media’s fault
than any structural or integrity issue, the Association created a proclamation that suggested
member schools ought only to: 1) bar gamblers from contests; 2) discontinue the issuance of
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prediction charts; and 3) stop the publication of odds by newspapers (Williams, 2014).
Soon after the 1945 proclamation, five student-athletes from Brooklyn College were
found to have accepted approximately $1,000 from New York City bookies to suggest the
NCAA needed a new approach to enforcement (Williams, 2014). A renowned basketball coach
at the University of Kansas, Dr. Phog Allen, previously suggested such an episode was likely and
that the NCAA needed to address the issue when he stated that it was his:
“desire is to awaken the college presidents of America to their responsibility in
providing a source of power in fighting these professional gambling
rodents…Only the college presidents can stop it by appointing an absolute czar
such as baseball has in Judge [Kenesaw] Landis” (“Allen Furnishes Data,” 1944:
para. 5-6).
Further, Dr. Allen blamed athletic directors, coaches, and faculty representatives for failing to
protect intercollegiate athletics (“No News to Allen,” 1945). Specifically, Allen stated:
“Intelligent people have known all along that big-time gamblers were getting to
college basketball players in the East. Instead of facing the facts and acting, our
national athletic bodies, to save face, have been meeting and denying that these
conditions exist when every well-informed person knew better” (“No News to
Allen,” 1945: para. 3).
In 1946, the Big Ten, Pacific Coast, Southwest, and Southeastern Conference met to
discuss how to become more compliant with the standards set by the NCAA and to address the
gambling problem (Salaga, 2015; Smith, 1987, 2000). At the subsequent 1946 Special
Convention, the NCAA created the Constitutional Compliance Committee to interpret rules and
the Fact-Finding Committee (FFC) to investigate possible violations as the first managerial
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subsystems to address wrongdoing. The NCAA also approved the Principles of Conduct of
Intercollegiate Athletics (i.e., Sanity Code) as a technical subsystem. The Sanity Code included
six principles focused on sound academic standards, amateurism, institutional control and
responsibility, governing financial aids to athletes, recruiting, and implementation (Edleman,
2014). The Sanity Code was regulated strictly between 1948 and 1950 as several institutions
(e.g., Boston College, Citadel, Maryland, Villanova, Virginia, Virginia Tech, and VMI) were
found in violation of the code. In the case of seven aforementioned schools, a majority vote of
from the growing association (n=387) members favored expelling them but the vote fell short
(“NCAA told,” 1950). Collectively, these problems pressured the NCAA to designate a leader or
add another horizontal segment to the institutional subsystem that could represent the
organization and keep group members from corporate dissolution (Byers & Hammer, 1995).
Walter Byers (1951 – 1988)
In 1951, the NCAA appointed a sports reporter Walter Byers, formally of United Press
International, as its first Executive Director following the positive recognition their competitor
received from the media (i.e., NAIA’s ability to manage the gambling problem) after hiring their
own czar in 1945 (Williams, 2014). As NCAA Executive Director, Byers was responsible for
keeping intercollegiate athletics fair and helping to generate revenue for a growing membership
of 415 schools (Byers & Hammer, 1995). Under Byers, the Sanity Code was lifted because “the
only form of punishment available to the Compliance Committee was the termination of the
violator’s NCAA membership [corporate dissolution]. [The] NCAA members deemed this
punishment too draconian and stripped the Compliance Committee of its punitive role in 1951”
(Depken & Wilson, 2006, p. 828). Byers won the job because he was focused on eliminating
illegal recruiting and gambling by student-athletes and did not view all wrongdoing as the same.
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Byers assessed some wrongdoing was worse than others but emphasized that recruiting was the
“Achilles heel” of intercollegiate sport (Byers & Hammer, 1995). Specifically, Byers added that
changes needed to be made in order “to enlist the support of true lovers of wholesome college
athletics … to reduce undesirable recruiting” (Crowley, 2006, p. 36). Evidence found in the
present research supports Byers’ focus as three of the top five violations in the Byers era
involved recruiting (e.g., improper recruiting inducements [150 cases], improper recruiting
transportation [143 cases]; improper recruiting entertainment [109 cases]).
Interestingly, Byers held the position of Executive Director for nineteen days before
facing a situation that would test the NCAA’s adjustments to improve member behavior. Some
players on the University of Kentucky men’s basketball team took part in a point-fixing scandal
and received illegal cash payments with the knowledge of the head coach (NCAA, 1953). The
NCAA presented the infractions case against the University of Kentucky (LSDbi case no. 1) to a
newly organized Membership Committee and Subcommittee on Infractions (Byers & Hammer,
1995). The Membership Committee operated as a managerial subsystem that would complete
preliminary examinations regarding accusations of violations by other member institutions. The
Subcommittee of Infractions similarly functioned to investigate allegations and presented a final
report to the NCAA. Regarding Kentucky, the Subcommittee of Infractions found three players
participated in point shaving, leading to a corporate dissolution penalty for the 1952-1953
basketball season (Byers & Hammer, 1995; NCAA, 1953).
In addition to the major infractions committed by the University of Kentucky, several
other member institutions were also charged and assessed sanctions in the 1950’s. For instance,
infractions committed by Arizona State University (e.g., football- improper financial aid,
recruiting transportation, tryouts, and use of outside funds), University of Notre Dame (e.g.,
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football and basketball- improper tryouts), Michigan State University (e.g., basketball- improper
financial aid, tryouts, and use of outside funds), and Bradley University (e.g., basketballimproper financial aid and ineligible athletes) in 1953 all prompted the NCAA to reform the
committees used to research violations and penalty aftermath (Byers & Hammer, 1995).
Byers implemented changes to the technical subsystem to make sure the institutions were
held accountable for specific actions based on the level of perceived wrongdoing (Byers &
Hammer, 1995). As an example, during the 1953 Convention, the NCAA Council and Byers
utilized formalization to classify misconduct as either major or secondary in the search for
fairness (Crowley, 2006). The NCAA classified major violations as those that provide “an
extensive recruiting or competitive advantage” (NCAA, 2015, n.p.). Secondary violations were
defined as violations that “isolated or inadvertent in nature, provides or is intended to provide
only a minimal recruiting, competitive, or other advantage and does not include any significant
impermissible benefit” (NCAA, 2015, n.p.). As a result of several infractions (i.e., improper
tryouts, recruiting transportations, illegal usage of funds, and participation in uncertified
postseason contests) committed by member schools (e.g., Seton Hall University, North Carolina
State University, Western Illinois University, University of Miami-Florida, University of
Portland, and Kansas State University), the NCAA Council and Byers organized the Committee
of Infractions (COI) in 1954. Representing the centralization of previous responsibilities held by
the Membership Committee and Subcommittee on Infractions, the COI serves presently as the
“investigative and fact-finding body” that tracks and categorizes wrongdoing and “reports its
findings to the NCAA, for action, including the imposition of penalties” (Wong, Skillman, &
Deubert, 2009, p.4).
One of the early outcomes emanating from the COI to the NCAA Council and Byers
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involved the formalization of show cause penalties in 1956 as part of the technical subsystem to
curtail future misconduct by the 506 member schools (NCAA, 2013b; Parkinson, 2012). Show
cause requires “any NCAA member institution that employs a coach subject to a show cause
penalty to appear before the committee to ‘show cause’ why that institution should not be
penalized if it does not take appropriate disciplinary or corrective action against the coach”
(NCAA Manual, 2016; Parkinson, 2012, p. 217). Show cause penalties are administered to
coaches that commit infractions in areas such as recruiting and impermissible benefits and
frequently given to repeat offenders (NCAA Manual, 2016). The creation of show cause placed
more responsibility on leaders within the athletic department, but also imposed more ownership
on university administrators to assure there are quality individuals at the institution.
Even though the NCAA received positive acknowledgment from member institutions
regarding the association's role as a third-party regulator, some of the member institutions
considered the centralized enforcement structure used by the COI as unfair and inconsistent
(Wong et al., 2009). The number of violations and penalties (e.g., probation, postseason ban, and
reduced financial aid) continued to grow between 1956 through 1971, as there were 121 different
major infractions, primarily committed by Division I (n=101) and within football (n=76) or
men’s basketball (n=50). To appease the growing number of members (n=757) and review the
methods used in enforcement, the NCAA Council appointed a new special committee in 1971
focused on the enforcement and reorganization of the association (Wong et al., 2009). In 1973,
the special committee reviewed claims by members that the COI and the NCAA’s in-house staff
were too interconnected and that an inadequate due process structure was responsible for the
high “conviction” rate (Porto, 2012, p. 100). Regarding the relationship between the enforcement
staff and the COI, Yeager (1991) reported one member stating,
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“The same people [who] investigate cases serve as staff support for the committee
that must eventually rule on the quality and outcome of those investigations. It’s
as if the police officer [who] arrested you also clerked for the judge [who] tried
you.” (p. 131)
The special committee ultimately recommended alterations to the enforcement division,
including the COI (“First Special Convention”, 1973). The revisions included: (1) changing the
method of assessing penalties by solely permitting the COI to evaluate violations and determine
resulting sanctions; (2) limiting the NCAA Council’s involvement to the appeal process; and (3)
requiring the COI to assure that members of the staff are following all of the proper rules and
regulations when completing investigations (“First Special Convention”, 1973). The NCAA
suggested their investigative process would follow a de-centralized “cooperative principle”whereby the NCAA expected the enforcement staff and the accused institution would work
together to determine whether the latter had indeed violated one or more Association rules
(Porto, 2014, p. 1063).
Some schools like the University of Minnesota, in 1976, surfaced as early self-reporters
and self-imposed penalties to reduce the amount of negative public perception and to lighten the
possible punishment through such cooperation (Winfree & McCluskey, 2008). However,
University of Denver Faculty Athletic Representative Burton Brody testified to a congressional
subcommittee reviewing the NCAA’s enforcement process that the assumption of de-centralized
cooperation was incorrect because only NCAA staff members were involved as witnesses and
typically they disregarded school sanction recommendations (Enforcement, 1978). Data from
Winfree and McCluskey (2008) showed support for this point as they found self-imposed
sanctions were accepted only 6% of the time by the NCAA.
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In 1979, the NCAA membership count grew to 861 which compelled increased
complexity through the provision of opportunities for the accused to “be represented by counsel
at hearings before the COI, establish evidentiary standards for those hearings, and set a time limit
for reviewing alleged violations (i.e., a statute of limitations)” (Porto, 2012, p. 109). While an
improvement, Byers continued to reject calls for fairer enforcement with respect to due process
and association-led entanglement. Such comportment against de-centralization led to criticism by
journalists and academics throughout the remainder of Byers’ tenure that college athletics was
out of control and the level of formalization was not sufficient but that complexity, interestingly,
may have led to a decreased adherence to the rules (Porto, 2014; Yeager, 1991). For example,
over Byers’ last ten years (1979 – 1988), there were 141 major violation cases involving NCAA
member institutions, which represented 40% of the total number of cases under Walter Byers.
Dick Schultz (1989 – 1993)
When Dick Schultz stepped into the role of NCAA Executive Director, he acknowledged
there was much to be done regarding enforcement and that the process would be on-going
(Crowley, 2006). Schultz noted that mutual trust between the NCAA and all of the 1,017
member institutions needed to improve (Moran, 1993). Crowe (1989) highlighted that Schultz, in
contrast to his predecessor, wanted more transparency for the organization. Schultz, a former
baseball and basketball coach (Iowa) and athletic director (Cornell 1976-1981 and Virginia
(1981-1987) suggested, “One of the complaints throughout the years has been (about) selective
enforcement. I personally don't think that's happened, but that's been the perception. There isn't
anybody that can say that now--not with some of the penalties that have been handed down
lately, and to whom” (p. 3). For example in 1990, both the University of Missouri-Columbia
(Division-I; LSDbi case no. 383) and Plattsburgh State University of New York (Division-III;
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LSDbi case no. 373) were found in violation of extra benefits, improper aid and lack of
institutional control infractions. Plattsburgh State received a one-year postseason ban, along with
two years of probation, and a recruiting restriction. Missouri-Columbia received the same
sanctions, as well as, a reduction in financial aid because this was their third major violation.
Schultz also wanted “more flexibility in the way we [NCAA] administer our rules,
especially as they deal with the student-athletes. I think too many times…there are
individuals[academically] that fall through the cracks” (Crowe, 1989, p. 2). Prior to the
beginning of Schultz’ tenure, the Presidents Commission was established in 1984 with an
immediate focus on assessing the current state of academic eligibility standards (Mondello &
Abernathy, 2000). The Commission ultimately created a product as part of the technical
subsystem called Proposition 48, which required a high school student-athlete to pass a set of
core courses with a minimum 2.00 grade point average (GPA) and a 700-point combined verbal
and math score on the Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) or a 15-composite score on the
American College Test (ACT; Mondello & Abernathy, 2000). If a prospective student-athlete did
not meet the requirements, he/she was still able to receive a financial aid package but would be
considered academically ineligible for one year (Mondello & Abernathy, 2000).
The creation of Prop 48 emanated out of perspectives that positioned the search for
student-athletes as equivalent to a ‘gun’ for hire. For instance, some prominent cases in the
NCAA (e.g., LSDbi case no. 363, 1989) involved student-athletes claiming educational
malpractice, negligent admission/hiring, and fraud among other items. Expectedly, Schultz
personal interest in academic integrity oversaw more cases (n=18) of violations involving
academic fraud and academic ineligibility (n= 4.5 cases per year) than his predecessor (n=.68
cases per year). For example, in 1989, the University of Kentucky (LSDbi case no. 362) was
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found to have committed academic fraud regarding a male basketball student-athlete (NCAA,
1989). In that case, the student-athlete was deemed eligible by the University and competed for a
season before an investigation into the validity of his SAT scores occurred (NCAA, 1989).
Rather than assess whether his test scores were genuine and classify the student-athlete as a
partial qualifier, Kentucky categorized the student-athlete as fully eligible and was found having
a lack of institutional control with respect to maintaining academic integrity (NCAA, 1989).
As Schultz transitioned into the Executive Director role, Prop 48 sparked outrage from
many institutions and outside organizations, such as the National Association for Equal
Opportunity (NAFEO) that represented many Historically Black Colleges and Universities
(HBCU) (Crowley, 2006). The NAFEO believed that the proposition and the reliance on test
scores would set African-American and other minority students at a disadvantage to earn a
college education (Crowley, 2006). Luna Mishoe, former University President at Delaware State,
expressed that “the SAT is a restraint that penalizes low-income students and does not indicate
whether a student can perform college work” (Crowley, 2006, p. 65). Schultz dealt with Prop 48
through passive avoidance because he supported it as necessary to enhance the student-athlete’s
readiness and overall academic experience once on-campus (Pentimone, 1997).
As the social-control agent, the NCAA implemented several other technical subsystem
modifications to keep members satisfied. The infractions case and sanctions administered to the
University of Nevada at Las Vegas (UNLV) in 1993 is one of the most researched enforcement
cases in intercollegiate athletics history illustrating such modification (Crowley, 2006). The case
involved former UNLV Men’s basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian and violations including
impermissible recruiting inducements, improper contacts, extra benefits, and a lack of
institutional control under Walter Byers administration (NCAA, 1993). Prior to arriving at
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UNLV, Tarkanian was a head coach at California State University at Long Beach (LBSU) in
1968. Tarkanian assisted in establishing LBSU as a successful basketball program but he left
LBSU to deal with the twenty-three violations presented by COI, which included a television ban
and a postseason ban for the 1974 NCAA basketball tournament (NCAA, 1974).
The prior violations committed under Tarkanian’s at LBSU increased the need of the
NCAA to be vigilant in observing the recruits, players, and coaches affiliated with his teams.
Interestingly, UNLV was also under investigation by the NCAA when they hired Tarkanian and
three years after starting new job, UNLV was found in violation of thirty-eight regulations which
included wrongdoing like: improper entertainment, financial aid, lodging, transportation, and
benefits, illegal tryouts, excessive number of official visits, and academic fraud among others
(NCAA, 1977). The majority of the violations were committed under the previous coach, but
notably there were ten violations specified as occurring under Coach Tarkanian (NCAA, 1977).
UNLV and Coach Tarkanian disputed the findings and appealed to the NCAA Council to
conduct additional analysis on the case, which took several years and carried over into Schultz’
tenure. UNLV and Tarkanian claimed the NCAA enjoyed too much of a procedural advantage:
“it [NCAA] controlled the flow of information during the enforcement process.
Tarkanian did not know what evidence the NCAA staff would present against
him, and much of that evidence was the investigators’ recollections, from
handwritten notes, of their interviews with witnesses. Tarkanian did not have
access to those notes.” (Porto, 212, p. 161)
The Council surveyed the findings and examined the appeal, yet supported the decision
of the Infractions Committee (Green, 1992). The sanctions received by UNLV basketball
included a two-year probation and the suspension of Coach Tarkanian. UNLV followed the
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directions of the NCAA Council, but Tarkanian responded with a lawsuit against UNLV and the
NCAA claiming that he was denied due process (Green, 1992). The case reached the United
States Supreme Court, which ruled in favor of the NCAA stating the association has the authority
to invoke any penalties as a third-party regulator (Green, 1992).
The occurrence and, in some cases reoccurrence, of institutions to commit violations,
such as those associated with UNLV and others (e.g., Auburn University [4 cases], Clemson
University [4 cases], Oklahoma State University [4 cases], University of Georgia [4 cases],
University of Illinois [4 cases], University of Kentucky [4 cases], University of Memphis 4
cases], University of Oklahoma [4 cases], and Wichita State University [4 cases]), required the
NCAA to explore new methods (e.g., complexity, formalization, and de-centralization) focused
on maintaining the integrity of intercollegiate sport. The status quo was not working. As an
example, the present research found the number of violations, particularly those associated with
recruiting and improper benefits remained high and some types of penalties (e.g., probation and
postseason ban) remained standard. However, the show cause penalty was re-introduced. Few
schools (n= 6) ever received that penalty during Byers’ tenure. The present study found over
Schultz’s time, he administered the show cause sanction with 44 cases, which represents 70% of
all major violations. Further, recruiting limitations were imposed on institutions for the first time
to deter wrongdoing.
The entire process involving Jerry Tarkanian also prompted the restructuring of the
NCAA’s enforcement process under Schultz. The Presidents Committee appointed a special
committee solely committed to analyzing the state of the enforcement and infraction process
implemented by the NCAA (Miller, 1993). The Committee proposed eleven changes including:
(1) "Enhance the adequacy of the initial notice of an impending investigation and
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assure a personal visit by the enforcement staff with the institution's chief
executive officer; (2) Establish a 'summary disposition' procedure for treating
major violations at a reasonably early stage in the investigation; (3) Liberalize the
use of tape recordings and the availability of such recordings to involved parties;
(4) Use former judges or other eminent legal authorities as hearing officers in
cases involving major violations and not resolved in the 'summary disposition'
process; (5) "Hearings should be open to the greatest extent possible; (6) Provide
transcripts of all infractions hearings to appropriate involved parties;" (7) Refine
and enhance the role of the Committee on Infractions and establish a limited
appellate process beyond that committee; (8) Adopt a formal conflict- of-interest
policy; (9) Expand the public reporting of infractions cases; (10) Make available a
compilation of previous committee decisions; and (11) Study the structure and
procedures of the enforcement staff” (Miller, 1993, p. 887-888).
Cedric Dempsey (1994 – 2002)
The NCAA continued to receive negative attention from University administrators, as
well as, media and community members regarding the development of Prop 48 and Dick Schultz.
Regarding Schultz, an independent investigator hired by the NCAA found he “had actual
knowledge” of some improper loans made to student-athletes while serving as athletic director of
the University of Virginia (Moran, 1993, para. 3). The University of Virginia received probation
for two years (LSDbi case no. 417) and Schultz resigned shortly thereafter (Moran, 1993).
Cedric Dempsey was hired away from the University of Arizona where he served as their athletic
director (1983-1993). Dempsey was considered to be a man of “integrity” capable of addressing
immediate concerns on membership misconduct (Pickle, 1993, p. 1). However, the record shows
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member institutions continued to be engaged in acts of wrongdoing, specifically participating in
academic fraud (n=34 cases) and allowing ineligible student-athletes to participate (n=14). For
instance, Washington State University (LSDbi case no. 429) committed major infractions in
various areas including improper financial aid, extra benefits, illegal playing seasons, lack of
institutional control, and academic eligibility (NCAA, 1994). The violation of academic
eligibility included a student-athlete on the Men’s Track and Field team and provision of a full
grant-in-aid even though he did not meet requirements set by Prop 48 (NCAA, 1994).
The implementation of Prop 48 eventually provided recruiting challenges for institutions
and may have led to an increased rate in recruiting violations because some top athletes may not
be prepared academically (Crowley, 1996; Gatmen, 2012). The Presidents’ Commission met to
reform and implement changes to Prop 48 by redefining initial eligibility. Proposition 16 was
formalized as another representative of the technical subsystem and ultimately implemented
during the 1995-1996 year to establish the initial eligibility index (IEI). The IEI allowed for
prospective student-athletes to become eligible for competition with a 2.0 GPA in thirteen core
courses, as long as the student obtained a SAT score of 1010 or an 86 combined ACT score
(Waller, 2003). Student-athletes could also become eligible if they scored at least 820 on the
SAT or a 68 combined on the ACT with a GPA of 2.5 (Waller, 2003). The Presidents’
Commission and NCAA Council assumed that Prop 16 would afford more opportunities to
potential student-athletes and possibly decrease recruiting violations, but few like the NAFEO
and many HBCUs agreed with their sentiment (Waller, 2003).
Due to the large adverse reaction expressed from the application of Prop 16 to NCAA
member institutions, the NCAA Council created a special committee at the 1999 Convention
which concentrated on analyzing the academic standards presented in the proposition (Gatmen,
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2012). The council also deliberated on other methods which could be implemented to enhance
the academic experience for all involved with the association (Gatmen, 2012). Again, as
mentioned previously, NCAA members (n=1,041) were still engaging in acts of academic
misconduct, not only with the admission and participation of ineligible student-athletes, but with
academic fraud cases centered on keeping current student- athletes eligible. For instance, Texas
Tech University (LSDbi case no. 480) engaged in acts of academic fraud by having assistant
football coach participate in the completion of student-athletes course work and permitting
student-athletes to compete while ineligible (NCAA, 1998).
Myles Brand (2003 – 2010)
After resigning as President of the Indiana University (1994-2002), Myles Brand was
hired by the NCAA to the president position to begin in January of 2003, shortly after the
retirement of Dempsey. Again, the status of academic integrity within Division-I athletics
continued to be questioned and many believed that those who participated in athletics were
athlete-students rather than student-athletes (Petr & McArdle, 2012). Brand gained national
attention for his calls to reform college athletics before the National Press Club. At that time,
Brand suggested it was “time to scale back the basketball and football ‘arms race’” because they
were a "threat to the academic integrity" of institutions (Rosenberg, 2002, n.p.). Brand focused
on football (n=241 cases) and men’s basketball (n=262 cases) because the vast majority of all
major violations occurred with them. Brand called on his colleagues to take an "academics first"
approach “to the problems of over-commercialization, poor graduation rates and questionable
academic standards used for athletes” (“NCAA hires Myles Brand,” 2002, para. 15-16).
Chairman of the Executive Committee and President of the University of Tulsa, Robert
Lawless suggested “choosing a university president [i.e., Brand]” was by design because it
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“sends a message that the NCAA is interested in the academic success of student-athletes”
(“NCAA hires Myles Brand,” 2002, para. 6). Many other presidents of the Association also
believed that the NCAA lacked a true academic atmosphere under former athletic directors and
newspapermen and that hiring one of their own was in their best interest (Petr & McArdle,
2012). For example, James Duderstadt, University of Michigan President (1988-1996), stated
that “major college sports do far more damage to the university, to its students and faculty, its
leadership, its reputation and credibility than most realize – or at least are willing to admit”
(Knight Commission, 2001, p.13).
In the seven-year span of Brand as Executive Director, there were 129 violations
committed by member institutions, which represents 16% of the total number of major
violations. The average of 18.4 violations per year is approximately 5 more violations per year
than under Dick Schultz, who produced the previous average high (Table 2). Specifically, there
were a total of 47 violations involving academic eligibility, with 30 occurring at the Division-I
level between 1993 and 2010. Member institutions within the Division-I level committed the
most acts of wrongdoing and were of the greatest focus during the Brand era (Davis & Hairston,
2013). As an example, in 2006, the University of Iowa, (LSDbi case no. 587) committed
numerous academic violations including academic fraud, academic ineligibility, and permitting
ineligible athletes to participate in men’s swimming (NCAA, 2006). Student-athletes were
wrongly admitted to Iowa after falsifying admission documents, which was known by the head
coach (NCAA, 2006). The COI presented Iowa with a two-year probation penalty, along with a
reduction in recruiting and a show-cause penalty for the head coach (NCAA, 2006).
Such activity prompted the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics (2001) to
investigate how commercialization and a lack of commitment to academics damaged the higher
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education experience for student-athletes. Their subsequent report led to formalization of
additional academic legislation by the NCAA Council to develop better communication
regarding academic integrity and expectation towards members (NCAA, 2017a). With
recommendations presented by the Knight Commission and public pressure to assure academic
integrity, the NCAA decided to create a special committee on academic improvement (NCAA,
2017a). Under the guidance of former University of Hartford President Walter Harrison, the
Division I Committee on Academic Performance was created and focused on improving
academic principles within Division-I member institutions (NCAA, 2017a).
NCAA member institutions were not fulfilling their academic mission because they did
not focus on the developing high-caliber students (Crowley, 2006). Academic issues, specifically
with initial eligibility, needed to be addressed to assure that the NCAA was fulfilling its mission.
In order for the NCAA to increase the value of academics in college sports and deter
wrongdoing, another technical subsystem surfaced which required programs to record how
student-athletes were prioritizing and progressing academically on a year to year basis. The
resulting reform, introduced by the NCAA Board of Directors in 2004, became known as the
Academic Performance Program (APP).
The purpose of the APP is to serve as an “incentive/discentive based program where the
only current incentive is a public commendation by the NCAA. The disincentives range from a
written warning to possible loss of NCAA membership” (Blackman, 2008, p. 227). The APP
encompassed two different components: the Graduation Success Rate (GSR) and the Academic
Progress Rate (APR). GSR is “an methodology developed by the NCAA that credits institutions
for incoming transfers or midyear enrollees who graduate, and does not penalize institutions for
student-athletes who leave prior to graduation if they leave in good academic standing” (LaForge
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& Hodge, 2011, p. 221-222). GSR is utilized by the present 1,100+ member NCAA, in order to
determine and observe the academic success of student-athletes over a period of time. APR is
defined as a method “holds institutions accountable for the academic progress of their studentathletes through a team-based metric that accounts for the eligibility and retention of each
student-athlete for each academic term” (NCAA, 2017b, p. 1). The utilization of APR is
primarily focused on providing an accurate depiction of a team’s current academic status. The
usage of APR is critical within the NCAA because APR provides a method in which the NCAA
can track the academic development of student-athletes, but also hold NCAA members
accountable for not meeting the expectations set by the Association (LaForge & Hodge, 2011).
Mark Emmert (2011 – 2016)
Following the death of Myles Brand in 2009 and service of Jim Isch as interim president
(2009-2011), University of Washington president (2004-2010) Mark Emmert was hired to
become NCAA president. One of Emmert’s first tasks involved holding a retreat for 50 college
and university presidents to obtain their perspectives regarding the current state of NCAA
enforcement and the diminished viewpoint of the public in general (Hosick, 2012). As a result of
the retreat, the NCAA created five working groups that would each be designated towards a
specific topic or area. Two working groups focused on rule development and governance: the
Rules Working Group (RWG) (i.e., Legislative Initiatives) and the Collegiate Model –
Enforcement Working Group (CMEWG) (NCAA, 2017c; NCAA, 2017d). The creation of both
groups is an example of task differentiation considering that the NCAA utilized two different
working groups with decision-making powers in order to assess and alter the current standing of
policies in college sport.
The focus of the RWG is to create “a multi-level NCAA rules violations structure, an
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enhanced penalty structure for rules infractions, and reestablishing a sense of shared
responsibility between member institutions and enforcement” (NCAA, 2012a, para.15). The
RWG echoed Emmert’s personal vision as a former university president to discover new
methods that bolster academic principles and that can help conduct a full analysis into NCAA
rules and regulations to assure “fairness, accountability, and integrity” (NCAA, 2012a, para.15).
The RWG charged the NCAA to build awareness to the rules within the NCAA Manual, but also
to minimize the rules that are deemed unenforceable.
The CMEWG assessed the two-level violation structure and strove to provide a new,
updated model that sought to foster fairness, hold individuals and schools accountable, and
improved the efficiency and effectiveness of the enforcement process (Davis & Hairston, 2013;
NCAA, 2017d). More specifically, the charge of the working group was to:
“propose a multi-level violation reporting and penalty structure. Ensure that the
enforcement efforts are focused on those infractions that clearly violate NCAA
enduring values. In addition, the group shall consider the level and severity of
penalties associated with the most egregious violations. Reestablish a sense of
shared responsibility with clarified roles among those who participate in, lead and
administer intercollegiate athletics at the campus, conference and national levels”
(NCAA, 2017b, p.1).
The call for such changes emanated from a variety of locations. For instance, a
membership survey suggested there was a desire for the Association to impose stronger penalties
(e.g., television and postseason bans) on wrongdoing and to be more consistent in penalty
assignment because risk-reward analysis suggested a lack of deterrence was prominent (Davis &
Hairston, 2013). As an example, in 2009, the University of Memphis (LSDbi case no. 631) was
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found guilty of participating in academic fraud for allowing a student-athlete to play for their
men’s basketball program during the 2007-2008 season (NCAA, 2009). The NCAA public report
presented the University of Memphis was aware about a highly-rated student-athlete’s
questionable SAT score, yet the school did not investigate (NCAA, 2009). The University of
Memphis men’s basketball team proceeded to go undefeated in conference play and advance to
the Final Four in the NCAA Tournament before contending with the investigation from the
NCAA (NCAA, 2009).
In the first five years of Emmert’s presidency, there were 128 major violation cases
primarily on unethical conduct and extra benefits amongst other wrongdoing but only 20 resulted
in postseason bans and notably zero led to television restrictions. Other opinions on wrongdoing
centered on incentivizing “institutions and institutional personnel, particularly coaches, to
comply” with regulations and investigations (Davis & Hairston, 2013, p. 985). Show cause
penalties seemed to be the most prominent individual sanction between Emmert and Brand (i.e.,
2003 – 2016) as there were 104 cases which resulted in that penalty assignment. Other assigned
sanctions typically involved probation, reduced financial aid, and recruiting restrictions.
However, Ed Ray, the president of Oregon State University and chair of the CMEWG argued:
“[I]t was clear we needed to have stiffer and more predictable penalties, so that
people who were doing the “risk-reward” calculation would think twice about
whether it was in their interests to engage in bad behavior. Having penalty
guidelines—and having penalties that are in those guidelines be more severe than
what we have now—was a good way of sending clear signals to people” (Brown,
2012, para. 1).
Interestingly, fines and postseason and television bans were not present, but more
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sanctions did get assigned to member institutions within Division-II and Division-III, suggesting
broader supervision and accountability by the NCAA occurred under Emmert. Prior to Emmert,
there were only 115 major violation cases against Division II and III. However, under Emmert
50 cases of major violations were processed involving Division II and III institutions largely
involving football and men’s basketball like their Division I peers.
The CMEWG also advised change due to the processing time associated with major
violations. Prior to August 2013, there was a rise in major violations committed by NCAA
member institutions, but the infractions included a wide array of situations from individual cases
of academic fraud to athletic department scandals regarding illegal use of financial aid (Davis &
Hairston, 2014). The CMEWG decided that predictable sanctions and quicker decision-making
regarding violations were necessary in order to deter member institutions from committing
violations. As the institutional subsystem, the NCAA acknowledged that the enforcement cases
took too long to investigate and provided five reasons for this including:
“(1) the NCAA does not have the same legal authority as the court system; (2)
more attorneys are involved in the enforcement process; (3) an investigation into
one allegation can reveal the possibilities of other infractions; (4) the burden of
complying with requests from investigators often falls on already-busy
institutional representatives; (5) the volume of documents involved in
investigations can be staggering” (NCAA, 2017c, para. 5-30).
The University of Miami (LSDbi no. 716) case serves as one example that took years
before concluding (NCAA, 2013c). The University of Miami major infractions case surfaced
when the University presented self-reported infractions to the COI in 2009 (NCAA, 2013c). The
COI completed their initial investigation in February 2011, but details regarding other instances
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of misconduct by the individuals in the athletic department were difficult to obtain because
individuals begrudgingly participated, extending the case another two years. In order to adapt,
the CMEWG recommended a new, four-level violation structure and a representative pool of
individuals with “intimate knowledge of the day-to-day operation of college sports”, which
including former coaches, presidents, university faculty, current athletic directors, and athletic
administrators with compliance experience (Davis & Hairston, 2013, p. 991).
In August 2013, the NCAA updated how rule infractions are classified, considering the
need to maintain the integrity of the rules set in the NCAA Constitution. The NCAA
implemented a violation structure with four different levels (NCAA, 2013a). Level I violations
are major:
“violations that seriously undermine or threaten the integrity of the NCAA
collegiate model as set forth in the Constitution and bylaws, including any
violation that provides or is intended to provide a substantial or extensive
recruiting, competitive or other advantage, or a substantial or extensive
impermissible benefit” (NCAAa, 2013, para. 3).

In October 2015, the University of Mississippi (LSDbi case no. 778) was found in violation of a
Level-I violation by the women’s basketball program (NCAA, 2016j). An assistant coach,
director of operation, and two members of the team participated in academic fraud in order to
assist the athletes with eligibility requirements.
Level II violations are considered major when:
“violations that provide or are intended to provide more than a minimal but less
than a substantial or extensive recruiting, competitive or other advantage; includes
more than a minimal but less than a substantial or extensive impermissible
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benefit; or involves conduct that may compromise the integrity of the NCAA
collegiate model as set forth in the Constitution and bylaws” (NCAA, 2013a,
para. 4).
In April 2015, Oklahoma State University (OSU) (LSDbi case no. 744) was found in violation of
a Level-II violation by the football program (NCAA, 2015b). The OSU athletic department
neglected to follow the drug testing policies of the NCAA and used illegal student hosts for
official and unofficial visits for prospective student-athletes (NCAA, 2015b). The violations
committed by OSU were classified as Level II violations since the actions did not provide a clear
competitive advantage as other Level I violations might (NCAA, 2015b).
Level III violations are minor “violations that are isolated or limited in nature; provide no
more than a minimal recruiting, competitive or other advantage; and do not include more than a
minimal impermissible violation” (NCAA, 2013, n.p.). Level IV violations are similarly
classified as “incidental infractions that are inadvertent and isolated, technical in nature and
result in a negligible, if any, competitive advantage” (NCAA, 2013, n.p.). Overall, the CMEWG
believes “the four-level violation structure allows the enforcement staff to resolve the infractions
cases with minimal impact…” so the NCAA can be more efficient and “focus its primary
resources on the most serious infractions cases” (NCAA, 2012b, p. 10). As of December 2016,
the LSDbi database has only labeled 20 of the 68 cases of major infractions using the updated
violation structure with eight cases associated with Level-I and twelve cases associated with
Level-II.
Discussion/Conclusion
In their review on a possible history-policy relationship, Seifried et al. (2017) advocated
for the use of history to help improve theory and efforts by opinion leaders (i.e., social-control
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agents) to enhance their programs, policies, behaviors, and overall decisions. Consistent with
applied history, the present study examined the possibility of organizational layering created by
social-control agents from preceding organizational misconduct to understand the influence of
sanctions and individuals as a third-party regulator to subsequent wrongdoing. Again, the current
management literature (e.g., Greve et al., 2010; Palmer, 2012) neglects to acknowledge the
various layers of social control created for the assessing and enforcing of wrongdoing and
whether they frame later behavior (i.e., type of wrongdoing and frequency). In this section,
several propositions emerged connecting third-party regulators to the synergy between
complexity (i.e., horizontal and vertical differentiation), formalization, and centralization in an
effort to contribute to the current literature and advise future practitioners.
The first question in the present study asked if organizational misconduct leads to future
changes by a third-party regulator with respect to changes in policy and personnel? The present
research showed supports for Goode’s (2015) claim that governing bodies and enforcement
groups exist because society is not self-regulating. Further, the present study confirms the
suggestions of Carpenter and Sanders (2009) and O’Brien and Gowthrop (2016) that wrongdoing
may influence the creation of organizational layers (e.g., the use of systems, processes, rewards,
punishments, and people) to control and/or manage future behavior. Throughout the history of
wrongdoing and NCAA enforcement, trends in rule violations and member dissatisfaction with
the investigation and sanctioning process caused the Association to hire an institutional leader,
develop various committees, and create rules to assess and enforce compliance, provide appeals,
and promote due process. Further, these activities of the NCAA featured variation in
centralization, increased formalization, and fueled complexity through expanding horizontal
differentiation, vertical differentiation (e.g., institutional, managerial, and technical) and spatial
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differentiation to regulate the daily business activities and behaviors within an organization.
The second question in the present study asked what impact does an individual socialcontrol agent have on future organizational policies and member behavior? Palmer (2012)
referenced that social-control agents can adjust the line of right and wrong behavior through their
actions. The present research showed the draconian sanctions associated with the Sanity Code
were eliminated by Byers in his early years. Moreover, recruiting violations and gambling
emerged as the primary focus of the Byers and the NCAA Council. Centralization and
formalization was strong at this time because the NCAA needed a stable social-control agent to
clearly delineated infractions and impending sanctions. However, once the NCAA started
tracking major violations and publicizing the wrongful behavior, the organization engaged in
increased complexity and de-centralization through task differentiation. Additional managerial
subsystems were put in place to reduce the individual power of the Council and Byers because
the growing membership voiced concerns that the NCAA’s enforcement arm was biased. The
use of special committees and constant review of policies allowed for the NCAA to continue to
grow and remain updated with the current state of intercollegiate athletics during Byers tenure.
After Byers, Schultz and then Dempsey became the executive directors and focused on
building mutual trust within the member institutions while maintaining pre-established
enforcement expectations. Schultz and Dempsey were former athletic directors (i.e., core
stakeholder) and wanted to improve transparency for their peers through increased decentralization and formalization. Further, both Schultz and Dempsey similarly focused on the
academic development of student-athletes with additional technical subsystems exhibiting both
limited and specialized horizontal differentiation (e.g., Prop 48, Prop 16, and due process
improvement). Myles Brand, a university president, replaced Dempsey and primarily focused on
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culture-changing redevelopment. Under Brand’s leadership, various products of a technical
subsystem (e.g., APP, GSR, and APR) held athletic teams/departments accountable academically
through increased executive power provided to him in an attempt to ‘take back the NCAA’ from
core stakeholders. Finally, Mark Emmert, another university president, succeeded Brand and
concentrated on the broad reaching advancement of formalization (i.e., revision of the definition
of major violation) and rules enforcement (e.g., RWG and CMEWG) to improve consistency
with sanctioning and efficiency. Featured within Emmert’s tenure was a focus on investigating
and sanctioning Division II and III schools for wrongdoing.
Lastly, the present research study sought to understand how member organizations
respond/behave with respect to changes made by third-party regulators and if instances of
organizational misconduct are deterred by sanctions in the future? Cullen et al. (2012)
acknowledged the role of third-party regulators on an industry, specifically holding member
organizations accountable for their acts of misconduct by imposing sanctions which would
hopefully discourage other members to partake in such behavior. Organizational research on the
NCAA reviewed various forms of punishment (e.g., fines, probation, and corporate
incapacitation) as a source of stability to determine their effectiveness in reducing the amount of
wrongdoing committed by employees or members (Porto, 2014; Weston, 2011). Further, the
threat of punishment, vicarious punishment, and actual punishment has been studied as possible
deterrents (Cullen, Latessa, & Jonson, 2012; Davis & Hairston, 2013). As a third-party regulator,
the present study found the NCAA struggled with assessing cases of misconduct and assigning
sanctions in a timely manner and at a level to deter future wrongdoing (i.e., many institutions
committed violation and did so on multiple occasions). To address these concerns, the NCAA
added to the institutional subsystem with the establishment of the executive director position and
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established specialized committees assigned to look at field-level specific wrongdoing. Initially,
institutional-level sanctions were prominent but individualize sanctions (e.g., show cause) were
later employed to deter transgressions. None, however, seemed to be effective as the number of
cases and violations increased over time. This was particularly true for the revenue sports of
football and men’s basketball and Division I. Overall, the results of the present study may be
explained by Palmer (2012) who previously suggested social-control agents might be responsible
for perpetrating wrongdoing through increased formalization and de-centralization efforts.
Propositions
In the development of an organization, the synergy of complexity, formalization, and
centralization creates the need for stability and to address potential wrongdoing that is not
representative of the firm (O’Brien & Gowthrop, 2016). In this section, several propositions
connect third-party regulators to the synergy between complexity (i.e., horizontal and vertical
differentiation), formalization, and centralization in an effort to contribute to the current
literature and future practitioners. Amis and Slack (1996) found organizational size affects the
structure and that the emerging structure is often a result of the maintaining or improving
relationships between internal stakeholders. Because the present research also saw significant
change based on membership growth, the subsequent propositions are framed through this lens.
Complexity. Slack and Parent (2006) alluded to how complexity details the diverse roles
and responsibilities different departments perform as part of an organization. The NCAA initially
began with a pre-existing institutional subsystem adding one managerial subsystem after another
tasked with determining whether behaviors by member institution were major acts of
misconduct. Subsequent changes to the institutional subsystem and additions to the managerial
subsystem produced corresponding technical subsystems to identify, adjudicate, and sanction
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wrongdoing. In essence, as the NCAA grew, the complexity of the organization grew, which
prompts the present study to suggest:
Proposition 1: As a third-party regulator grows in size, complexity increases to address
wrongdoing.
Featured within complexity are vertical, horizontal, and spatial differentiation. The
present study also suggests:
Proposition 2: As a third-party regulator grows in size, vertical differentiation increases
in an effort to address wrongdoing.
Proposition 3: As a third-party regulator grows in size, horizontal differentiation
increases and becomes more specialized in an effort to address wrongdoing.
Proposition 4: As a third-party regulator grows in size, attempts to control spatial
differentiation will increase when wrongdoing is present.
Formalization. As mentioned previously by Bradish (2013), formalization can be
measured through recognizing the amount and frequency of rule violations. Further,
formalization may emerge in additional layers when rules are broken in order to improve
subsequent behavior or reduce wrongdoing. However, Brandish also suggested excessive
formalization may be related to decrease rule following. The present study found that, as
additional rules and committees were placed within the NCAA, the number of violations
increased. In some cases, such as Southern Methodist University, the University of Memphis,
and Oklahoma State University, member institution were engaging in multiple acts of
misconduct, regardless of the rules that were in place. Collectively, this information suggests:
Proposition 5: Excessive formalization by an organization leads to decrease adherence
to the rules.
Centralization. Regarding centralization, the present study shows the NCAA generally
used a de-centralized structure when assessing acts of misconduct. Further, decentralization
became more prominent (i.e., formalized and complex) as the association grew in membership.
The de-centralized structure of the NCAA included the establishment of various managerial
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subsystems committees asked to analyze situations and provide a decision or offer
recommendations based on incidents of wrongdoing. Frequently, the expansion of the
managerial subsystem led to development of products (e.g., rules, regulations, and reports) as
part of a technical subsystem. In the present study, the growing NCAA membership frequently
characterized the enforcement process as potentially biased (e.g., favoring big-time programs and
leader institutional power). Based on the above information, the present research proposes:
Proposition 6: Products associated with the technical subsystem are more likely a part of
an inverse relationship whereas the organization grows so does de-centralization.
Practical Implications
The findings of this study provide particular practical implications for social-control
agents. First, it was previously mentioned that, for fines to be effective, they must match the
level of harm created (Davis & Hairston, 2013; Weston, 2011). Similarly, the present study
argues it is necessary to match prescribed punishment to wrongdoing committed by the
institution.
However, it is also critical to deter individuals from engaging in acts of wrongdoing
through assigning specific and strong penalties to individuals directly involved in misconduct
cases. Third-party regulators should also review the possibility of administering strong individual
punishments to upper level executives within the organization. Within, the contribution of the
organizational leaders and the recognition of external factors in the production of new
institutional strategies regarding organizational misconduct will be acknowledged over various
stages of the NCAA’s life cycle (Drori & Honig, 2013; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007). Notably,
this work highlights how a changing and challenging environment can influence the development
of an interest-based association and what they define or perceived as organizational misconduct.
The present research revealed show cause penalties were one sanctioning method but this
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alone was ineffective. In the future, social-control agents, like the NCAA should consider a
combination of penalties such as fines, public reprimand, probation, and disbarment for the
individual principal violator and possibly their supervisor. We have seen instances of this in the
past. For instance, after Cincinnati Reds (Major League Baseball) owner Marge Schott was fined
$250,000 and banned from day-to-day operations during the 1993 season for making racist
remarks about several minority groups, she was banned again three years later for an additional
two years and essentially forced to sell the Reds (Mather, 2015). More recently, Donald Sterling,
owner of the Los Angeles Clippers (National Basketball Association) made insensitive
statements about blacks. Caught on audio, Sterling’s remarks were played on various mass and
social media platforms across the country. In addition to being fined $2.5 million, the maximum
allowed in the NBA, Sterling was banned for life and forced to sell his franchise (“Steve
Ballmer,” 2014).
Trevino and White (n.d.) mentioned the publicity component of announcing punishments
was less significant in the past because acts of wrongdoing were limited to publications in
newspapers. Today, various social media outlets (e.g., Internet, Facebook, Twitter, and
Instagram) provide instantaneous information vastly more connected to the public.
Appropriately, Greve et el. (2010) stated the media can
“impose public scrutiny and humiliation, which is a form of sanction; although it
cannot impose punitive sanctions of the form that the state or professional bodies
control, the media has the ability to frame behaviors as misconduct and put
pressure on social-control agents to put such sanctions in place.” (p.57)
The mass and social media should be used to keep the public informed about the wrongdoing,
and records about the outcome of wrongdoing should be maintained on a publicly available
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database to help remind people of wrongdoer’s permanent record.
Social-control agents should also provide opportunities for managers to comprehend how
firms and individuals are evaluated in cases of misconduct. Organizations and individuals learn
from the experiences of violating organizations within their association. Moreover, organizations
and individuals come to understand how the social-control agent will punish them on similar acts
of misconduct. In addition to the aforementioned public record, the NCAA shows that a publicly
available database, which not only identifies transgressors but outlines penalties, should serve as
a deterrent. Furthermore, as NCAA member institutions continue to engage in misconduct;
harsher penalties should be assessed to violators beyond the individual show cause penalties. It
appears post season and television bans have been underutilized. By distributing stricter
sanctions for institutions with multiple occasions of violations, this may encourage members to
create and implement new strategies to assure that participation in misconduct is minimal.
Lastly, the present research demonstrated the effectiveness of decentralization with
respect to the growth of an association and the enforcement of wrongdoing. As organizations
grow, representation for various internal stakeholder groups is critical to avoid bias in the
decision-making process. Further, in order maintain fairness and remove bias, organizations
should strive to gain a variety of opinions from areas surrounding sport in order to make the best
decision possible.
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CHAPTER 3.

A COMPARATIVE FRAMING ANALYSIS OF MAJOR
VIOLATIONS WITHIN THE NCAA
Introduction
Organizations have an opportunity to be recognized by the general public in a positive
manner through success, a strong relationship with stakeholders, and/or the creation of a
substantial rapport with community members (Bakker & Schaufeli, 2008). Yet, the probability of
organizations receiving negative attention is just as likely when they engage in misconduct
(Pozner, 2008). Greve, Palmer, and Pozner (2010) defined organizational misconduct as
“behavior in or by an organization that a social-control agent judges to transgress a line
separating right from wrong” (p. 56). As a social-control agent, the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) formally defines what behavior is designated as misconduct for member
organizations (Palmer, 2012). Further, the NCAA acts as a social-control agent because it
remains interested in “managing issues and crises” to achieve and maintain “stability,
profitability, and popularity, as well as recovering from problems” (Pratt, 2013, p. 43).
To facilitate their social control objectives, the NCAA publishes reports (e.g., Legislative
Services Database- LSDbi) and produces articles (e.g., NCAA News) to provide information on
wrongdoing incidents and their resulting sanctions. In the case of the NCAA, organizational
misconduct may be presented as several types of violations (i.e., major and minor) that include a
breach of contract, lack of institutional control, academic fraud, failure to cooperate, unethical
conduct, and failure to monitor, among other wrongdoing (Clark & Batista, 2009). The list of
sanctions for wrongdoing can include fines, probation, suspension, and corporate dissolution
among other possible options (Simpson, 2014; Weston, 2011).
As part of the reporting process to organizational members and the media, it is likely the
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NCAA frames misconduct in specific ways “to marginalize such conflicts that result from the
increased commercialization of big-time college sport” (Southall & Nagel, 2008, p. 520). In
support of this assumption, Southall and Nagel (2008) previously highlighted NCAA leaders
frequently attempt to frame the organization as capable of remaining “true to the organization’s
identity and values while pursuing additional revenue” (p. 520). Framing also appears likely
because businesses from all over the world attempt to build relationships with member
institutions of the NCAA and the NCAA itself. Evidence of this overall point is strong as the
NCAA made an estimated $912 million during the 2015 fiscal year (NCAA, 2016a).
Rowe (2000) notably suggested the influence of framing by the media is equally
supportive, different, strong and so much so that it is “implausible … to try to uncouple the
production, distribution, and consumption of sport from the media’s role in these processes” (p.
22-23). Expectedly, several scholars have examined the role of sports media framing to
understand issues like the characterization and perceptions of race and gender (e.g., Angelini &
Billings, 2010; Billings & Angelini, 2007; Giacobbi & DeSensi, 1999; Rada & Wulfemeyer,
2005; Wensing & Bruce, 2003). Further, sport-related framing studies on the media and
organizations looked at issues regarding collective bargaining (e.g., Lewis & Proffitt, 2013),
sport facility construction (Buist & Mason, 2010; Curry, Schwirian, & Woldoff, 2001; Foster,
Soebbing, & Seifried, 2015; Hirshon, 2015), and mega-events (e.g., Barretta, 2016).
To a lesser degree, scholars commented on the framing of organizational misconduct by
NCAA members (Dusek, 2006; Smith & Cho, 2017). Moreover, little to no study explored the
contrasts in framing practiced by third-party regulators like the NCAA and the newspaper sports
media as distinct social-control agents to better assess their differences and similarities
whenreporting on organizational misconduct. This is interesting because Yoo, Smith, and Kim
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(2013) previously expressed it is necessary to analyze how specific organizations and/or
individuals are represented by sport organization against those created by the media.
The lack of study on misconduct is also interesting because the concept carries with it a
valence news frame. Valence news frames frequently cover values such as honesty, integrity, and
competence which might bestow a positive or negative evaluation on to individual actors, events,
and issues that can be used as permanent but contentious anchor points for public opinion (Von
Sikorski, Schierl, Möller, & Oberhäuser, 2012). To study the contrasts and similarities between
the media and the NCAA is further compelling because both engage in framing and may do so
through cooperation or within contested financial, ethical, or socio-political interests (Laucella,
2009; Wallace, Wilson, & Miloch, 2011; Yoo, et al., 2013). Collectively, this information led the
present study to ask: What significant differences and similarities, if any, exist between how
newspapers and formal social-control agents frame reports involving cases of organizational
misconduct?
In order to understand how the media may frame information on misconduct similarly or
differently than the NCAA, the present study utilizes a textual analysis of reports and articles
from the NCAA and various local and national newspapers. Prior research has acknowledged the
value of utilizing newspapers in determining how reports can positively or negatively influence a
community’s interpretation of events (Buist & Mason, 2010; Franiuk, Seefelt, Cepress, &
Vandello, 2008). In order to analyze the relationship between acts of misconduct, social-control
agents, and framing, the present study focused on reviewing major violations committed by
NCAA Division-I institutions and resulting publication results between 1998 through 2016.
Major violations by Division I programs receive the most attention from the media and
produce the most detailed documents from the NCAA (Brown & Billings, 2013). The present
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research reviews this specific time frame because it respects the notion that “sports journalists
often include historical events to elicit an emotional connection with readers and audiences” (Li,
Stokowski, Dittmore, & Scott, 2016, p. 82). The year 1998 is a particularly good beginning point
because the media designated programs in the Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS)
institutions as either BCS or non-BCS based on their access to the Bowl Championship Series,
football postseason event. Starting in 2014, the BCS/non-BCS designation changed to Power
Five and Group of Five with the start of the College Football Playoff (CFP). Establishing such a
time span and classifications are also important because framing scholars suggest that the
“choice of words or phrases, use of sources, and repetition of themes [i.e., lamented language]…
persist over time, defining and structuring social relationships” (Kian & Hardin, 2009, p. 188).
Lastly, the present study makes the following contribution. First, this study enhances the
literature on social-control agents through framing theory. Previous studies explored the media
as a social-control agent, yet none have not examined the strategic frames used by the media and
compared them against a third-party regulator regarding acts of misconduct. This study fills in
this gap by investigating how the NCAA presents details concerning major infractions in
comparison to newspapers. Second, the present research assesses the framing strategy used by
newspaper media and the NCAA to understand how they speak to specific audiences (e.g., public
and NCAA members). Within, the concept of conflict framing (i.e., frame alignment, counterframing, and re-framing) is featured to review instances of thematic and episodic framing and to
articulate their differences. Third, this study highlights differences and the importance of
lamented language by newspapers and a formal social-control agent (i.e., NCAA) to understand
how they emphasize consistency, transparency, and exactness when reporting on misconduct.
Literature Review
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Before proceeding with a review on the concept of social-control agents and framing
theory, it is important for the present study to outline how organizational misconduct is defined.
Occurrences of organizational misconduct can be classified in two different categories: normal
and abnormal (Palmer, 2012). Normal organizational misconduct is the result of wrongdoing
from individuals that are considered a likely by-product of ‘doing business’ (Palmer, 2012).
Normal organizational misconduct is recognized in the present study as Level-III and IV
violations or secondary/minor violations. Specifically, Level-III infractions are “violations that
are isolated or limited in nature; provide no more than a minimal recruiting, competitive or other
advantage; and do not include more than a minimal impermissible violation” (NCAA, 2013,
n.p.). Level-IV violations are “incidental infractions that are inadvertent and isolated, technical in
nature and result in a negligible, if any, competitive advantage” (NCAA, 2013, n.p.).
Abnormal organizational misconduct is characterized as “wrongful behavior that is
viewed as aberrant-a clear departure from the norm and thus implicitly rare” (Palmer, 2012, p.
7). Abnormal organizational misconduct also refers to their likeliness to deviate from the norm
set by the organization in order to produce personal gains at the expense of others (Palmer &
Yenkey, 2015). For the present study, abnormal organizational misconduct is recognized as
Level-I and Level-II or major infractions. Level-I violations are:
“violations that seriously undermine or threaten the integrity of the NCAA
collegiate model as set forth in the Constitution and bylaws, including any
violation that provides or is intended to provide a substantial or extensive
recruiting, competitive or other advantage, or a substantial or extensive
impermissible benefit” (NCAA, 2013, para. 3).
Level-II violations are:
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“violations that provide or are intended to provide more than a minimal but less
than a substantial or extensive recruiting, competitive or other advantage; includes
more than a minimal but less than a substantial or extensive impermissible
benefit; or involves conduct that may compromise the integrity of the NCAA
collegiate model as set forth in the Constitution and bylaws” (NCAA, 2013, para.
4).
Social-Control Agents
When the NCAA assesses the behavior of member institutions and determines if actions
are instances of misconduct, the association is functioning towards developing social control.
Deflam (2015) framed social control as an informal or formal power individuals or groups enjoy
or impose on other people or groups to increase or decrease desired behaviors. Informal social
control typically involves cues from body language such as smiles, ridicule, sarcasm, and
disapproval to promote conformity or communicate disapproval with behavior connected to
some desired community norm and/or social standard or law (Hollinger & Clark, 2005). Informal
social control can be applied by groups within the community, such as media, considering the
agenda setting of media outlets on misconduct cases. Agenda setting is “the idea that there is a
strong correlation between the emphasis that mass media place on certain issues (e.g., based on
relative placement or amount of coverage) and the importance attributed to these issues by mass
audiences” (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 11). Formal social controls surface when informal
social controls cannot alone control behavior or encourage conformity to societal or
organizational norms (Hollinger & Clark, 2005).
Pollock, Mishina, and Seo (2016) described formal social control as monitoring,
preventing, and sanctioning of any behavior that differs from the norm in organizations and/or
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society at-large. Within this description, social-control agents evaluate the behavior of members
and “judge the transgressions on the legal, ethical, and/or socially responsible line that separates
right from wrong” (Palmer, 2012, p. 4). Further, as Greve et al. (2010) concluded, formal socialcontrol agents serve as “actors that represents a collectivity and that can impose sanctions on that
collectivity’s behalf” (p. 56). International governing bodies (e.g., Fédération Internationale de
Football Association), national governing bodies (e.g., British Olympic Association), local
governing bodies (e.g., Ohio High School Athletic Association), and professional associations
(e.g., National Association of Basketball Coaches) all enjoy this type of responsibility.
When misconduct does occur within organizations, social-control agents are ultimately
responsible for administering sanctions to match the severity of wrongdoing (Greve et al., 2010).
The decision-making of social-control agents to match sanctions to the wrongdoing is very
dependent on the concept of precedent (Greve & Teh, 2016). Thus, if an organization is found in
violation of the rules, the subsequent punishment should rely on previously established sanctions
assigned to others following similar acts of misconduct (Black, 2003; Greve & Teh, 2016;
Palmer, 2012). Lawsuits, fines, probation, suspension, and corporate dissolution are amongst the
social control sanctions available to agents that hold or assume the special responsibility to
penalize an individual or group that engages in misconduct (Pollock et al., 2016). Still, other
forms of sanctioning are available such as public reprimand. By publicizing acts of misconduct,
formal social-control agents seek to potentially embarrass and/or shame organizations in order to
punish and possibly deter future non-conforming behavior (Cullen, Latessa, & Jonson, 2012).
Previous research conducted by Kihl and Richardson (2009) offered support for the
notion that public reprimand could adversely affect intangible items such as prestige, reputation,
and morale. Public sanctioning can come from third-party regulators like the NCAA, however,
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groups with no “formal authority” (e.g., newspapers) may also serve as social-control agents in
cases of organizational misconduct (Pollock et al., 2016, p. 240). Media outlets function as a
sample group with no formal authority, but they nonetheless have an instrumental role as a
social-control agent, particularly in cases of organizational misconduct (Maclean, 2008; Pollock
et al., 2016). Take for example the work of Sherry, Osbourne, and Nicholson (2016). In their
work, they analyzed media coverage regarding the off-field behavior of numerous professional
male athletes. Sherry et al. (2016) reported there was a higher frequency of media reports on
wrongdoing committed by these athletes which ultimately prompted them to proclaim that the
media influences how specifics of cases and various situations involving sport organizations are
delivered to members of society. Other studies also acknowledged that cases of misconduct,
including prominent sport figures, increase the likelihood of supplementary information being
provided to the public and positions the media as a social-control agent (Osborne et al., 2016).
Pollock et al. (2016) further referenced the authority the media enjoy when illuminating how
various media outlets, receiving the same information on specific cases of misconduct, can shape
future interpretation of events and/or individual behavior. Within this point, Pollock et al. (2016)
argued the media can frame behavior as with or against societal and organizational norms. Still,
the aforementioned studies do not examine the variation of details presented by the media and
formal social-control agents like the NCAA to understand their similarities and differences.
Theoretical Frame
The theoretical lens used in the development of the present study embraces framing
theory because frames are commonly noticed in situations involving misconduct (Dusek, 2006;
Entman, 1993). Goffman (1974) established framing theory based on the tendency of journalists
and media members to publish news stories that framed evidence from their perspective.
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Specifically, Goffman (1959, 1974) and later Gitlin (1980) presented that individuals and
organizations possess the ability to socially control how others view them through various
impression management tactics (i.e., selection, emphasis, and exclusion) that direct, magnify, or
shrink specific information. Entman (1993) extended this understanding by suggesting:
“To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem
definition, causal interpretation, moral valuation, and/or treatment
recommendation for the item described” (p. 52).
Overall, framing involves the defining of situations or events through specially selected
language and/or purposive agenda setting (Dusek, 2006; Schmitt, 1993). Journalists and
document authors frequently concentrate on specific attributes of a story, individual, or event and
may employ sensationalized, personalized, or dramatic reporting in order to gain reader interest,
which can encourage them to feel similarly or share the author’s opinion (Laucella, 2009; Sant &
Mason, 2015). Frames should thus be seen as socially constructed through social interaction
made available within various media and the timeliness of that interaction. Moreover, frames
should be viewed as originating “within the media or from elite sources” and as designed to
shape subsequent deliberation because research has demonstrated that a defined issue is difficult
to reshape (de Vreese, 2005; Dusek, 2006, p. 19; Kian & Hardin, 2009; Laucella, 2009).
Within the notion of framing, Goffman (1974) proposed that the media and organizations
may use a layered activity or a sequential presentation of facts through system-defined language
to help build a picture for others to see and accept as reality. Schmitt (1993) introduced this type
of layered activity as lamented language and presented it as a sequence that involves “protecting,
rejecting, accepting, satirically extending, and integrating definitions through the creation of
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appropriate linguistic laminations” (p. 136). Laminated language is anchored in the concrete and
labels of the well-known through “power, social structure, the media, conflict, ambiguity, and
social change” (Schmitt, 1993, p. 144). Framing devices such as “keywords, metaphors,
concepts, symbols, and visual images” are often the markers used to highlight a specific reality
(de Vreese, 2005; Entman, 1991, p. 7; Hirshon, 2015; Moore, Hesson, & Jones, 2015).
Regarding the NCAA, the association itself, media, members of a fan nation, and administrators
create the language that helped frame the reality provided by documents and newspaper articles
to enhance the experience (e.g., protect, reject, accept, and satirically extend).
Selection, emphasis, and exclusion are often connected to one of two primary types of
framing strategies commonly used to create reports that detail specific situations: thematic and
episodic (Aarøe, 2011). Iyengar (1991) defined thematic framing as a method which “places
public issues in some more general or abstract context and takes the form of a ‘takeout’ or
‘backgrounder’, report directed at general outcomes or conditions” (p. 14). Thematic framing
analyzes how situations occur on a larger scale rather than focusing on individual cases (Aarøe,
2011). Thematic framing is well-employed by scholars (e.g., Lee, Kim, & Love, 2013; Moore et
al., 2015; Nicely, 2007) in the sport-based academic literature. For instance, Lee et al. (2013)
conducted research on newspaper coverage regarding the Gay Games, an Olympic-type
competition for gay men and women. Their investigation discovered evidence of thematic
framing strategies used by journalists when publishing content about the competition from 19802012 (Lee et al., 2013). Elsewhere, Nicely (2007) studied the thematic framing techniques
utilized in selected magazines (i.e., Sports Illustrated, The Sporting News, and ESPN The
Magazine) when reporting on female athletes generally and their corresponding athletic events as
compared to male athletes generally in their own events.
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Iyengar (1991) argued that “the episodic news frames takes the form of a case study or
event-oriented report and depicts public issues in terms of concrete instances” (p. 14). In stories
involving episodic frames, “better pictures, can be told more briefly, are easier to prepare, and
are less susceptible to charges of bias” (Farnsworth & Lichter, 2010, p.79). Episodic framing has
also been prominently utilized by sport scholars (e.g., Frisby, 2016; Mastro, Blecha, & AtwellSeate, 2011; Turner, 2014; Zaharopolous, 2007) to assess the framing techniques used by
newspapers and television broadcasts. As an example, Zaharopolous (2007) conducted research
regarding the news framing strategies within newspapers for the 2004 Olympic Games. The
study concluded that over 80% of the newspapers contained an article or report of the 2004
Olympic Games which as evidence of episodic framing. Moreover, Turner (2014) analyzed the
Sportscenter telecasts on ESPN and evaluated how the broadcast has evolved, in terms of
framing strategy, between 1999 and 2009. That research determined that segments tended to use
more episodic framing of sport stories versus thematic frames (Turner, 2014).
Some scholarly research also notably highlighted the potential use of conflict to create
the impression of unbiased reporting in either thematic or episodic framing (Dusek, 2006).
Known also as competitive framing, conflict framing is employed by the media as a special
strategy to present disagreement between individuals, organizations, and potentially socialcontrol agents (Curry et al., 2001; Dusek, 2006). The process of conflict framing frequently
involves the use of frame alignment, counter-framing, and re-framing (Curry et al., 2001; Dusek,
2006). Frame alignment encompasses the “initial framing of an issue and re-framing can be
defined as an adjustment to these original frames” (Dusek, 2006, p. 20). Both frame alignment
and re-framing make use of activities such as bridging, amplifying, extending, and transforming
(Snow, Rochford, Jr., Worden, & Benford, 1986). Counter-framing should not be viewed as the
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same as re-framing as counter-framing as it may involve vilification and debunking (i.e.,
highlighting of false narratives and information) (Curry et al., 2001; Dusek, 2006).
Finally, it should be noted that when analyzing misconduct, researchers need to
acknowledge the conflict between the reactivist and normative approaches (Wolf & Zuckerman,
2012). A reactivist approach aligns, counter-frames, and re-frames misconduct through the
perspective of a specific society. In most situations, earlier cases of those who exhibited
misconduct are used as example and current behaviors are compared to them (Wolf &
Zuckerman, 2012). The normative approach explains how the example of misconduct fails to fit
normal expectations of a society in general (Wolf & Zuckerman, 2012). The normative approach
compels attempts to identify norms and considers differences in attitudes, cultures, and mindsets
when frame aligning, counter-framing, debunking, and reframing (Wolf & Zuckerman, 2012).
Methodology
The present study uses textual analysis similar that employed by Buist and Mason (2010),
Eagleman (2011), Laucella (2009), and Sant and Mason (2015) in an effort to determine the
frames used by newspapers and the NCAA when reporting on organizational misconduct within
the NCAA Division-I from 1998 through 2016. The textual analysis was chosen because it
allowed for better comparison of how various newspapers and the NCAA frame information on
misconduct and to acknowledge their similarities and differences. Determining and qualifying
the relevance of information compelled the present research to incorporate a quantitative
component. Riffe, Lacey, and Fico (2005) characterized the inclusion of quantitative content as
requiring “the systematic assignment of communication content to categories according to rules,
and the analysis of relationships involving those categories using statistical methods” and as
useful to discover “typical patterns and characteristics” on a subject (p. 2). Neuendorf (2002)

72

similarly advocated for recording qualitative data or content units with quantitative-like purposes
(e.g., calculate descriptive statistics related to the content) because like variables some
information from qualitative studies can be considered “measurable concepts” (p. 95). Lastly,
Riffe et al. (2005) advocated that these content units can contribute to theme development as
intended in the present study.
Details regarding all violations committed by Division-I member institutions were first
collected using the Legislative Services Database (LSDbi) provided by the NCAA to obtain not
only the LSDbi case number but also institution name and date of public violation announcement
to set the boundary for other NCAA and corresponding newspaper reporting. Publications of the
NCAA News (n=168) were collected and examined, in addition to, the reports provided on the
LSDbi databases (53 cases). Additional web-based public reports were used for the final four
years of major violation cases, due to the lack of public access to the NCAA News archive. Text
in the articles from the NCAA News and web-based public reports, included exact details similar
to the LSDbi infraction cases. Specific information gathered on violations and sanctions as part
of the quantitative textual analysis from the NCAA, LSDbi database, and newspapers included
(i.e., institution name, violation type, sanction type, teams involved [revenue/non-revenue], and
classification [BCS/Power Five, non-BCS/Group of Five, Non-Football, Football Championship
Subdivision-FCS, and FBS] (Table 3). Schools were treated as a member of their specific
delineation(s) during the time of their sanction.
Table 3: Violation Totals within NCAA Division-I Classifications
Classification
n
Football Bowl Subdivision
Power Five/BCS

84

Group of Five/Non-BCS

47

73

Football Championship Subdivision

64

Non-Football Athletic Departments

25

Newspaper articles were obtained from local and national print media sources which
detailed reports of the infractions. Local newspapers (e.g., Altoona Mirror, Bangor Daily News,
Evansville Courier & Press, and Fairbanks Daily News-Miner) published in a two-week span
after the announcement were in addition to national newspapers (e.g., Atlanta JournalConstitution, Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, and Washington Post). Details
concerning each instance of misconduct were searched for on various news search engines (e.g.,
Google, Factiva, Lexis-Nexis, and America’s Historic Newspapers) and the key terms used for
each case included NCAA, major, and violations. Additional search terms varied for each
individual major violation case, such as the year and name of the College/University guilty of the
misconduct. As an example, to search for the 2011 major violations case against Texas Tech
University (LSDbi case no. 663), the search terms used included NCAA, major, violations, 2011,
Texas Tech. Any violation acknowledgement in a newspaper needed to provide at least 50 words
in order to be retained for this study. The initial search produced details for 221 cases of
misconduct of Division-I member institutions in 152 different newspaper reports. Overall, the
present study is confident that theoretical saturation was achieved (Gratton & Jones, 2004).
Role of the Researcher
As the first author, who conducted the research for the present study, I identify as an
African-American male that is a doctoral candidate at a research-intensive institution in the
Southeastern United States. In addition, I am a former NCAA Division-I student-athlete at a
Division I-FCS institution in the Southeastern United States. This study was conducted under the
notion that the NCAA serves as the primary governing body within intercollegiate athletics and
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the Association should work with member institutions to build assure that student-athletes
receive a quality educational experience. I comprehend, as a former student-athlete, that my
perspective regarding the NCAA may differ from other individuals within the academic
community as well as other external stakeholders without any affiliation. Given my own personal
background, I understand my responsibility as a researcher to gather and analyze the data
without manipulating the results based on my background.
Coding
Beamon (2010), Eagleman (2014), and Turman (2003) are all notable examples of
qualitative analyses which have only one coder. Krippendorff (2004) specified that “qualitative
studies tend to be carried out by analysts working alone, and replicability is generally of little
concern” (p. 88). The collection of data within the aforementioned documents and the
assessment of information in the present study are particular to a single researcher. To complete
a single-researcher coding process, three critical steps were undertaken as advised by Stern
(1996). First, the text of each distinct subject group (i.e., NCAA or newspapers) was read and
then coded by identifying key terms, phrases, and the aforementioned categories. Second, the
creation of sub-themes occurred through an emergent or inductive analysis because the various
frames of laminated language were not always defined prior to a review of the various texts.
Third, the present research grouped “the discourse into appropriate categories that could be
further examined for underlying or implicit meanings” (Moore et al., 2015, p. 165).
In the present study, the units of analysis were the paragraphs of each document. Matthes
and Kohring (2008) stated that, in some cases, the paragraph should be the primary unit of
analysis within the research of media framing because “the basic idea is that specific words are
the building blocks of frames” (p. 260). For newspapers, the newspaper name, date, title of the
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article, journalist name, name/type of violations, and aforementioned themes presented within
the article were recorded to build potential connections with the existing frames offered in other
documents. After the completion of coding for each document used, the newspaper articles were
coded again in order to identify individuals and/or job titles connected with each major violation.
Lastly, comprehensive frames were generated for each type of publication. Drawing from
Altheide’s (1996) research, it should be noted that the historical-cultural and social context are
respected because the present study sought to understand violations through precedent and other
past and other cultural-societal factors. Next, comprehending the distinctions between frames
forced the creation of “mini-frames” that were separate “from other possibilities” (Altheide,
1996, p. 30).
Overall, the coding results involved understanding the selection, emphasis, and exclusion
of information as outlined by Gitlin (1980). Next, coding involved asking whether episodic or
thematic framing was present and if conflict framing (i.e., frame alignment, counter-framing, or
reframing) was utilized using either a reactivist or normative approach. After the frames were
identified, the results were compared to determine whether there are similarities or differences in
how newspapers and the NCAA frame the same instances of organizational misconduct. It
should be noted that a codebook was utilized in this study to assure that the coding process
maintained consistency throughout and matched the overall purpose of this research.
Results
A total of 3,116 paragraphs were analyzed in NCAA and newspaper publications to
determine the various framing strategies utilized by both newspapers and the NCAA across the
220 major violations (i.e., organizational misconduct) produced by NCAA member institutions
from 1998 through 2016. There were 131 major violations committed by FBS members of which
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84 emanated from Power Five/BCS institutions and 47 by Group of Five/Non-BCS institutions
(Table 3). The remaining 89 major violations surfaced from the FCS (n=64) and Division I
athletic departments without football (n=25). The units of analysis suggest through framing
selection, emphasis, and exclusion that episodic framing was more prominent in both the NCAA
and newspapers, (i.e., 86% or n=2,678) than were instances of thematic framing (i.e., 14% or
n=438); thus confirming previous study. Specifically, the NCAA News articles and the public
reports solely used episodic framing (i.e., 48% or n=1,508). Newspaper articles also represented
a considerable number of episodic framing examples (i.e., 38% or n=1,170).
However, thematic framing was only found in newspaper articles. Lastly, under the
umbrella of conflict framing, the present study determined multiple instances of frame alignment
(i.e., 48% or n=1,508), reframing (i.e., 40% or n=1,251), and counter-framing through
vilification (i.e., 7% or n=242), and debunking (i.e., 4% or n=115) (Table 4).
Table 4 Summary of Framing Strategies in Major Violation Publications
Publication
Type

EpisodicThematic

CounterFraming

NCAA News

Episodic: 1485

Debunking: 0

Thematic: 0

Vilification: 0

NCAA
Public
Reports
Newspapers

Episodic: 69

Debunking: 0

Thematic: 0

Vilification: 0

Episodic: 1170

Debunking: 242

Thematic: 438

Vilification: 115

Frame
Alignment

Reframing

Total

1439

46

1485

69

0

69

0

1,251

1,608

Note: Units of analysis are paragraphs

NCAA Publications
Selection. Collectively, the NCAA offered episodic framing through presenting specific
facts about an individual case of misconduct. Next, the present study found the acts of
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misconduct by member institutions compelled the NCAA to select a reactivist approach since the
wrongful behaviors were promoted as violating the norms of the specific governing body for a
particular time frame. The present study found the public reports and press releases on major
violations displayed only frame alignment. As an example, in the major infractions case against
the University of Notre Dame (LSDbi case no. 784), the public report includes a section focused
on providing a summary of the case and then identifying the exact NCAA bylaws violated.
Specifically, the public report acknowledged that in the case against Notre Dame that,
“the former student athletic trainer and two football student-athletes engaged in
academic misconduct when the former student athletic trainer completed
academic course work for the student-athletes over two academic years. Further,
another football student-athlete committed academic misconduct without the
involvement of an institutional staff member. The conduct constituted academic
misconduct pursuant to NCAA Bylaw 10” (NCAA, 2016b, para. 2).
Vital facts and critical details pertaining to every case were also selected and placed in reports
where specific components of the infractions and sanctions are elaborated on in a sequential
order that followed a precedent or template-like reporting process. Purposely, information
detailed in violation descriptions provided assessments of misconduct sequentially through
including a general case history, findings of fact, infraction & bylaw analysis, and violation type.
Emphasis. The various NCAA publications emphasized three key elements when frame
aligning acts of misconduct to the public: 1) attributing responsibility, 2) outlining
transgressions, and 3) distributing sanctions to the member institutions. Each of these elements
also represents lamented language because they contribute to a sequence of details in NCAA
publications. As an example, Coastal Carolina University (LSDbi case no. 750), Southeastern
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Louisiana University (LSDbi case no. 742), and Wichita State University (LSDbi case no. 738)
all were found in violation of providing improper benefits to prospective student-athletes.
Although the exact improper benefits varied in each individual case, the NCAA identically
classified each institution as engaging in “improper recruiting inducements”. The NCAA
compiles and delivers information utilizing such lamented language throughout every infraction
case report and article; thus, emphasis contains consistency from the NCAA.
Regarding the attribution of responsibility, the present research discovered 517
paragraphs (i.e., 34%) focused on who played an instrumental role in the misconduct committed
by NCAA Division-I member institutions. Whether current or former student-athletes, head
coaches, assistant coaches, or administrators performed the infractions, the NCAA publications
recognized individuals only by their job titles or positions and the specific infraction(s) classified
in the NCAA handbook; names of individuals were never included. As an example, in the LevelI major violations case involving the University of California-Los Angeles (UCLA) football
team in 2016 (LSDbi case no. 776), the public infractions decision released by the Division-I
COI identified the attribution of responsibility by stating:
“In this case, the institution's associate head football coach knowingly arranged
for and provided impermissible services to two then prospective football studentathletes. In doing so, the associate head football coach also violated the NCAA
principles of ethical conduct. Additionally, the associate head football coach
engaged in impermissible off- campus recruiting contacts with three prospective
football student-athletes. Lastly, the institution impermissibly provided one
prospective football student-athlete with a second official visit to its campus”
(NCAA, 2016c, para. 1).
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The public reports and NCAA News articles were nearly identical when recognizing those whom
were responsible for the acts of misconduct. Again, emphasis contains consistency.
The outlining of major infraction cases was represented in 47% (n=715) of the
paragraphs within the NCAA publications primarily through connecting the misconduct to a
specific bylaw within the NCAA Manual. For instance, in the major infractions case of Weber
State University in 2014 (LSDbi case no. 736), the COI detailed the process of determining the
acts of misconduct by the institution in a section titled “Review of Case” or “Analysis”. Within
this section each infraction is specified, but the exact bylaw which is violated within the NCAA
Manual is provided as well. As an example, a portion of the analysis section from the Weber
State University infractions report states:
“1. NCAA legislation relating to unethical conduct resulting in academic fraud.
Bylaw 10.1 Unethical Conduct. Unethical conduct by a prospective or enrolled
student-athlete or a current or former institutional staff member, which includes
any individual who performs work for the institution or the athletics department
even if he or she does not receive compensation for such work, may include, but
is not limited to, the following: (b) Knowing involvement in arranging for
fraudulent academic credit or false transcripts for a prospective or an enrolled
student athlete.” (NCAA, 2014, p. 6)
Through directly detailing the wrongful behaviors of the member institutions by acknowledging
specific bylaws, the NCAA emphasizes transparency to show the public and member schools
what rule(s) were violated and the association’s subsequent punishment decision. Overall, the
present study found 132 cases of recruiting violations, 111 cases of unethical conduct violations,
and 62 cases of academic violations (Table 5). Further, the information presented by the NCAA
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News and public reports was similar when outlining transgressions. However, the NCAA public
reports tended to provide more direct links to passages from the NCAA Manual in order to
further connect violations to the decision-making process of the NCAA as a third-party regulator.
Table 5 Summary of Key Themes in NCAA Publications
Number of Cases
Key Themes
• Student-Athlete misconduct: 207
• Prospective Student-Athlete misconduct: 186
• Head Coach misconduct: 178
• Assistant Coach misconduct: 151
• Administrator misconduct: 124
Outlining Transgressions
• Recruiting Violations: 132
• Unethical Conduct: 111
• Academic Violations: 62
• Financial Violations: 60
• Institutional Control Violations: 56
Revealing Sanctions
• Show cause penalty: 117
• Reduction in financial aid: 106
• Limitation in recruiting: 88
• Two-year probation: 84
• Three-year probation: 56
Note. Information was collected from the LSDbi database provided through the NCAA website
at https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/
Attributing Responsibility

Interestingly, the lamented language of the NCAA publications also provided insight into
the process of enforcement in major violation cases through presenting how they collected
information, conducted interviews with members of the athletic department, and their public
notice regarding the distribution of punishments. NCAA publications also specify the sanctions
presented to institutions and various areas within athletic departments (e.g., coaching staff,
recruiting department, and compliance department). In comparison to the attributing
responsibility and outlining transgressions elements within NCAA publications, the details
regarding sanctions is not as obvious, only accounting for 18% (n=276) of the paragraphs within
NCAA documents. The punishments are listed in regard to the level of the penalties (i.e.,

81

major/Level-I or II). For example in the Jackson State University major infractions case of 2016
(LSDbi case no. 770), the penalties referenced in the NCAA periodicals included:
“1) One year of probation beginning July 1, 2016, and ending on June 30, 2017.
2) Financial penalty: The institution shall pay $5,000 to the Association. 3) The
former head men's tennis coach agreed that he violated NCAA recruiting,
eligibility and benefits legislation. 4) Public reprimand and censure. 5) The
institution shall vacate any records pertaining to the contest in which the studentathlete competed under an assumed name while ineligible” (NCAA, 2016d, p.7).
All NCAA publications include details about sanctions and the time frame of the distributed
punishments. Again, individuals by name are not included.
Exclusion. The exclusion of individual names is important to recognize as another
component of frame alignment. Unlike the newspapers, the NCAA excluded this information in
the publication of their reports and press releases. NCAA Bylaw 19.5.2. refers to the public
announcements of infractions cases by stating:
“The enforcement staff shall not publicly confirm or deny the existence of an
infractions case before complete resolution of the case pursuant to this article.
However, if information concerning a case is made public, the institution,
enforcement staff and the involved individual may confirm, correct or deny the
information made public.” (NCAA, 2015a, p. 309)
Once the NCAA presents details of the infractions case to the public, the association no
longer has to be confidential in the information pertaining to the violation, especially with those
individuals who engaged in the wrongful behavior. Yet, the NCAA remains consistent in only
referencing the positions and title of wrongdoers, rather than publicizing their names (Table 5).
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For example, in the major infraction case of Baylor University (LSDbi case no. 788), the
violation summary on the LSDbi database states:
“Two Baylor University assistant football coaches exceeded the number of
allowable recruiting evaluations for two prospects and had impermissible contact
with one of the prospects. A third assistant football coach attended a game of a
future opponent, which was prohibited off-campus scouting.” (NCAA, 2016e,
para. 3)
Overall, the NCAA publications provided insight into why the wrongdoers received a certain
punishment. However, precedent cases were notably absent in their reporting or communication
process about sanctioning decisions. This is interesting because newspapers overwhelmingly
utilized precedent cases to emphasize transparency, consistency, and exactness.
Newspapers
Selection. The collection of newspapers for this study included examples of both
thematic and episodic framing. The instances of episodic framing included any articles published
which solely focused on one case of misconduct by a member institution. For example, in the
Southern Methodist University major infractions case in September 2015 (LSDbi case no. 751),
the USA Today compiled data and published a story about what events took place when SMU
was found in violation of a lack of institutional control (Auerbach, 2015). The article analyzed
the behaviors of the institution by researching and reporting on characteristics of the players,
assistant coaches, and head coach of the SMU men’s basketball program. There were no
references to other major violation cases involving any other Division-I member institutions.
Thematic framing was also prominent in several newspaper articles about major
violations and subsequent sanctioning. For instance, in 2015, the USA Today published an article
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discussing the violations of major programs and whether there was a lasting impact on violating
teams (Wolken, 2015). In the article, major violations cases of the University of Oregon (LSDbi
case no. 709), the Ohio State University (LSDbi case no. 684), University of Connecticut (LSDbi
case no. 665), and the University of Southern California (LSDbi case no. 649) were mentioned
(Wolken, 2015). However, rather than emphasizing on one specific case, the article took a
normative approach and connected each case while describing the implementation of new
strategies after receiving sanctions from misconduct (Wolken, 2015).
At times, the information provided in newspapers regarding acts of misconduct by
NCAA members was also delivered in a reactivist manner. Newspaper publications would reframe or counter-frame the original information provided by the NCAA and allow for responses
for those directly affiliated with the cases. As an example, the major infractions case of the
University of Michigan football team (LSDbi case no. 658) led to the program being placed on
three-year probation. The newspaper article referenced to the violations committed by stating,
“Among the rules violations the NCAA Committee on Infractions found that
Rodriguez failed to monitor the duties and activities of the quality control staff
members, the former graduate assistant coach and a student assistant coach, and
the time limits for athletically related activities" (Baumgardner, 2013, para. 5).
However, the article also included quotes from the former head coach, which debunked the
notion of the case being considered major. The former head coach declared,
"I get mad when I think about that, to me -- and I don't mind saying it -- I thought
it was abunch of BS. We got in trouble for, in the offseason, a strength coach
putting a rubber ball on a stick for a get-off thing when (players) did their
running. A rubber ball on a stick. "Now think about that, I could have put a hat on
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a stick -- that was something I got

in trouble for” (Baumgardner, 2013, para. 3)

Emphasis. The present analysis of newspaper articles on NCAA major infractions led to
the observation of three key themes within the text emphasis: 1) the social impact of infractions
on an institution, 2) the conflict between the violating institution and the NCAA, and 3) the
reaction of community members to the major infraction(s). Each of the aforementioned elements
represents an aspect of the text which was noticeable in many of the newspaper publications. The
newspapers utilized the lamented language crafted by the NCAA by copying that in their
publications in order to classify the acts of misconduct and resulting sanctions. Yet, newspaper
articles tended to present more detail regarding the cases. Specifically, newspapers suggested
that they provided more perspective, depth, and analysis through incorporating a variety of
perspectives like those directly affiliated with the case, administrators from the NCAA, and those
in the surrounding campus community.
The social impact of infractions is evident in many newspaper reports (n=836), especially
with how journalists reflected upon the violations and the effect of impending sanctions within
the campus community. The campus community included more than just the team, coaches, and
administrators in the athletic department, but any individual or group that could be formally
associated with the institution, such as students, faculty, and academic administrators. The social
impact theme was more prominently reported with larger institutions when there were heavy
sanctions distributed, such as what occurred with the basketball and football teams at the
University of Southern California (USC) in 2010 (LSDbi case no. 649).
USC athletes were found guilty of accepting extra benefits from boosters and sport
marketers while still competing for the University (NCAA, 2010). The NCAA imposed strong
sanctions on to the institution including a one-year postseason ban, loss of scholarships,
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recruiting constraints, vacation of records, and the return of revenue earned from participation in
postseason play (NCAA, 2010). The Associated Press detailed the impact of infractions and
sanctions on the institution and one specific quote included:
"I don't see why the actions of one person is basically spilling over the entire
community," said USC student Warren Tichner."Basically, it's affecting USC, it's
affecting a lot of our image, our prestige, and I don't see why one little thing is
going to go on and ruin it all for all of us" (Associated Press, 2010, para. 13).
Journalists use social impact to gain viewpoints which from those who may not be
directly associated with a situation of wrongdoing, but endured the repercussions in some way.
The usage of the social impact theme by newspaper media generates interest due to gauging the
overall significance of infractions. Through the inclusion of various perspectives outside of the
athletic department and a thorough investigation of acts of wrongdoing, newspapers strived to
complete a comprehensive analysis of an infractions case before delivering a report to the
general public.
Many articles also published information that focused on how members of the athletic
department, violating sports teams, head coach, assistant coaches, etc., felt about receiving
sanctions. Conflict emerged throughout many of the reports (n=397), specifically in cases where
the institution does not agree with the sanctions presented from the NCAA. The use of the
conflict frame surfaced in various ways by newspapers detailing violations, using either a
thematic frame (i.e., 39% or n=155) or an episodic frame (i.e., 61% or n=242). For instance,
articles detailed information provided by head coaches, assistant coaches, athletic directors, and
in some cases NCAA personnel, who strongly disagree with the decision-making of the NCAA.
The infractions case of Syracuse University’s Men’s Basketball team in 2015 (LSDbi case no.
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741) exists as a superior exemplar of conflict framing in newspaper reporting. The NCAA found
the men’s basketball program in violation of academic fraud, extra benefits, and unethical
conduct regarding the drug testing policy held at the University (NCAA, 2015b). After the public
report and press releases from the NCAA were released to the public, Syracuse head coach Jim
Boeheim expressed to the USA Today that:
“I am disappointed with many of the findings and conclusions as stated in the
Infractions Report. The Committee chose to ignore the efforts which I have
undertaken over the past 37 years to promote an atmosphere of compliance within
the Men's Basketball Program. Much is also made in the Infractions Report
regarding alleged academic violations that occurred within the Men's Basketball
Program. As the Head Coach of the Program, I demand academic excellence from
my student-athletes. However, under NCAA rules, I am not permitted to intervene
in academic matters nor am I permitted to review academic work performed by
student-athletes” (Prisbell, 2015, para.5).
The usage of the conflict by newspapers transpired through the development of counterframes, especially with the perspectives which utilized debunking. Some of the articles included
quotes from head coaches and/or athletic directors defending the behaviors of violators, even
including proclaiming innocence. In 2016, the University of Louisiana at Lafayette football
program (LSDbi case no. 757) committed major recruiting violations leading to a vacation of
record from 2012 to 2014 (NCAA, 2016c). The athletic director of the University debunked the
report of the NCAA declaring that, “Due to lack of credible evidence, the university respectfully
disagrees with the NCAA’s findings that Coach Saunders made cash payment to a studentathlete” (Buckley, 2016, para. 8). Yet, the only reason that the institution did not file an appeal
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on the case was that “under the appeals process, even if the university were to prevail, the result
would not likely change the sanctions” (Buckley, 2016, para. 9). With the usage of conflict
framing, especially debunking, newspapers provided a platform for violating institutions to
defend themselves (i.e., diminish the public reprimand) and to provide their perspective about
what exactly had taken place subsequent to or after the infractions. The viewpoints of the
institution likely do not change the consequences provided by the NCAA, but allows for the
public to obtain statements from the violators’ point of view before making their own opinions.
Local publications rather than national newspapers were more likely to provide reactions
from those not directly affiliated with a College or University found in violation of NCAA rules.
There were 375 total public reaction paragraphs found in newspapers with 310 paragraphs (i.e.,
83%) labeled as episodic frames and 65 paragraphs (i.e., 17%) classified as thematic frames.
When colleges and universities are found guilty of violating rules and regulations of the NCAA,
the public reaction on the case provides insight on how the non-campus community feels about a
specific team or the entire athletic department.
One example includes when Baylor University committed a major violation involving
recruiting in 2016 (LSDbi case no. 788) and the NCAA did not impose any further sanctions
after the University disciplined the coaches that engaged in the wrongdoing (NCAA, 2016e).
Even though the NCAA did not provide any additional sanctions, members from other peer
institutions expressed resentment with the behavior of the Baylor Football coaching staff, such as
Xavier University (Ohio) Athletic Director Greg Christopher, who stated,
“It is disappointing that the university's coaching staff was more interested in
finding loopholes to exploit the rules instead of trying to follow the rules. The
assistant coaches could have easily avoided these violations if their focus had
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been following the rules rather than finding ways around them” (Associated Press,
2016, para.5).
Public reaction appears similar to the aforementioned social impact theme; however, the present
study outlines public reaction as including the perspective of those in the community or not
enjoying a formal status (e.g., student, faculty, and staff) with the violating institution. Through
the utilization of public reaction, the counter-framing method implemented by newspaper
reporters presented a possibility for the NCAA or wrongdoing individuals or institutions to be
characterized as villains.
Exclusion. Newspaper articles detailing major violations of NCAA Division-I members
tended to be very limited in regard to excluding information in their reports. As previously
mentioned, newspaper media made a formidable effort to include as much detail and perspective
in their analysis of violation cases. The reports would include the lamented language utilized in
NCAA publications including the type of violations (i.e., lack of institutional control or academic
fraud), yet newspapers would be more willing to disclose specific details, including the full name
of those involved in wrongdoing. The only noticeable omission from the newspaper articles on
major infractions was the lack of reference to the NCAA Bylaws and the NCAA Manual. The
newspapers would describe the acts of wrongdoing by using the lamented language presented in
the NCAA reports, but would not provide the section or correlating subsections to the public.
Finally, elements from the initial frame alignment provided by the various NCAA
publications were also occasionally re-framed in newspapers (n=1,205) through exclusion. In
2016, Norfolk State University (LSDbi case no. 768) committed a level-II violation involving the
improper compliance certification of 48 athletes representing six different teams (NCAA, 2016).
The article re-framed the case stating that Norfolk State University “failed to monitor the
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conduct and the administration of its athletic program in that the institution failed to establish
proper systems and safeguards for ensuring that student-athletes’ eligibility was certified
according to NCAA eligibility standards” (Hall, 2016, para. 12). Re-framing occurred because
the newspaper article excluded the specific bylaw section and/or subsection of the violation that
categorized the violation; thus, facilitating beliefs that the case involved Level-I type violations
such as a lack of institutional control.
Discussion/Conclusion
Utilizing the concept of framing theory, the present study investigates and contrasts the
strategies of framing implemented by a formal social-control agent (i.e., NCAA) and newspapers
reporting on acts of organizational misconduct. Previous management literature (e.g., Dusek,
2006; Smith & Cho, 2017; Yoo et al., 2013) has detailed information pertaining to organizational
misconduct and resulting media portrayals, yet has neglected to address the role of social-control
agents in the administration of facts regarding misconduct cases to the general public and
institutional members. In this section, an assessment of each of the primary areas of episodic and
thematic framing (e.g., selection, emphasis, and exclusion) are evaluated within the two sources
of data (e.g., NCAA publications and newspapers) as a method to determine how misconduct is
presented to organizational members and society at-large.
The present research demonstrated support for Farnsworth and Lichter (2010) and
Turner’s (2014) analyses that episodic framing is more widespread and involves the
incorporation of prominent, precise information but that episodic frames are used differently for
specific audiences. Next, the present study offers thematic framing as highly correlated to the
normative approach and confirms Curry et al.’s (2001) and Dusek’s (2006)’s recommendation
that media outlets utilize assorted conflict framing strategies (e.g., frame alignment, counter-
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framing, and debunking) to emphasize that information and perspective provided on cases was
false, incomplete, correct, or filtered. Such results also support the appearance of impartiality
which notably reinforces Rowe et al.’s (1998) and Pollock et al.’s (2016) assertion that the
media, as an informal social-control agent, can be both supportive and contrasting.
Regarding general similarities in the presentation of information, the NCAA and
newspapers, as social-control agents, sought to emphasize consistency, transparency, and
exactness for their particular audiences. First, both sources provided general information relating
to the major violation cases including the names of the violating institutions, specific violations,
and sanctions distributed. The sequence of events (i.e., case history, findings of fact to infraction
& bylaw analysis, violation type, and sanction) were reported similarly by both sources. Next, it
should be noted that the usage of lamented language was featured throughout the description of a
major infraction case, regardless of the source. For instance, if the NCAA acknowledged that a
member institution displayed a lack of institutional control within the NCAA News or public
report, then the newspaper would adopt the same terminology when describing a case to the
public. In this instance, the NCAA established the initial frame alignment for subsequent
newspaper articles. Further, through maintaining consistency with lamented language, it appears
the membership and public at-large would be more likely to comprehend the wrongful behavior
and acknowledge transparency within the NCAA decision-making and sanctioning processes.
The present research also suggests frame alignment specifically occurred through bridging and
amplifying. As an example, the formal language and well-defined social structure of the NCAA
provided some exactness to each case. The newspapers, in contrast, differed significantly,
particularly in the area of conflict framing.
As previously mentioned, the NCAA used precedent as a method for uniformity and
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stability when providing news about major violations to the public. The results indicated that the
NCAA incorporated a similar sequential structure and formal reporting strategy on infraction
cases through emphasizing the attribution of responsibility, outlining of transgressions, and
revealing of sanctions. The NCAA was also very specific with respect to identifying the
position/job of those individuals committing misconduct. Further, the NCAA provided exact
information about which bylaw(s) were violated and what sanctions were assigned. Again, this
information provided by the NCAA publications importantly served as the initial framework
(e.g., frame alignment) for newspapers. Specifically, newspapers made use of the information
and aforementioned lamented language revealed in those documents to set the foundation for
their own reports. However, newspapers were less formal and more specific in certain areas. For
instance, newspapers frequently identified the names of individuals involved in instances of
misconduct but frequently excluded the names of bylaw(s) violated.
The NCAA may have been strategic to avoid the provision of additional public
sanctioning or embarrassment to the institution by putting a ‘face’ to the misconduct and
subsequent sanctions. By this, the present study endorses the assumption of Southall and Nagel
(2008) that the NCAA was intentionally formal to decrease the marginalization of the wrongdoer
and thus the association itself. Again, the NCAA is likely interested in protecting members as
best they can because their individual members and the Association itself frequently create and
maintain relationships with businesses and their fan nations to keep revenues strong (Southall &
Nagel, 2008). Still, formal social-control agents are tasked to enforce the behaviors of member
organizations, but also deliver accurate information pertaining to the case to the public.
However, in the completion of this study, the NCAA removed the NCAA News archive
from public access which detailed all former cases of major violations committed by NCAA
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members. The removal of the archive served as a practical implication of this study considering
that social-control agents function in transparency and should fully commit to easily accessibility
for member organizations. Beginning with the presidential era of Dick Schultz in 1989, there was
a strong effort towards making the rules, regulations, and decision making of the Association
apparent to member organizations, but also individuals in the community (Crowe, 1989). The
elimination of the NCAA News archive negatively impacts the NCAA as an institutional
subsystem considering the concealing of details regarding past cases of organizational
misconduct goes against the notion of being transparent in society.
Next, it should be noted that while the NCAA, as a formal social-control agent,
maintained consistency due to precedent reporting processes, the Association did not
demonstrate a reliance on precedent to make decisions and assign sanctions. Newspapers
regularly used precedent decisions and sanction assignments to compare cases with similar
instances of misconduct. Moreover, newspapers engaged in re-framing and counter-framing in
order to provide additional insight (e.g., interviews, surveys, polls, etc.) to their communities.
The NCAA exclusively used frame alignment; however, newspapers, specifically those closer in
proximity to violating institutions, appear more likely to conduct an extensive analysis on a
major infraction case that involved counter-framing and re-framing. The present study suspects
this may be due to the probable association and personal connection that community or regional
newspapers may have to the aforementioned institution. Overall, newspapers differed from the
NCAA because they focused their emphasis on the social impact of infractions, conflict, and the
reaction of community members.
Finally, the framing strategies of journalists determine whether the acts of misconduct
would result in public disapproval (Buist & Mason, 2010; Clemente, Durand, & Porac, 2016;
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Franiuk et al., 2008). The usage of counter-framing strategies, such as debunking and
vilification, were prominent valence frames in newspaper articles and serve as another way to
differentiate their products from that offered by the NCAA. In newspapers, those involved with
the violation and receiving sanctions received an opportunity to defend themselves and their
program or to criticize the decision-making process of the third-party regulator. The newspapers
offered themselves as fully transparent with their partnering communities by disclosing any
additional information left out of any initial frame alignment. Again, the NCAA tended to
exclude certain details (e.g., violator or student-athlete name) from publications as a method to
maintain a strong rapport with members. Still, the possibility of exclusion by newspapers is
possible. For instance, if the media does not believe that major violations are mediated or
representation of a deeper scandal, then the likelihood of the media to provide additional analysis
or coverage decreases.
Future Research
Finally, some future research areas emerged as a result of this work. For instance,
although the present study looked at major violations committed by Division I institutions, future
research could look at framing differences with major misconduct committed by Division II and
III members. Specifically, it would be interesting to see if the NCAA reports similarly in length
and the use of lamented language. Further, it would be interesting to see if potential coverage
demonstrates differences between local media from national media. Regarding media, it would
also be interesting to see if the new burgeoning social media outlets by the NCAA and mass
media engage in different framing techniques than that offered by newspapers. There are
suggestions that social media platforms are rising in importance to communicate information to
the public and institutional members (Sanderson, Snyder, Hull, & Gramlich, 2015). Next, future

94

focus could also look to see if specific instances of major violations or misconduct prompt
different selections in framing strategies by the various mass media platforms. As an example, in
the present study, infractions involving extra benefits presented to student-athletes could be
compared to cases of academic misconduct across newspapers, radio, newsletters, tweets, blogs,
and other media alternatives.
Also, another future research topic could focus on analyzing the media attention given to
celebrity firms. Celebrity firms are classified as “social actors that attracts large-scale public
attention: the greater the number of people who know of and pay attention to the actor, the
greater the extent and value of that actor’s celebrity” (Rindova, Pollock, & Hayward, 2006, p.
50). In the present study, the NCAA Division I was described as supporting BCS/Power Five
institutions. Rindova et al. (2006) referenced how celebrity firms are typically presented in a
positive manner from society due to their perceived value. The present study demonstrates an
opportunity to observe if there are differences in how infractions were detailed in media reports
and the NCAA on cases of misconduct by BCS/Power Five schools.
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CHAPTER 4.

A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NCAA’S ENFORCEMENT
In terms of understanding social-control agent behavior, the present study utilizes the
theory of social control. Social control is simply defined as the efforts by leaders to ensure
conformity to the norms (Goode, 2015). In other words, rather than society being self-governing
or self-regulating, there are individuals or groups who are appointed to ensure that members are
acting in an appropriate way (Goode, 2015). These individuals or groups, termed social-control
agents, have the legitimate authority to punish individuals or organizations who engage in
activities deemed by social-control agents as misconduct. While social-control agents are
recognized in the literature, the research understanding their behavior is limited (e.g., Greve,
Palmer, & Pozner, 2010).
The purpose of the present study is to analyze the likelihood of social-control agents
handing down different types of penalties to organizations who commit misconduct. More
specifically, the study seeks to understand any change in behavior regarding social-control
agents in the wake of a change in leadership as well as the influence of the media coverage of
wrongdoing. The empirical setting in which the present research is using to examine behavior of
social-control agents is the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). Of particular
interest is the punishment levied by the social-control agent [i.e., NCAA through the Committee
of Infraction (COI)] in response to the misconduct of the organization (i.e., university). Division
I-FBS universities were chosen due to their popularity (athletics and overall institution) as well
as amount of revenue the athletic department generates (Brown, Farrell, & Zom, 2007; Otto,
2005). For example, in some of the larger athletic departments in Division-I (e.g., Power Five
Conferences), achieving high levels of success in revenue-generating sports, such as football and
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men’s basketball, can lead to increased donations to the institution (Grimes & Chressanthis,
1994), increased donations to the athletic department (Humphreys & Mondello, 2007), increased
number of student applications (Chressanthis & Grimes, 1993; Pope & Pope, 2014), and an
increase in state funding (Humphreys, 2006). However, other research acknowledged the pursuit
and effort to sustain success, especially revenue-generating sports, can prompt participation in
misconduct (Fizel & Brown, 2014; Mahoney, Fink, & Pastore, 1999; Otto, 2005).
In order to understand the likelihood of different penalty types, a two-stage probit model
is estimated in order to control for the inherent endogeneity of punishment type contingent upon
an organization committing misconduct. Overall, the results from a twelve year sample (2003
through 2015) finds evidence that the type of violations committed in major infraction cases (e.g,
amateurism, financial, institutional control, and team-related) are significant in determining the
likelihood of sanctions. The present study examines the qualities which comprise Division-I
institutions and investigates whether the NCAA assesses penalties based upon the structure of
each college and university.
Literature Review
In order to understand organization misconduct, an individual has to consider that an
action by the organization is considered misconduct because an individual or a collective body
judges actions as misconduct. Greve, et al. (2010) defined misconduct as “behaviour in or by an
organization that a social-control agent judges to transgress a line separating right from wrong;
where such a line can separate legal, ethical, and socially responsible behaviour from their
antitheses” (p. 56). They further defined social-control agent as “actor(s) that represents a
collectivity and that can impose sanctions on that collectivity’s behalf” (Greve et al., 2010, p.
56).
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Social-control agents have roots within social control theory (Greve et al., 2010). Gibbs
(1994) and Deflam (2015) framed social control as involving informal or formal power levied
against or toward other person(s) or group(s) to foster or strengthen desirable behaviors. Goode
(2015) similarly positioned social control as the selection and implementation of special
behaviors employed by leaders to ensure conformity to the norms (Goode, 2015). Pollock,
Mishina, and Seo (2016) elaborated on the individual responsibility of social-control agents,
stating that “social-control agents include various entities that differ in the formality of their
constitution, the breadth of their jurisdiction, and the severity of the punishments that they can
administer” (p. 240).
Formal social control power is established by third-party regulators and often surfaces
with efforts to enhance or maintain commitments to established rules and regulations produced
by a professional society (Hollinger & Clark, 2005). Formal social controls are necessary
because, within institutions where competition is present, a professional society is not selfgoverning or self-regulating. Social controls like governing bodies and enforcement groups are
necessary to ensure that members of society avoid misconduct and understand the consequences
related to such behavior (Goode, 2015). Greve et al. (2010) offered several examples of thirdparty regulators (e.g., international governing bodies, national governing bodies, local governing
bodies, and professional associations) responsible for such oversight.
The existence of social-control agents contributes to the usage of the sociological
approach of defining wrongdoing, which simply states social-control agents punish the behaviors
of individuals/organizations that they label as wrong (Palmer, 2012). In doing so, this approach
places the power of enforcement directly upon the social-control agents. Like previous literature,
the present study argues social-control agents make enforcement decisions about misconduct
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through sanctioning or penalty assignments (Greve et al., 2010; Palmer, 2012). Penalizing
individuals and organizations for engaging in wrongdoing is common and well researched, but
analyzing the punishments administered from social-control agents is still developing (Greve et.
al, 2010; Vaughan, 1999). The present research uses the NCAA as its empirical setting to further
understand how social-control agents punish misconduct or organizations.
Empirical Setting
Within the literature, the NCAA is recognized as a cartel (e.g., Fleisher, Goff, & Tollison,
1992; Kahn, 2007). Humphreys (2012) defined a cartel as “a formal economic agreement among
agents or organizations that would normally compete with one another to not compete in some
dimension. Cartels engage in collusive behavior, and the success of a cartel depends on all
members of the cartel abiding by the agreement” (p. 710). This incentive to cheat by
organizations, so as to act in their own self-interest, threatens the strength and stability of the
cartel over the long-term (Humphreys & Ruseski, 2009). Thus, the social-control agent’s
responsibility is to not only punish members who engage in misconduct, but to punish in such a
way to deter future organizational misconduct to maintain the stability within the cartel
agreement.
Since 2003, an increase in major violations committed by member institutions of the
NCAA and subsequent penalty assignments occurred, which prompted some scholars to
associated the increase with the growth of commercialism in college athletics over the last 15
years (NCAA, 2017; Otto, 2005; Parkinson, 2012; Weston, 2011). A number of studies
examined misconduct throughout the history of the NCAA from a variety of angles including
sociology, law, and economics, such as Fizel and Brown (2014), Mahony, Fink, and Pastore
(1999), and Otto (2005). Organizational misconduct is presented in the NCAA as several types
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of violations that include a breach of contract, such as lack of institutional control, academic
fraud, failure to cooperate with the NCAA, unethical conduct, recruitment of student-athletes,
and failure to monitor (Clark & Batista, 2009). Research acknowledged the pursuit and effort to
sustain success, especially revenue-generating sports, can prompt participation in misconduct
(Fizel & Brown, 2014; Mahony et al., 1999; Otto, 2005). Such examples of negative behavior
associated with athletic departments result from individuals and/or groups that place more value
on the servicing of self-directed interests (Agle & Kelley, 2001; Kelley & Chang, 2007).
Davis and Hairston (2013) argued some institutions and/or individuals also use a riskreward analysis to engage in wrongdoing. More specifically, Cullen, Latessa, and Jonson (2012)
surveyed a number of student athletes asking about their behavior in violation of NCAA rules
and regulations. Their findings suggest that many infractions committed by students are minor
in nature. Broadly, the results suggest the reason for committing individual violations relate
back to theories of social control than economic motives (Cullen et al., 2012). More recent
research by Fizel and Brown (2014) found, over a 30-year period (1981-2011), there were a
number of determinants of a university’s football program that would lead to an increase in the
likelihood that the program would engage in misconduct. Some of these determinants include
current on-field team performance and conference affiliation. Fizel and Brown (2014) also
examined four specific time periods during the sample. They found that playing in the 1980s, an
era where there was significant structural change in Division I, significantly impacted the
likelihood of misconduct.
As it relates to behavior of the social-control agent, Cullen et al. (2012) stated that formal
social control (i.e., punishment from the NCAA) is not effective; rather, informal social control
is much stronger in reducing misconduct. In addition to Cullen et al.’s (2012) research,
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Humphreys and Ruseski (2006) sought to understand the likelihood of Division I-A football
teams are put on probation due to their misconduct. Of specific interest is the change in behavior
following a change in policy by the NCAA eliminating mandatory penalties for violations as it
relates to the recruitment of athletes. Their results showed changes in behavior by the
Committee of Infractions as it relates to the determinants of punishment. For example, the more
successful the football team was as it relates to its winning percentage in the previous year led to
an increase in the likelihood of being placed on probation prior to the rule change in 1993.
Following the rule change, recent performance is insignificant.
Winfree and McCluskey (2008) sought to understand the incentives for school to selfreport their violations to the social-control agent. The rationale is that pursuing this action,
schools may be able to convince the social-control agents to punish them lighter than if the
social-control agents uncovered the misconduct. Over a 20-year sample, Winfree and McCluskey
(2008) examined three common punishments by the NCAA: television, postseason ban, and
probation. They found that self-report violations and punishment by organizations did
significantly impact the likelihood that social-control agents would agree with that form of
punishment.
In summary, the incentives are aligned within the NCAA’s cartel agreement for
organizations to engage in misconduct for their own self-interest. The social-control agent within
the cartel, the association and in particular the COI, has the legitimate authority to punish actions
they deem to be misconduct. While some research has explored the enforcement behavior of the
NCAA, little research incorporates elements of social control theory to understand behavior by
social-control agents. This behavior is analyzed below.
Methodology
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The present study focuses on the actions by Division I universities judged to be
misconduct by the social-control agent (NCAA, COI) that are subsequently punished. The
sample period in our panel dataset is from 2003 to 2015, which corresponds to the year in which
Miles Brand began his tenure as the head of the NCAA. The unit of observation is a universityyear, and the sample period consists of 4,589 university-year observations. The present research
examines punishments given by the social-control agent. Data on punishments delivered by the
NCAA was provided by the NCAA Legislative Services Database (LSDbi). During the sample
period, there were 148 documented instances of misconduct with subsequent punishments.
Examining these cases, punishments were coded into seven categories: probation
(Probation), postseason ban (Postseason), show cause (ShowCause), recruiting (Recruit),
reduction of financial aid (FinAid), vacation of on-field records (Vaca), and public reprimand
(PublicRep). For each variable, the variable is equal to 1 if the NCAA delivered the punishment
in the observed year. There are many cases where multiple penalties are delivered by the socialcontrol agent (e.g., probation and public reprimand). In these cases, all penalties are included.
The present study includes a number of explanatory variables that are grouped in four
categories: misconduct characteristics, environment, university characteristics, and social-control
agent characteristics. The first group of variables consists of defining the intensity and scope of
organization misconduct. Similar to punishment, organization misconduct is also obtained
through the LSDbi. The LSDbi includes the details of misconduct committed by the
organization. From reading the description, misconduct was coded into six groups: academic
(Academic), amateurism (Amateur), financial (Finance), institutional control (Icon), recruiting
(Recru), and team (Team).
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Table 6 Categories of Violations (n=3,832)
Name

Description/Definition

Mean

Std. Dev

Examples
•
•

Academic

Academic Violations

0.007

0.083
•

Amateur

Amateurism Violations

0.010

0.098

Finance

Financial Violations

0.018

0.134

Icon

Institutional Control
Violations

0.019

•
•
•

Amateurism
Eligibility
Usage of a Professional
Talent Scout

•
•
•

Extra Benefits
Improper Financial Aid
Outside Funds

•
•

Failure to Comply
Unethical
Conduct/Questionable
Practice,
Institutional Control
Excessive Official Visits
Improper Recruiting
Entertainment
Improper Recruiting
Inducements

0.136
•
•
•

Recru

Recruiting Violations

0.016

0.127

Academic Fraud
Improper
Administration of Precollege Administration
Tests
Academic Misconduct

•
•
•

Improper Competition
Improper
Team
Team Related Violations 0.014
0.116
Entertainment/Employment
• Improper
In addition to the type of misconduct, other characteristics from
the report are included.
Lodging/Transportation
First, the present study includes the total number of teams involved case (#Teams). The second
characteristic is an indicator variable for if the university self-reported their violation (SelfRep).
Previous research by Winfree and McCluskey (2008) found self-reporting violations can affect
the punishment given to them by the NCAA. Third, an indicator variable is included for if the
institution was a repeat violator (RepeatVio). Being a repeat violator is classified whether this
was not the first instance of a major infraction case against the institution since 1953. Finally, a
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variable is included if at least one revenue generating sport contributes to the misconduct
(RevSport). For the purposes of this paper, a revenue sport is defined as men’s basketball and
football. The variable is equal to 1 if at least one of these sports are included, 0 otherwise.
The second category is labeled environment, which encompasses the coverage of
misconduct in the external environment as well as the institutional environment for misconduct.
The first variable is media coverage (MediaCov), which is an unduplicated newspaper count in
the initial 30 days mentioning the organization’s misconduct. This 30-day window begins on the
date of the initial notice of allegations by the social-control agent (i.e., NCAA) to the
organization (i.e., university). The newspaper counts were done by searching “institution name,
major violations, year of infraction, sport involved” within the Google News and Newspaper
Source databases.
The second variable in this category looks at the number of similar instances of
misconduct over the past year (Similar), which is a count of the number of incidents in the same
category as the observed incident over the past 365 days at the initial notice of allegations.
Finally, we include a count of all misconduct that occurred over the past year from the initial
notice of allegations (AllInc). Both of these counts were obtained from the LSDbi database.
The third category is university characteristics, which are obtained from the Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) and the Equity in Athletics Data Analysis
(EADA) websites. The first variable is an indicator variable for if the observed school is a
Historical Black College and University (HBCU) institution (HBCU). The variable is equal to 1
if the observed university is an HBCU, 0 otherwise. The second variable is an indicator variable
for whether the observed university is a private university (Private). The third variable is a
dummy variable for whether the observed university is a member of a Power conference
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(PowerConf). For the present study, the following conferences are classified as power
conferences: Big10, Big12, Pac12, Atlantic Coast, and Southeastern. If a university is a member
of one of these conferences in the observed year, the variable is coded as a 1; 0 otherwise. The
present research includes two variables controlling for the size of both the athletic department
(SizeAD) and university (SizeUniv). For the athletic department, the total number of athletes is
included for the observed year. This data was retrieved from EADA. The size of the university
variable is operationalized by the total number of enrolled first-year students on campus at the
beginning of the fall semester of the observed year. This data was obtained from the IPEDS
website.
The final category of variables is social-control agent. In the present research there are
three variables within this category. The first is an indicator variable equal to 1 in the years in
which Myles Brand was president of the NCAA (Brand). Recall from Chapter 2, his tenure
began in 2003 and lasted until his death prior to the 2009 school year. The second variable is an
indicator variable equal to 1 in the years in which Mark Emmert was president (Emmert). His
tenure began in 2011. The third variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 in the years where the
NCAA classified penalties into four levels (Level). This policy change took effect in August
2013 (NCAA, 2015).
Model and Estimation Issues
Due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables, a probit model is estimated in
the present research. Equation 1 outlines the probit model:
Penaltyit = f (Academicit, Amateurit, Financeit, Iconit, Recruit, Teamit, #Teamsit, SelfRepit,
RepeatVioit, RevSportit, MediaCovit, Similarit, AllIncit, HBCUit, Privateit, PowerConfit, SizeADit,
SizeUnivit, Brandit, Emmertit, LevelVioit, ϵit )
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(1)
where i indexes universities and t indexes years.
In the present study, there are a number of estimation issues. The biggest estimation issue
is the endogeneity associated with any penalty variable. When a social-control agent is thinking
about what penalty, if any, to impose on an organization, the organization must first have
committed some sort of misconduct. Thus, one must have to control for the likelihood that
misconduct occurs.
In order to predict misconduct, the present study estimates an additional probit model
with the dependent variable being misconduct (Misconduct). This variable is equal to 1 if the
observed university committed misconduct in the observed year, defined by appearing in the
LSDbi database. A number of explanatory variables are included in the model. First, we
control for the number of NCAA sports that are sponsored by the university in the observed year
(#Sports). It is anticipated that the more sports offered by the university, the higher the likelihood
of committing misconduct. The second variable is the observed university’s percentage of male
coaches to overall coaches in the observed year (%mcoach). Research by Mahony et al. (1999)
examined university misconduct and subsequent university impacts of that misconduct over a 45year period. Their study highlighted previous research outlining the “male model”, where male
coaches would be more likely to commit misconduct. Thus, the %mcoach variable controls for
this possibility.
The present study also includes five university characteristics. The first is whether or not
the observed school is a member of Division I-FBS (FBS). The second variable is if the
observed school is a Division I member with no football team (NoFB). It is anticipated that the
FBS variable will have a positive and statistically significant increase in the likelihood to commit
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misconduct, while the NoFB will have a negative and statistically significant impact. Both of
these impacts are in comparison to the reference group, a Division I-FCS university.
In addition to athletic membership, we include a variable for academic quality of the
school. Previous research found that academic quality has a significant and negative impact on
the likelihood of committing misconduct (e.g., Fort & Quirk, 2001; Humphreys & Ruseski,
2009). We operationalize academic quality as the average SAT Scores of the 75th percentage of
their incoming freshmen (TSAT). The third variable, retrieved from IPEDS, is an indicator
variable for whether or not the school is in a rural location (Rural). The fourth variable, Private,
is outlined above and included in the first stage model. The final variable is the number of
sanctions imposes by the social-control agent in the previous year (#Sanctions(t-1)). It is
anticipated the higher the total number of sanctions in the previous year would lead to a
statistically significant lower likelihood of a university committing misconduct in the observed
year. The rationale is the total number of sanctions would deter an organization to engage in
misconduct. In addition, we include the variables for both the Brand (Brand) and Emmert
(Emmert) presidencies.
This first stage probit model predicting misconduct is estimated. From the estimation, the
Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) is calculated and used as a control variable in Equation 1. In other
words, the IMR is used to help predict the punishment contingent upon the organization
engaging in misconduct. In addition to the endogenity issue, the other estimation issue in the
present study deals with the equation error term. In Equation 1, the error term (ϵ) has two
components, a random component as well as a university component. Thus, the error term is
Equation 2 is clustered by individual universities using the “vce(cluster)” option in STATA.
Results
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Table 7 presents the summary statistics for the punishment categories. An average of
3.3% of university-year observations included probation, whereas 2.8% of university-year
observations resulted in public reprimand. Within the observations, 1.6% of the observation
exhibited both show cause penalties and the reduction of financial aid capabilities. 1.3% of the
observations represented the limitation of recruiting capabilities and the vacation of team record.
A ban from postseason competition represented 0.5% of observations in the sample. As far as
the acts of misconduct, 1.9% represented institutional control violations, 1.8% represented
financial violations, 1.6% detailed recruiting violations, 1.4% specified team-related violations,
1.0% described amateurism violations, and 0.7% referenced academic violations.
Table 7 Summary Statistics of Sanctions
Name

Description/Definition

Mean

Std. Dev

Probation

Probation Sanction

0.033

0.179

Postseason

Ban from participating in Postseason
Competition

0.005

0.074

ShowCause

Show Cause Penalty

0.016

0.127

Recruit

Recruiting Limitations

0.013

0.113

FinAid

Reduction in Financial Aid

0.016

0.124

Vaca

Vacation of Record

0.013

0.110

PublicRep

Press Release from the NCAA
regarding violation

0.028

0.166

Table 8 presents the rest of the summary statistics including variables from the first stage
regression. The total sample observations for the study are 3,832. Recall from above that the total
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population for the sample period is 4,589. This reduction for the overall population during this
time period is due to missing data from IPEDS database detailing the University category, such
as SAT scores or total enrollment for Division-I institutions. Within the misconduct category,
2.8% of the observations involved repeat violators of major infractions, 2.5% of the observations
included self-reported major violations, 2.7% involved revenue-based athletic teams (e.g., men’s
basketball & football), and there was a maximum of 18 teams implicated in infraction cases.
In the environment category, there was an average of 10.4 violations in the previous year
of observations with a minimum of 7 violations and a maximum of 16 violations. Media
coverage of major infractions has a mean of 0.40 articles within the observations with a
maximum of 31 articles detailing a major violation case. The similar violation types in the past
year have a mean of 0.077 and a maximum total of 6. The University category contains historical
black colleges and universities, which represent 6.3 percent of the observations. 36.2% of the
observations are classified as private institutions in the IPEDS database. Power five and BCS
institutions are represented in 19.2% of the observations. The size of the athletic department, in
terms of student-athletes, has an average of 489 student-athletes per institution with a minimum
of 69 student-athletes, and a maximum of 1,488 student-athletes. The enrollment size of the
institution in the fall semester of the academic year has a mean of 2,391 students with a
minimum of 199 and a maximum of 10,835. The social control category included the executive
directors, in which 44.7% of observations were under the guidance of Myles Brand and 47.5% of
the observations occurred under Mark Emmert. Also, 15.8% of the observations transpired after
the NCAA made alterations to the violation structure, changing from two levels to four levels.
Table 8 Summary Statistics – First Stage Probit Regression
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

#Teams

0.097

0.876

0

18
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SelfRep

0.025

0.157

0

1

RepeatVio

0.028

0.164

0

1

RevSport

0.027

0.162

0

1

MediaCov

0.401

2.339

0

31

Similar

0.077

0.482

0

6

AllInc

10.410

2.363

7

16

HBCU

0.063

0.242

0

1

Private

0.362

0.481

0

1

PowerConf

0.192

0.394

0

1

SizeAD

489

200

69

1,488

SizeUniv

2,392

1,673

199

10,835

Brand

0.447

0.497

0

1

Emmert

0.475

0.499

0

1

Level

0.158

0.365

0

1

#Sponsor

16

4

5

35

%mcoach

0.453

0.047

0.286

0.818

FBS

0.375

0.484

0

1

NoFB

0.282

0.450

0

1

TSAT

1,230

136

840

1600

Rural

0.122

0.327

0

1

26

11

0

45

#Sanctions(t-1)

Within the first stage regression results, the number of sport teams represented within
each athletic department has an average of 15.99 teams with a maximum of 35 teams. The
percentage of male coaches within a Division-I athletic department has a mean of 45.3% with a
minimum of 28.6% and a maximum of 81.8%. The classification of athletic departments is also
used in this category, with 37.5% of the institutions representing Division-I FBS and 28.2%
representing Division-I athletic departments without the sport of football. The average SAT
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scores of incoming freshman students in the 75th percentile was 1,230 with a minimum of 840
and a maximum of 1600. A total of 12.2% of the institutions in this sample were located in a
rural location, which is defined on the IPEDS database. The average number of sanctions
distributed to members of the NCAA was .08 with a maximum of 6 sanctions administered.
Table 9 First Stage Probit Regression Results
Variable
Description

Coef.

Std. Error

#Sponsor

# of Sports University sponsors

-0.001

0.012

%mcoach

% of university coaches that are male

-0.118

0.895

FBS

School is a member of DI-FBS

0.337***

0.101

NoFB

School is a member of DI-AAA

-0.261**

0.114

TSAT

Average SAT Score of the 75th percentile of freshmen

0.000

0.000

Rural

School is in a Rural Location

-0.257*

0.133

Private

School is a Private School

-0.103

0.104

#Sanctions(t-1) # of Sanctions delivered by NCAA in previous year

-0.001

0.004

Brand

-0.020

0.176

Myles Brand is President (1=Yes)

Emmert
Mark Emmert is President (1=Yes)
0.005
0.163
Table 9 presents the first stage regression results with the dependent variable being
misconduct committed by the organization in the observed year. Regarding the variables utilized
in this model, both the number of sports the university sponsored in the observed year and the
percentage of male coaches to overall coaches in the university’s athletic department was
statistically insignificant. The FBS variable was positive and statistically significant in
comparison to the reference group, schools that were in Division I-FCS. The NoFB variable was
negative and statistically significant in reference to the same group of universities. The average
SAT score by the incoming freshman at the observed university was statistically insignificant. If
the university is located in a rural setting was negative and statistically significant while a private
school was not statistically significant. The number of different punishments delivered by the
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NCAA to member institutions in the previous year was statistically insignificant. Both variables,
controlling for the presidential eras of Brand and Emmert, were statistically insignificant
compared to the reference group which is the interim presidential era of Jim Isch from 2009 2011.
Table 10 presents the second stage regression results across different penalty types.
Recall the inverse mills ratio was calculated from the first-stage probit estimation. The first
model details the probit regression model results for the probation sanction only. The positive
and statistically significant variables included academic violations, amateurism violations,
financial violations, recruiting violations, team-related violations, self-reported violations,
revenue sports, repeat violators, media coverage, the number of incidents in the NCAA in the
past year, the size of the athletic department regarding the total number of student- athletes, the
time under the leadership of Myles Brand, and the time under the leadership of Mark Emmert.
Institutional control violations, the size of the university regarding the total number of incoming
freshmen enrolled, the total number of similar NCAA incidents in a previous year, historically
black colleges and universities, private institutions, BCS/Power Five institutions, and the
violation levels were all negative, yet statistically significant.
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Table 10 Second Stage Regression Results
Penalty
Variable
InvMillsRatio

Probation
Coef
StdErr

Postseason

ShowCause

Recruiting

Coef

StdErr

Coef

StdErr

Coef

StdErr

FinAid
Coef
StdErr

PublicRep

Vaca
Coef

StdErr

Coef

StdErr

-1.295

0.807

-2.325**

1.139

-1.078

0.666

-0.076

0.657

-1.176

0.735

0.610

0.794

-0.349

0.470

Academic

8.039**

3.399

0.207

0.418

0.315

0.449

-0.411

0.420

0.995**

0.430

0.785

0.418

-0.650

0.821

Amateur

14.012***

3.013

1.293***

0.354

-0.036

0.357

0.410

0.327

1.207***

0.305

1.349***

0.355

1.159

0.635

Finance

8.110***

2.149

1.225***

0.341

0.416

0.311

-0.001

0.299

1.336***

0.327

1.416***

0.298

0.330

0.369

Icon

-4.822***

1.865

1.080**

0.516

1.604***

0.331

0.255

0.339

-0.183

0.317

0.376

0.346

-0.325

0.551

Recru

14.075***

3.648

0.239

0.437

1.002***

0.318

1.252***

0.295

0.683**

0.301

0.159

0.325

0.588

0.481

Team

12.481***

2.788

0.783*

0.444

0.536

0.340

0.468

0.337

0.677**

0.289

0.157

0.291

0.828

0.601

#Teams

-0.086

0.070

0.089

0.055

0.033

0.041

-0.035

0.046

-0.010

0.054

0.085

0.055

-0.013

0.073

SelfRep

2.501***

0.961

0.886**

0.407

0.035

0.345

0.880***

0.299

0.826***

0.268

0.107

0.310

0.329

RepeatVio

5.311***

1.023

0.721

0.495

1.545***

0.396

1.064***

0.378

0.662

0.359

0.760**

0.367

0.888*
**
1.539*

0.377

0.430

RevSport

8.832***

1.587

-0.326

0.425

-0.182

0.358

0.623

0.385

0.601

0.322

0.070

0.377

**
0.569

MediaCov

0.379**

0.172

-0.018

0.039

0.019

0.033

0.011

0.031

-0.002

0.026

0.106***

0.037

0.052

Similar

-6.775***

1.384

0.234***

0.088

0.227**

0.109

0.077

0.139

0.006

0.254

0.194*
**
-0.001

AllInc

1.020***

0.193

0.134

0.085

-0.009

0.041

0.270***

0.092

0.095

0.061

0.117**

0.058

0.081

0.076

HBCU

-11.102***

2.812

0.682

0.539

0.050

0.430

-0.705

0.663

0.437

0.356

-0.516

0.499

-0.211

0.202

Private

-11.390***

2.612

0.573

0.502

0.114

0.314

-0.309

0.378

0.043

0.393

-0.558

0.394

-0.228

0.329

PowerConf

-1.333**

0.553

0.538

0.392

-0.515

0.282

-0.089

0.303

-0.068

0.296

-0.044

0.336

-0.442

0.429

SizeAD

0.003**

0.001

-0.003

0.002

0.000

0.001

0.001

0.001

-0.001

0.001

-0.002

0.001

-0.001

0.001

SizeUniv

-0.003***

0.001

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Brand

9.444***

3.036

-1.119*

0.662

-0.157

0.418

-0.493

0.367

0.090

0.474

-1.149***

0.408

Emmert

7.887***

2.894

-0.010

0.615

0.176

0.381

-0.544

0.408

-0.339

0.501

-0.458

0.339

Level

-18.8935***

3.774

-0.149

0.518

0.248

0.256

-2.301***

0.710

-0.225

0.404

0.095

0.316

0.259
0.540*
-0.309
0.205
*
(omitted)

Constant

-17.485***

4.600

-0.515

2.887

-1.331

1.498

-5.473***

1.892

-1.303

1.841

-5.567***

2.154

-1.891

Pseudo R²

0.9744

(omitted)

0.7274

0.7565

0.7023
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0.7450

0.7376

0.089

2.059

0.899

The second model details the probit regression results for model with the postseason ban
sanction as the dependent variable. In this model, within the types of punishment category,
amateurism violations, finance-related violations, and institutional control violations were all
positive and statistically significant. Additionally, the self-reported violation sanction was also
positive and statistically significant. Finally, the variable coefficient for Myles Brand’s
presidency was negative and statistically significant in reference to the Jim Isch era.
The third model utilized in the second stage of the present study examined the probit
regression results for the show cause sanction. The four positive and statistically significant
variables included the institutional control violation, recruiting violation, repeat violators, and the
total number of similar NCAA incidents in a previous year. The fourth model presents the probit
regression results with the recruiting limitations sanction acting as the dependent variable.
Recruiting violations, self-reported violations, repeat violators, similar NCAA incidents in a
previous year, and the number of incidents in the NCAA in past year were all positive and
statistically significant. The implementation of the new violation levels variable was statistically
significant and negative. The fifth model detailed the probit regression results for the reduction
of financial aid sanction. The positive and statistically significant variables included academic
violations, amateurism violations, financial violations, recruiting violations, and self-reported
major infractions.
The sixth model examines the probit regression results with the vacation of record as the
dependent variable. The variables which were positive and statistically significant included
amateurism violations, financial violations, repeat violators, media coverage, and the number of
incidents in the NCAA in the past year. The observations which were classified under the
guidance of Myles Brand were also statistically significant, yet negative. The final model tests
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the probit regression results of the public reprimand sanction as the dependent variable. Within
this model, there were three positive and statistically significant variables including self-reported
violations, repeat violators, and media coverage. The observations which occurred under Myles
Brand were negative and statistically significant.
Discussion
The purpose of the present study is to analyze the likelihood of social-control agents
handing down different types of penalties to organizations who commit misconduct and also
understand any change in behavior regarding social-control agents in the wake of a change in
leadership, as well as, the influence of the media coverage of wrongdoing. Previous literature
(Greve et. al, 2010; Palmer, 2012; Vaughan, 1999) acknowledged the punishments delivered
from formal social-control agents to violating organizations, yet the strategies and sanctioning
process utilized by social-control agents has been neglected. Within this section, an evaluation of
significant variables and corresponding literature is completed as a method to conclude how
social-control agents assess penalties to member organizations.
Table 9 presents some interesting findings as it relates to detecting misconduct. First, we
find that both the number of sports sponsored and the percentage of male coaches to overall
coaches are insignificant. These two results are surprising because one would anticipate that
more sponsored sports means additional athletes, coaches, and other administrators further
increasing the likelihood of misconduct. The insignificant results could mean that as the athletic
department grows in terms of the number of sports, this growth leads to better self-regulation by
the university in terms of compliance education of its athletes and employees. The insignificant
result as it relates to male coaching percentage refutes the male model outlined by Mahony et al.
(1999) and other research. However, the findings in the present dissertation do support Mahony

122

et al.’s (1999) findings that the majority of NCAA major violations occur in revenue sports.
The finding that a school that is member of FBS is more likely to engage in misconduct
intuitively makes sense. FBS members generate the highest revenues and, generally, receive
higher attention within the media. The pressure for athletic success placed upon these institutions
from a variety of internal and external stakeholders would make likely for them to engage in
misconduct. Similarly, a school that is a Division I member but does not have football would be
less likely to engage in misconduct.
Academic quality, defined by average freshman SAT score, was insignificant. This result
is surprising due to previous research indicating that academic quality reduces the likelihood that
a university engages in misconduct (e.g., Humphreys & Ruseski, 2009). The institutions located
in a rural setting, defined by the U.S. Census Bureau’s Population Division, show a negative and
statistically significant relationship. This result makes sense as individuals have less opportunity
to engage in misconduct due to the small size of the location surrounding campus. The results in
Table 9 show there is no significance in organizations committing misconduct during the
different presidential eras in the sample period. This finding is consistent with the results in
Chapter 2 showing stability in terms of the focus of each president during the time period. Even
though anecdotal evidence shows increasing counts of misconduct (e.g., NCAA, 2017; Otto,
2005; Parkinson, 2012; Weston, 2011), there is no indication that a president’s (or social-control
agent’s) policy or action leads to increase in misconduct. Finally, the number of sanctions
handed down by the social-control agent in the previous year did not influence the likelihood that
a firm engages in misconduct. This does not support Cullen et al.’s (2012) research regarding the
role of social-control agents in administering sanctions strong enough to deter organizations from
future organizational misconduct.
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The results presented in Table 10 provide other interesting findings regarding socialcontrol agent behavior. First, the results find that media coverage statistically impacts the
likelihood of the social-control agent delivering the punishments of probation, vacating of onfield performance records, and public reprimand. These findings are interesting considering the
previous literatures reference to the media being an informal social-control agent (Pollock et al.,
2016). Thus, the media’s role as the informal social-control agent leads to an increased
likelihood of three punishments. The public reprimand should be the least surprising of the three
punishments, as the public reprimand would garner increased coverage by the media in terms of
reporting the punishment. When media outlets frame major violation cases, the reports are
generated from the frame alignment of the NCAA, but also include re-framing, which provides
more depth regarding the infraction, and counter-framing, which gives the violators a chance to
defend themselves. The vacation of record sanction is newsworthy considering the impact that
the punishment has on former teams which could have accumulated winning seasons and
championships. Community members, especially those with genuine interest in the athletic
department of the violating institution, would be intrigued to receive information about what
behaviors led to the sanction. Even though probation occurs often, the details regarding the
infraction case are published to inform readers on wrongful behavior, but also increase
awareness that any additional acts of organizational misconduct would lead to harsher sanctions.
In addition to the informal social-control agent’s impact, the present study also examined
similar incidents that occur over the past year to understand behavior. One may anticipate the
higher the similar incidents may lead to differences in the likelihood of punishments. From Table
10, the present study found that show cause and recruiting penalties are more likely to occur as a
result of a rise in similar incidents in the past year. However, probation is less likely to be given
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by the social-control agent in the wake of an increase of similar incidents of misconduct. The
social-control agent may deem show cause and recruiting penalties to be the harshest, hence, are
more likely to use these penalties in the wake of similar incidents in order to potentially deter
similar misconduct in the short term (Peterson, 2013). Similarly, probation may be too broad of
a penalty to send a message to other organizations.
An increase in the total number of incidents in the previous year leads to an increase in
the likelihood of probation, recruiting, and the vacating of on-field records as punishments levied
by the social-control agent. The increase in probation sanctions to NCAA members derives from
the understanding that the majority of major infractions result in probation. The recruiting and
vacation of records sanctions relate to the increase of unethical conduct and recruiting violations,
which have also increased throughout time as acknowledged in Chapter 2.
Examining presidential eras, we find that Myles Brand was less likely to vacate records,
publicly reprimand universities, or use a postseason ban as punishments in comparison to the
other presidents during the time period. The reason being that during Brand’s tenure as
Executive Director, the focus was on the enhancement of the academic experience of studentathletes, which meant examining cases of academic misconduct. Participation of academic
misconduct did not result in the vacation of records or postseason bans, unless the participating
student-athlete was deemed ineligible. Public reprimand was neglected during Brand’s tenure
due to protecting the identity of the violating student-athletes. However, Brand was more likely
to hand down a punishment of probation. As it pertains to Mark Emmert, he was more likely to
also hand down a punishment of probation. However, he was not any more likely to hand down
other punishments in reference to the interim president. Mark Emmert made a concerted effort to
pay more attention to the other classifications (e.g., Division-II & Division-III) within the NCAA
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in order to assure fairness in rule enforcement. The probation sanction was used as method to
Division-I institutions to provide a warning in infraction cases where the violation did not call
for harsher punishments.
Finally, the change in NCAA protocol from 2 levels of violations (i.e., major and minor)
to 4 levels of violations (i.e., Levels I, II, III, and IV) led to a decrease in probation and
recruiting punishments. The results could be due to a couple of reasons. First, it could be that the
social-control agents recognizing those as insufficient in the new classification of violations. The
NCAA manual specifically outlines each violation level and misconduct that would lead the
social-control agent to classify actions as such. Thus, this specificity might lead to a more
specific punishment. The second reason could be due to the limited number of cases under the
new classification system in the sample. As more cases arise, one might get a better
understanding of the behavior of social-control agent.
Other findings from the results in Equation 1 are interesting. This present study supports
the results provided in Winfree and McCluskey’s (2008) research regarding the incentive of
reporting sanctions directly to the NCAA. As Winfree and McCluskey (2008) noted, generally
when schools self-report and provide suggestions for the penalty, the NCAA goes along with
these penalties. While the penalties suggested by the universities engaged in misconduct were
not examined, it could be assumed that the positive and significant variable coefficients for five
of the penalty models would indicate the social-control agent agreeing with those penalties.
Academic violations were found to increase the likelihood of probation, postseason,
reduction in financial aid, and vacation of records. These punishments, in particular postseason
bans, reduction of financial aid in terms of scholarships, and vacation of records, intuitively
make sense since the NCAA model revolves around amateurism. Given this model, one would
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expect an increase in recruiting penalties. However, this increase did not occur.
Regarding the conference affiliation of member institutions, prior research varied on
whether larger conferences (i.e., BCS/Power Five) were investigated differently from smaller
Division-I institutions (i.e., Non-BCS/Group of Five; Fizel & Brown, 2014; Otto, 2005). The
present study supports Fizel and Brown’s (2014) assumption that larger institutions that are
highly recognized for their athletic achievement are not punished differently in comparison to
other Division-I athletic departments. The PowerConf variable was statistically insignificant
within every model except probation, which differed from the results provided in Cox and Davis
(2011), which determined that the odds of larger athletic programs with football teams receiving
major violations were higher than other members.
Conclusion
The present study looked to further understand the punishment role a social-control agent
plays within an industry. There have been investigations on the impact of sanctions within
organizations (Davis & Hairston, 2013; Trevino & White, n.d.), yet minimal research exploring
how social-control agents assess violations and determine proper sanctions to distribute to
violators are present in the literature (Greve et al., 2010). Social-control agents are responsible
for enforcing policies set within organization and constantly evaluate the line of right wrong. In
addition, there is an opportunity to understand how the line has evolved through the examination
of violations over a period of time. The present study acknowledges that the NCAA can hold
firms accountable as a social-control agent by assessing cases of organizational misconduct,
determining the type of violation committed, and distributing sanctions as an attempt to
minimize future cases of organizational misconduct. In addition to formal social control agents,
media outlets can function as informal social control agents, which can provide significant
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attention to misconduct case and deter organizations from engaging in future wrongful
behaviors.
Utilizing data on punishments within NCAA Division I athletics, the results from a
twelve-year sample indicated that various violation types impacted the likelihood of sanctions
distributed in major infraction cases. The present study indicated that engagement in academic
violations would increase the likelihood of probation and a reduction in financial aid.
Amateurism violations increase the likelihood of receiving probation, a postseason ban,
reduction of financial aid, and the vacation of win-loss record. An athletic department’s
participation in improper financial activities would increase the likelihood of receiving
probation, a postseason ban, reduction in financial aid, and the vacation of win-loss record.
Partaking in institutional control violations would decrease the likelihood of receiving probation,
increase the likelihood of a postseason ban and show cause penalty. Additionally, team-related
violations would increase the likelihood to receive probation and a reduction in financial aid.
Recruiting violations would increase the likelihood probation, show cause, recruiting, and
reduction in financial aid sanctions.
The present study provided an opportunity to assess the enforcement strategies
implemented by the NCAA as a formal social-control agent. Although there were contributions
to the literature, there were limitations with the data analysis. The first limitation of the study
was the lack of information provided on the EADA and IPEDS database regarding the university
characteristics. Both the EADA and IPEDS databases only began assembling specific data points
utilized in this study in 2003 (e.g., SAT scores, total enrollment data, total student-athlete count
in an athletic department). For example, the gathering of additional data regarding the university
characteristics provides an opportunity to investigate the misconduct cases of each major
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violation after the introduction of the BCS conferences in 1998.
An additional limitation of this study was inconsistencies within the LSDbi database.
Details regarding major infractions were collected from the case summary provided on the
LSDbi database prior to March 2016. However, the database was reformatted shortly after March
2016 and there were differences in the numbering of cases, as well as, the details of each case
summary, including violation type, sanction distribution, and the length of sanctions. As an
alternative, the public report of each infraction case was analyzed to determine essentials of each
case. However, inconsistencies still existed and, in many cases, information pertaining to the
case was gathered from the NCAA press releases rather than the information provided on the
database.
Future research should understand further actions of the social-control agent and the
consequences of punishments rendered by social-control agents on the broader organizational
community. Two potential consequences are applications and donations. There has been some
research conducted to begin to understand the impact that NCAA punishments have on the
university. Grimes and Chressanthis (1994) found that sanctions administered by the NCAA
does negatively impact alumni donations and resulted in a $1.6 million dollar per year difference
at Mississippi State University from 1962 to 1991. Rhoads and Gerking (2000) assembled data
on 87 universities regarding the effect of the men’s basketball team receiving probation from the
NCAA and how probation impacts alumni contributions. They discovered that, because of an
institution being on probation, alumni donations decrease by 13.6% per student. Goff (2000)
found that the impact of the “death penalty” sanction administered to Southern Methodist
University by NCAA led to a 12% decrease in the total number of applications while the school
was serving their penalty and remained on probation. These studies, however, are limited in that
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they either investigate one school or one specific punishment. Future research should develop a
more comprehensive understanding of the role that punishments have on outcomes of the
organization that commit misconduct.
In addition to understanding consequences to the organizations that engaged in
wrongdoing, it is also important to understand how potential wrongdoing and subsequent
punishments by the social-control agent impact other organizations. As Greve and Teh (2016)
remarked, “[T]he range of organizations that get punished is broad and, as a result of
stigmatization, includes organizations that did not engage in the original misconduct” (p. 370).
Hence, future research should further understand these dynamics and consequences.
Third, future research should further explore actions taken by social-control agents in
terms of variation of punishment. For example, NCAA Division I institutions have a wide
variation in terms of university size along with its status and reputation. Thus, future research
should consider how different punishment decisions made by social-control agent are moderated
by these factors. Finally, future research should explore reasons surrounding the duration
between the uncovering of organization misconduct and the punishment by the social-control
agent. This duration between misconduct and punishment would be of interest in understanding
the social-control agent’s role in deterring future organizational wrongdoing, in addition to its
legitimacy as an entity who decides what actions constitutes misconduct.
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CHAPTER 5.

CONCLUSION
The goal of social control is to build camaraderie within a community by setting norms
others are expected to follow (Ross, 1901). Rooted within social control, social-control agents
by nature are expected to enforce the rules and regulations with a society. In addition, they
need to constantly re-evaluate their methods of functioning as a governing body (Greve et al.,
2010). Within the present dissertation, the NCAA is analyzed as a social-control agent due to
the association’s role as a third-party regulator. The decision-making process of the NCAA is
highly scrutinized and evaluation of misconduct is challenging considering the rapid
transformation of intercollegiate athletics on a regular basis. Yet, the examination of the
strategies implemented in order to ensure social control in college sports, presents an
opportunity to extend literature on social-control agents by recognizing how they function
when identifying, assessing, and enforcement organizational misconduct.
The present dissertation presents three distinctive studies to further understand socialcontrol agent behavior. Chapter 2 details the evolution of the NCAA as a social-control agent
and examines the history of decision-making strategies regarding enforcement. This applied
historical analysis of NCAA enforcement showcases the utility of the large number of primary
and secondary resources available on intercollegiate athletic history, as well as, the rules,
regulations, and expectations of college sport for both scholars and practitioners. From a
scholarly perspective, the historical study of social-control agents within the setting of the
NCAA exhibits the transformation of rule enforcement and governance, while acknowledging
the organizational layering that takes place when examining cases of major violations.
Specifically, Chapter 2 acknowledged the new strategies implemented by the NCAA as far as
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the strength of complexity, formalization, and centralization under each Executive Director. In
the duration of each executive director there were changes to how the NCAA governed, in
order to serve as a social-control agent. For instance, in the early years of Walter Byers as
executive director, the NCAA Council made all decisions regarding infractions and impending
sanctions. However, once the NCAA started tracking major violations and publicizing the
wrongful behavior, the organization created the Membership Committee and Subcommittee
on Infractions. The development of these initial rule enforcing committees provided a
foundation, which rule enforcement is assessed upon today. The results in Chapter 2 support
previous work by Palmer (2012), who previously suggested social-control agents might be
responsible for perpetrating wrongdoing through increased formalization and de-centralization
efforts. More broadly, the results in Chapter 2 illustrate the history to theory approach
outlined by Kipping and Üsdiken (2014) where longitudinal data is used to develop theories,
particularly in understanding underlying processes.
From a practical perspective, Chapter 2 acknowledges misconduct can be minimalized
in the community, but the sanctions need to be strong and specific. For example, in order for
fines to be successful in the deterring of violations, the fine amount must match the severity of
the misconduct committed (Davis & Hairston, 2013; Weston, 2011). Also, the combination of
penalties provide an opportunity for NCAA to limit organizational misconduct because the
variety of sanctions would make the entire athletic department aware for wrongful behavior
and perhaps provide additional incentive to implement new strategies to not participate in such
behavior. The usage of social media outlets, such as Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, allow
for the NCAA to announce punishments of violators and obtain perspectives from those in the
online community.
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In the analysis of Chapter 3, the focus was observing the usage of media outlets to
detail acts of misconduct and to understand any differences and similarities between
newspapers and formal social-control agents framing efforts. The similarities of information in
the NCAA and newspapers, as social-control agents, sought to emphasize consistency,
transparency, and exactness for their particular audiences. Both sources attempted to deliver
information using lamented language and the initial frame alignment provided in the NCAA
publications. To compare to the framing strategies used by media outlets, the frames used by
the social-control agents, who assessed the violation cases and administered the punishment,
were utilized in this study. The differences in themes discovered in NCAA publications and
newspapers exhibited how media members frame information presented from social-control
agents. The presentation of information from the NCAA provided an example of frame
alignment. The themes utilized by the NCAA provided broad details specific to each case for
public consumption. Social-control agents are tasked to not only enforce the behaviors of
member organizations, but also deliver information pertaining to the case to the public. In
comparison, media outlets examine situations and re-frame initial reports from the NCAA to
produce stories to their followers, but the themes within newspaper publication are geared
more towards attributing responsibility, outlining transgressions, and revealing sanctions.
Chapter 3 also provided analysis regarding the usage of conflict framing within newspaper
publications, specifically the usage of vilification and debunking. The details provided in the
NCAA publications and newspapers utilized the lamented language throughout to maintain
consistency when describe infraction cases and punishments.
Chapter 4 focused to determining the likelihood of sanctions stemming from acts of
organizational misconduct within member institutions. The purpose of Chapter 4 is to analyze
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the likelihood of formal social-control agents handing down different types of penalties to
organizations who commit misconduct. The results illustrated the changing behavior of the
formal social-control agents in the wake of recent similar instances of misconduct and how
changes in how misconduct is judged effects the likelihood of punishment. The results also
revealed how informal social-control agents influence behavior. Informal social control refers
to the behaviors of individuals or groups within a community which leads to conformity to
norms and laws (Hollinger & Clark, 2005). The impact of informal social control is seen in
how those who have conformed to the beliefs of society treat those who have not. Some of the
informal sanctions distributed through informal social control include smiles, ridicule,
sarcasm, and disapproval (Hollinger & Clark, 2005). Informal social-control agents would
consist of non-governing bodies (e.g., formal social-control agents) within the community,
which assist with the maintaining of societal norms.
Media members function as agents of informal social control depending to the agenda
setting techniques utilized by various newspapers and magazines. Scheufele and Tewksbury
(2007) defined agenda setting as “the idea that there is a strong correlation between the
emphasis that mass media place on certain issues (e.g., based on relative placement or amount
of coverage) and the importance attributed to these issues by mass audiences” (p. 11). Media
outlets may choose to designate much attention on cases of organizational misconduct, due to
the severity and resulting punishments designated by third-party regulators. Thus, if media
outlets have an agenda to publish numerous stories and details regarding a major infraction
case as a method to reprimand the violation organization, then the media is serving as an
informal social-control agent.
Within Chapter 2, the NCAA chose to make major infraction cases public information
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and implemented the public reprimand sanction, which held violating athletic departments
accountable for their acts of organizational misconduct. In Chapter 3, the re-framing of major
infraction cases by newspaper media outlets used the lamented language of the NCAA
publications. Yet, the newspaper publications provided a thorough analysis to hold violators
accountable and assure that members of the community were receiving specific details
regarding what individuals were directly involved in a case. In Chapter 3, the results support
the acknowledgement of the media as an informal social-control agent considering media
coverage of violation cases were statistically significant in determining the likelihood of the
social- control agent administering the sanctions of probation, vacation of record, and public
reprimand.
The limitations of this dissertation are two-fold: the inconsistencies of data collection
and missing data, specifically in Chapters 3 & 4. The collection of information pertaining to
major infraction cases and violating NCAA Division-I institutions was problematic at times.
The NCAA LSDbi database provides an extensive amount of statistics and critical
documentation regarding NCAA violation cases. However, the database tends to change on a
regular basis, thus the adjustment of observation data was quite common. The missing data
points were another limitation in this dissertation, especially in the EADA and IPEDS
databases. As stated in the chapters, further analysis of infraction cases is essential. Yet, the
databases tend to be limited in the time frame of data and, in many cases, the data points for
the earliest time frames are not complete. For example in Chapter 4, the earliest time frame in
which the likelihood of sanctions could begin was in 2003 because this was the earliest year,
but additional observations were removed for data missing in the database.
There are many areas for future research. The first is to further understand the cartel’s
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role with influencing social-control agent’s behavior. As Humphreys and Ruseski (2009)
commented:
“the NCAA might not need to be particularly good at detecting and punishing
cheating in order to maintain the cartel. Perhaps the main strength of the NCAA
cartel is that each member who cheats is not really a competitor, like in other
cartels. A single team cannot leave the NCAA and compete with the remaining
NCAA members” (p. 159).
This comment by Humphreys and Ruseski (2009) can be seen broadly within the findings of
Chapter 3 in relation to the difference between how the social-control agent frames
misconduct compared to the media. However, future research should look to trace the strength
of this cartel through the NCAA and potentially other social-control agents embedded within a
cartel structure.
An additional area of future research is the analysis of the FBS institutions in the
NCAA as celebrity firms. Celebrity firms are classified as “social actors that attract large-scale
public attention: the greater the number of people who know of and pay attention to the actor,
the greater the extent and value of that actor’s celebrity” (Rindova, Pollock, & Hayward, 2006,
p. 50). Pfarrer, Pollock, and Rindova (2010) recognized the popularity of celebrity firms by
acknowledging when celebrity firms perform well, the result tends to lead to prosperity.
However, when celebrity firms tend to perform lower than expected or engage in wrongful
behavior, the resulting punishment tends to be lesser than organizations that are not considered
a celebrity (Pfarrer et al., 2010). Research detailing the relationship between celebrity firms
and sport has received little attention, yet many sport organizations should be classified as
celebrity firms for a variety of factors.
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Many sport organizations should also be classified as celebrities considering the
accessibility of economic, financial, and cultural resources for many firms. For example, this
study classifies Division-I Bowl Championship Series (BCS)/Power Five Conference athletic
departments as celebrities considering the large amounts of attention and resources the
athletic departments receive in comparison to Non-BCS/Mid-major athletic departments,
which are categorized as non-celebrity firms. Seifried (2011) detailed the financial gap
between BCS and Non-BCS programs, specifically in postseason bowl games, by
acknowledging that “the 2009- 2010 bowl season produced about $237 million in bowl
revenue. BCS-charter institutions secured approximately $198 million (i.e., 83.6%) while
non-BCS institutions earned the remaining $39 million” (p. 29). It would be interesting to see
whether there are similarities and differences in the evaluation and sanctioning of celebrity
intercollegiate athletic organizations.
The final area of future research is the classification of deviant behavior, specifically
exploring the differences between organizational deviance, organizational corruption, and
organizational misconduct. Heckert and Heckert (2002) defined deviance as “behavior that
violates the norms or that is negatively labeled and evaluated” (p. 450) and also as “socially
disapproved behavior, attributes, or conditions that violate acceptable standards of behavior or
appearance in a given group” (p. 451). Deviance occurs when someone or some group decides to
participate in a behavior that goes against the norms, which may or may not be against the law
(Kidwell & Martin, 2012).
Thus, deviance is a broad concept that includes criminal behavior, but also includes acts
that are not deemed illegal in society, such as major violations within the NCAA. The concept of
deviance may differ from person-to-person or community-to- community based upon the history,
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morals, and values that are pre-existing (Becker, 1963; Kidwell & Martin, 2012).The terms
deviance, misconduct, and corruption are interchangeable in various literature, yet there are key
differences within each term (Avey, Palanski, & Walumbwa, 2011; Ferris, Brown, & Heller,
2009; Santomier, Howard, Piltz, & Romance, 1980). Potential research could acknowledge
deviance as an overarching term and how deviant behavior in an organization could be classified
as positive deviance, organizational corruption (if the harmful behavior is forbidden within
society), or organizational misconduct (if the harmful behavior is not forbidden within society).
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APPENDIX A.
LITERATURE REVIEW
This literature review focused on the relationships between deviance, organizational
misconduct, and cartel behavior, along with how each of the aforementioned concepts are
established within the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). Understanding the
organizational behavior of the NCAA and the member institutions is essential to both scholars
and practitioners considering the role of the NCAA as a social-control agent.
This review begins with an analysis of deviance, the different theories that exist on that
concept, and also the relationship between deviance and social control. Following the review of
deviance, there will be a brief summary regarding corruption and the role of an organization
involving corrupt individuals, as well as, corrupt organizations in society. The next section will
introduce organizational misconduct, both theoretically and the resulting consequences of
organizations that participate in misconduct. Following the review of organizational misconduct,
cartel literature will be presented. The areas within cartels that will be reviewed include a brief
introduction into what a cartel is, collusion, how the NCAA acts as a cartel, and how cartel
behavior connects with deviance and organizational misconduct. The literature review concludes
with insight regarding the current gaps within the literature and potential research topics.
Deviance
Deviance is a well-known topic of discussion in society and has essentially become
impactful to organizations that present active participation in that behavior. There have been
leaders within major corporations over the past 15-20 years that engaged in deviance, which
ultimately led to prison sentences (Hayes, 2005). Former chief executives Bernard Ebbers of
WorldCom Inc., John Rigas of Adelphia Corporation, and L. Dennis Kozlowski of Tyco
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International Ltd. all participated in deviant behavior within their organizations and were
sentenced to prison terms, even though the organization continued to maintain operations
(Hayes, 2005). Other examples of executive-led deviance include the Enron Corporation, Credit
Suisse First Boston, and Martha Stewart Living (Hayes, 2005). Each of the organizations
previously mentioned were in separate industries, yet saw their highest executives take part in
the deviant behavior, which led to the personal downfall of the executives (Hayes, 2005). The
Enron Corporation was one organization of the aforementioned group that fully ended operations
as a result of deviant behavior. The other organizations instituted a complete restructuring of
their governance departments, ethics programs, and implemented better training to assure the
abiding of rules and regulations by all employees and executives (Hayes, 2005).
Heckert and Heckert (2002) defined deviance as “behavior that violates the norms or that
is negatively labeled and evaluated” (p. 450) and also as “socially disapproved behavior,
attributes, or conditions that violate acceptable standards of behavior or appearance in a given
group” (p. 451). Kidwell and Martin (2012) defined deviate as “to depart, as from a norm,
purpose, or subject” and presented deviant as “one that differs from a norm, especially a person
whose behavior and attitudes differ from accepted social standards” (p. 4). Becker (1963) argued
deviance as “not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the
application by others of rules and sanctions to the offender” (p. 9). From this, we see deviance
tends to be an all-encompassing concept, yet no one in society is deviant in all aspects of their
life (Goode, 2015). However, when individuals participate in deviance, there is a belief that their
engagement in the behavior is due to attempting to achieve higher levels of success (Goode,
2015). Whether an improvement of social influence or an improvement of employmentinfluence,
this literature review presents deviance as any behavior that differs from the norm in an attempt
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to seek a competitive advantage.
In sociology, deviance commonly refers to the infringement of normal behavior and rules
that have been previously established in the community. In economics, Becker’s (1968) theory
on crime stated that many individuals would research the pros and cons of participating in
criminal behavior before choosing what their next course of action will be. Although deviant
behavior is the generally that which differs from the norms and not acceptable by a social
system, some studies posit positive deviance exists and is instrumental in the development of an
organization (Heckert & Heckert, 2002; Palmer & Humphrey, 1990). Through the lens of
objectivists, positive deviant behavior is seen as the events, activities, or behaviors that may
exceed one’s normal expectations of a member in the society, which varies from community to
community (Heckert & Heckert, 2002). Subjectivists, or individuals that view actions in a
positive manner, understand positive deviance as the behaviors that are positively evaluated
(Shoenberger, Heckert, & Heckert, 2012). For example, being a hero is an example of positive
deviance considering how becoming a hero is highly desirable and valued highly in society
(Heckert & Heckert, 2002). In comparison, negative deviance is the underconformity or
nonconformity to norms (Heckert & Heckert, 2002).
Deviance occurs when someone or some group decides to participate in a behavior that
goes against the norms, which may or may not be against the law (Kidwell & Martin, 2012).
Thus, deviance is a broad concept that includes criminal behavior, but also includes acts that are
not deemed illegal. The concept of deviance may differ from person-to-person or community-tocommunity based upon the history, morals, and values that are pre-existing (Becker, 1963;
Kidwell & Martin, 2012). Becker (1963) stated deviance is “not the act itself, but the reactions to
the act, that makes something deviant” (p. 3). Becker’s (1963) definition of deviance leads some
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to believe that not all people labeled as deviant must participate in deviant behavior, but could be
mislabeled or affiliated with those that do engage in deviance.
Deviance is formulated from a group’s ability to follow or object the norms established in
society and previous literature established that human groups rely on norms in order to exist
(Jetten & Hornsey, 2014; Tittle & Paternoster, 2000). The existence of norms provide order for
communicate and permit socialization between those from different backgrounds. As a result of
norms, members of society create a model of social control that provides insight into how norms
will be implemented, as well as, how the violation of norms will be managed (Jetten & Hornsey,
2014). The individuals or groups that violate the norms created by the social control model could
be categorized as being deviant (Jetten & Hornsey, 2014). The social control model is based
upon creating conformity within a community by striving for those individuals apart of the
community to limit deviant behavior, follow expectations, norms, rules, and laws (Reckless,
1967). Those that violate the norms in place would receive negative punishments or sanctions for
their behaviors, which could have long-term effects. However, those that coincide with the
norms of society, or even exceed what is believed to be expected, would receive some sort of
positive sanction (Jetten & Hornsey, 2014).
When organizations engage in deviance, in most cases, those involved, whether the
individual or the organization as a whole, will be labeled as deviants (Guay et al., 2015). When
any one person or company is assessed a label, there are immediate consequences that, in some
cases, may be lasting. Firms are given a stigma, when past employees or management engaged in
deviant behavior. Even though the current staff may not currently participate in such behavior,
the previous actions of past employees affect those who currently work at the organization (Guay
et al., 2015). When individuals or companies participate in deviant behavior, the punishments
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could range from minor sanctions to possible capital punishment depending on the severity of the
deviance (Guay et al., 2015).
When discussing deviance or deviant behavior, researchers also need to understand the
critical differences between the two different approaches: normative and reactivist (Wolf &
Zuckerman, 2012). The normative approach explains how the violation or example of deviant
behavior does not fit normal expectations in society (Wolf & Zuckerman, 2012). The normative
approach of deviance compels attempts to identify norms and considers differences in attitudes,
cultures, and mindsets (Wolf & Zuckerman, 2012). Certain behaviors could be assumed as
wrong and negative by many, but that may not be the case for all. The example provided in
Heckert and Heckert (2002) stated:
“For example, killing someone may be first-degree murder, negligent homicide, a
mercy killing, or a heroic act in wartime. Without the context of the situation, the
social group within which the act occurs, and an understanding of the group
members’ definitions and evaluations, it is difficult to know what acts (or
conditions) are truly deviant” (p. 452).
By presuming what the situation may be and not receiving the full context, improper
assumptions can be made and labeling one as deviant could be erroneous (Heckert & Heckert,
2002).
The reactivist approach of labeling deviant behavior includes perspective from members
of society. In most situations, earlier cases of those who exhibited deviant behavior are used as
example and current behaviors are compared to them (Wolf & Zuckerman, 2012). The issue with
the reactivist approach includes how to classify deviant behavior considering the behavior in the
past may not be considered deviant in the present (Heckert & Heckert, 2002).
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Even though deviance is classified either as positive or negative, understanding the
process of deviant behaviors and how normal expectations, along with the reactions of
societies,are necessary. The best method needed in order to properly understand deviance is
when “one acknowledges that individuals and social groups have both expectations for behavior
and conditions and reactions to behaviors and conditions” (Heckert & Heckert, 2002, p. 458).
Subheadings of Deviance. The concept of deviance is classified into four subheadings
(which is also described on Table A2): positive deviance, negative deviance, rate-busting, and
deviance admiration (Heckert & Heckert, 2015).
Negative Deviance. Negative deviance is best described as “any type of behavior or
condition that the majority of a given group regards as unacceptable and evokes a collective
response of a negative type or would evoke a collective, negative response if detected” (Heckert
& Heckert, 2002, p. 459). The previous definition includes both the normative and reactivist
perspectives and is the best representation of what deviance or deviant behavior includes. Some
of the distinct examples used in characterizing negative deviance are: street crime, property
damage, domestic violence, organizational deviance, drug usage, and sexual deviance (Heckert
& Heckert, 2002).
Rate-busting. Rate-busting is understood as those who overconform to certain situations
and are negatively seen in the eyes of others (Shoenberger et al.,, 2012). People view these
individuals as foolish because overconformers are likely to agree and adhere to any policies or
situations without questioning. Even though overconforming should not always result in a
negative evaluation, there are many people in the community that would be considered in the
rate-buster grouping (Shoenberger et al., 2012). Examples include the terms nerd, dweeb, dork,
or geek because of the tremendous effort placed towards schoolwork and overall intellectual
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capability, yet these individuals are assumed to lack social skills and other desirable
characteristics in society (Heckert & Heckert, 2002).
Deviance Admiration. Deviance admiration is much more common in today’s society
than in past because the current society, at times, seems to enjoy someone who may not obey the
rules and follows their own path (Shoenberger et al., 2012). The delinquent character that
engages in acts of deviance has recently received positive evaluations from those in communities
and is also seen in media (Shoenberger et al., 2012). Kooistra (1989) originally discussed the
deviance admiration as:
“Murderers and thieves harm not just their immediate victims but also subvert the
moral basis upon which society rests. They are specters of evil that terrorize
honest citizens, forcing people to live in fear behind locked doors, to spend large
amounts of money to protect themselves, and even to abandon their homes and
neighborhoods when the fear of crime seems too great. . . Nonetheless, throughout
history we find a handful of individuals who have robbed and killed in clear
violation of law, but who were not considered wicked or depraved. Instead these
robbers and murderers were viewed as social heroes, and not just during their
lifetime but for decades afterwards. They have been popular media creatures
whose criminal exploits have been celebrated in song, newspapers, books, plays,
mores, and even television dramas. These are lawbreakers who have been
transformed from ordinary criminals into legendary Robin Hood figures of epic
proportions” (p. 7).
Some famous American examples of such outlaws include Billy the Kid, Bonnie and Clyde, and
Jesse James. These individuals committed numerous acts of deviance, yet some view them as
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legends in a positive manner (Kooistra, 1989). These people are also seen in a positive
perspective because they were different from what society deemed as acceptable. Through
deviation from the standards set from others, they were able to be positive evaluated from future
generations because of the change they provided (Kooistra, 1989).
In sports, the acceptance of gamesmanship behaviors when franchises are competing for
the highest recognition is an example of deviance admiration. Seifried (2004) identified
societies’ accept and promote gamesmanship in athletic competition because it reflects a winning
attitude. Gamesmanship is the ability to achieve success in competition without cheating, yet
using alternative measures to seek an advantage (Seifried, 2004). Examples of gamesmanship
include: bluffing, espionage, and intimidation (e.g., physical or verbal trash talk), which are
completed in order to gain a competitive advantage. Some research referenced the lack of
gamesmanship research on competition is disappointing and a lack of integrity shown by
competitors should be absent from any level of competition (Dixon, 2003). However, other
research stated that gamesmanship is expected at some competition levels and desired because it
shows participants and consumers they will do what is necessary to achieve success (Lumpkin,
Stoll, & Beller, 2003).
Positive Deviance. Positive deviance is simply the approval of behavior that goes above
and beyond what is expected in the standards of society. Specifically, the individuals that strive
for the best and continue to leave lasting positive legacies in the community, are the ones
exhibiting positive deviance (Heckert & Heckert, 2015). These individuals exceed the normative
standard and, in most cases, are involved in selfless behavior (Heckert & Heckert, 2015). The
engagement in selfless behavior is commonly seen in organizations and is also known as
altruism, which is likely to be evaluated in a positive manner.
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In organizations, there is an expectation for all employees to follow rules and regulations
that have been set in place (Martin, Lopez, Roscigno, & Hodson, 2013). In industries, there are a
written set of expectations that organizations should follow in order to allow for genuine, fair,
and acceptable business practice. However, in both cases, there will be a moment where an
employee or organization will consider breaking the rules in order to seek an advantage
(Vardaman, Gondo, & Allen, 2014). Rule-breaking is described as a “form of heroic individual
resistance against socially pernicious organizational power structures” (Dodson, 2009; Martin et
al., 2013, p. 551). To engage in rule-breaking at the organizational level, employees are
outwardly showing opposition to those who are in authority (Vardaman et al., 2014). Examples
of rule-breaking are categorized as either contentiousness or hierarchy. Contentiousness refers to
how rule-breaking is seen in the perspective of those who enforce rules (Martin et al., 2013).
Hierarchy refers to rule-breaking that occurs at different levels within an organization, along
with how executives and management alter enforcement policies varying on the level within the
company (Martin et al., 2013). The previously mentioned examples of rule-breaking provide
insight into the occurrence of deviant behavior, specifically how different theories of deviance
are created.
Theories of Deviance. Considering that deviance is such a broad term and defined in
many different ways by various communities, understanding the different theories regarding
deviant behavior is essential in grasping the concept as a whole. Theorists ranging from Emile
Durkheim to Edwin Sutherland possess differing opinions of deviance and why individuals or
businesses may engage in deviant acts. Table A3 provides a brief description regarding each of
the theories that are discussed.
Emile Durkheim is acknowledged as being the chief investigator of deviance (Ben-
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Yehuda, 2012). His prior research and results conclude deviance is considered functional
because of the impact on social order. The concept of deviance confirms the norms of a
community and also entails the notion of moral boundaries, which is the overall belief of how a
community member should behave (Ben-Yehuda, 2012). Durkheim believed in creating
harmony in the community and positioned deviance as aiding in providing social unity (BenYehuda, 2012). Social unity is the creation of synergy within a group based upon the actions of
deviant individuals or groups (Heckert & Heckert, 2015). Once the group creates social unity,
then many of the thoughts and beliefs of the group could be perceived as the norm (Heckert &
Heckert, 2015). Social unity can sometimes be problematic considering that deviance can present
social change that acknowledges prohibited behavior, but with enough support, can become
tolerated.
Strain Theory. Through the development and defining of deviance by Durkheim,
sociologist Robert Merton generated Strain Theory (Agnew, Piquero, & Cullen, 2009). Strain
Theory references how members of society can be pressured to conform to the behaviors that
previously exist. If those behaviors are negative or go against the norms, then ultimately, there is
pressure to participate in deviance (Agnew et al., 2009). The pressure becomes an issue,
particularly in goal-setting, because in society, individuals and groups are taught to strive for
goals, but strain is created when there is no permissible opportunity to reach the goals (Agnew et
al., 2009). When the opportunity is blocked, deviance occurs and Merton stated that there are
four categories of responses to the strain created: innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion
(Agnew et al., 2009). Innovation refers to the engagement in forbidden behaviors in order to
achieve the goals of society. Ritualism describes that members of society abandon their goals, in
order to obey the regulations set by leadership. Retreatism represents a lack of participation in
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goal-setting and the achievement of goals. Rebellion indicates a desire for someone to replace to
goals of the community with their own (Agnew et al., 2009).
Symbolic Interactionist Theory. The next theory is commonly referenced in the literature
regarding deviance is the symbolic interactionist theory. In the symbolic interactionist theory,
there is reliance on the members of society creating their own circumstances and making their
own decisions that may have a lasting impact on their life (Conyers & Calhoun, 2015). The
interactionist theory focuses on the ordinary behavior of individuals and is categorized in two
different areas: cultural transmission and routine activities theory (Conyers & Calhoun, 2015).
Sutherland (1947) connected the theory to deviance by stating individuals learn how to be
outstanding citizens in the same manner as they learn to engage in deviance. Sutherland (1947)
referenced the cultural transmission theory when describing an individual’s participation in
deviance, stating that deviant behavior is learned from other individuals in society. Through
communication with each other in formal and informal manners, people start to create their own
definitions for proper and improper behavior. The routine activities theory focuses on the notion
that the likelihood of deviant behavior is higher when the opportunity is more readily available to
those looking to conduct deviance (Sutherland, 1947).
Social Identity Theory. Social identity theory, created by Howard Becker in 1963,
involves more of a personal relationship between an individual and deviant behavior committed
(Hogg & Terry, 2000; Tse & Chiu, 2014). When a group or person utilizes the social identity
theory, there is a firm understanding between what is considered personal and what is considered
social (Hogg & Terry, 2000). When someone is referring to their personal identity, he or she is
referencing to characteristics that are specific to that one person, including their morals, interests,
values, and hobbies (Tse & Chiu, 2014). In comparison, someone’s social identity involves being
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classified due to characteristics such as their age, gender, and social status (Tse & Chiu, 2014).
Individuals or groups classified with the social identity theory are motivated by the need to
achieve success. Ashforth and Mael (1989) stated that the identification an employee may
experience with their organization is an example of social identification. Different components
of the organization, including the specific department, work group, union, lunch group, are
examples of how someone’s social identity is formed by the organization (Ashforth & Mael,
1989). The reason these groups are impactful on an individual’s social identity is the role that
these groups play on the development of self-esteem (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Through success,
the individual will feel accomplished, respected by other members of the organization, and as a
result, will lead to an increase in their self-esteem (Hogg & Terry, 2000).
Labeling Theory. Labeling theory, created by Lemert (1951), posits people are classified
under labels provided by the perceptions of others and the resulting behavior leads to deviance.
When deviants attempt to flee the generalizations of society, Sykes and Matza (1957) created the
term “techniques of neutralization”, which includes: the denial of responsibility, injury, and
presence of a victim, condemnation of the condemners, and appeal to higher loyalty (p. 664).
When members of society label each other, the consequence presents how people see each other,
but also how they see themselves as deviant or not (Sykes & Matza, 1957). Labeling theory is
also known as the societal reaction theory and was further researched by Kitsuse in the early
1960s. Kitsuse (1962) focused on the impact of deviance in society. In the article, Kitsuse (1962)
stated the:
“Sociological theory of deviance must focus specifically upon the interactions
which not only define behaviors as deviant but also organize and activate the
application of sanctions by individuals, groups, or agencies. For in modern
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society, the socially significant differentiation of deviants from the non-deviant
population is increasingly contingent upon circumstances of situation, place,
social and personal biography, and the bureaucratically organized activities of
agencies of control” (p. 256).
The concept of labeling theory presumes that deviance occurs due to the communication between
members of society and the others that help regulate social control.
Control Theory. Control theory, developed by Reckless (1967), is commonly referenced
in deviance literature when an individual’s inner control and outer control work against their
motivations to deviate. Inner controls consist of concepts and ideals, such as the role of
conscience, the religious background of the person, knowing the difference between what is
considered right and wrong, the fear of reprimands for participation in wrongful behavior,
integrity, and the overall goal of striving to be considered a good person, according to society’s
standards (Reckless, 1967). The outer controls are any individuals that can encourage someone
to not participate in deviance and strive for proper behavior (Reckless, 1967). The effect of
controls relies on the relationship that one has with society. For example, if an individual has a
good grasp on the standards and expectations of society, then the more effective inner controls
will be.
The relationship that one has with society is based upon four different factors:
attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief (Hirschi, 2002). Attachment deals with the
respect and admiration shown to those that follow norms established in society. Commitment
references to the numerous responsibilities that an individual may have, whether being a parent,
student, or an employee. Involvement only concerns the participation in activities that are
generally accepted in society. Belief is geared towards understanding what is acceptable in
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society, most importantly what actions are considered detrimental and unethical (Hirschi, 2002).
In literature, control theory is ultimately about the self-control an individual shows
(Goode, 2000). Self-control is the behavior one exhibits by striving to be an active, cooperative
member of the community (Goode, 2000). The process of socialization is critical for all in order
to properly demonstrate self-control, yet should be taught to individuals early in childhood
(Goode, 2000). Socialization is the achieved through personal development of individuals in
society by learning from those that surround them and includes the norms, values, behaviors,
social skills, and ideologies presented in the community by others (Goode, 2000). Through the
process of socialization, there is an obligation by the leaders of the group or community to assure
that all members are conforming and practicing social control.
Deviance & Social Control. Ross (1901) thought social control presented an opportunity
to help society grow considering that there was minimal reasoning to why the social behavior of
those in the community created harmony. He was interested in what drew people together as a
community (Ross, 1901). Ross (1901) stated that he wanted to provide guidance and insight to
those being stigmatized and misled. Through his investigation on social control, Ross set the
foundation of social control through his evaluation of community and provided the initial
framework of how society operates (Janowitz, 1975).
Cooley (1909) and Thomas (1920) further developed the notion of social control and
provided different perspectives of what social control entailed (Janowitz, 1975). Cooley believed
social control was imperative for a member of society to understand, in order to properly interact
with others (Cooley, 1909). Thomas (1920) suggested increasing the value of rational thought in
social situations in order to improve social control. He felt society consisted of several different
groups and social control relied on effective relationships being built between the groups
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(Thomas, 1920).
When the idea of social control was originally developed in Sociology, the term referred
to those individuals in a social group having the ability to control themselves with rules and
regulations. Mead (1925) concluded social control depends on the behavior of others and the
willingness to work together as a society. Mead (1925) wanted the definition of social control to
convey unity and how society should be held to certain standard. He believed that through
holding all members of society to similar, well-known beliefs, served as an opportunity to
experience growth in community presented itself (Mead, 1925).
Janowitz (1975) researched the impact of social control in the community and established
that social control is necessary for societies to function, but needs to be set in a manner that
focuses on the best interest of the individuals in the community. Janowitz (1975) concluded that
social control was imperative to have in society, however, the previous implementation of social
control led to disconnect between community members and those who enforced social control.
Community members believed that social control was solely focusing on the negative aspects of
society and not the overall betterment of the community (Janowitz, 1975). In order to
communicate all aspects of what social control accomplishes, Janowitz (1975) believed social
control enforcement needed to enhance their image in the community by providing more insight
to the advanced industrial areas.
Gibbs (1994) attempted to describe social control by implementing the scientific theory
of social control. Gibbs (1994) defined social control as: 1) the apparent actions of individuals
that believe their actions increases or decrease the chance of a given condition; 2) the behavior
shown by individuals that is adjusted if the behavior becomes more or less desirable. The
development of the scientific theory of social control attempted to provide insight into social
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control that was accurate, testable, and appropriate (Delfem, 2015). Gibbs (1994) concluded that
an individual’s control over another person includes the practice of self-control, along with direct
and continuous social control (Delfem, 2015).
Hollinger and Clark (2005) classified social control into two categories: informal and
formal. Informal social control refers to the behaviors of individuals and group within a
community which leads to conformity to norms and laws (Hollinger & Clark, 2005). The impact
of informal social control is seen in how those who have conformed to the beliefs of society treat
those who have not. Some of the informal sanctions distributed through informal social control
include smiles, ridicule, sarcasm, and disapproval (Hollinger & Clark, 2005). Formal social
control is utilized when informal social control is not adequate enough to assure conforming to
the society’s norms (Hollinger & Clark, 2005). Formal social control is enforced by agencies that
are in charge of enforcing rules and regulations of society, which are also known as socialcontrol agents (Hollinger & Clark, 2005).
Social-control agents are known as “an actor that represents a collectivity and that can
impose sanctions on that collectivity’s behalf” (Greve, Pozner, & Palmer, 2010, p. 56). Greve et
al. (2010) identified examples of social-control agents, such as: international governing bodies,
national governing bodies, local governing bodies, and professional associations. The
identification of social-control agents is critical in analyzing deviance or organizational
misconduct due to determining which managers in violating organizations will be accountable
for the firm’s indiscretions and which managers would rather administer blame (Greve et al.,
2010).
The existence of social-control agents is contributed the usage of the sociological
approach of defining wrongdoing. The sociological approach is simply the punishment of
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behaviors that are labeled as wrong by social-control agents (Palmer, 2012). The advantages of
using the sociological approach includes: offering a sole definition of wrongdoing to those who
follow, a better opportunity to express opinions regarding leadership, and attempts to recognize
the differences between normative and social scientific considerations (Palmer, 2012). The
disadvantages of the sociological approach include the continuous change of the definition of
wrongdoing and not all behavior, which should be labeled as wrongdoing, is classified by the
social-control agents (Palmer, 2012). The sociological approach to dealing with wrongdoing
places the power of enforcement in the hands of the social-control agents. Social-control agents
should firmly understand the group dynamics of the organization before administering any
sanctions.
The group dynamics theory, researched by Lewin (1951), is critical to understand by
social-control agents because if there is not a firm grasp of how employees communicate within
an organization, then the likelihood of administering incorrect sanctions increases (Bargal,
2012). Group dynamics focuses on the make of the group and how the individuals within the
group guide interaction (Bargal, 2012). The type of individuals within the group has influence on
the personality, power, and behavior of how the group approaches different situations (Bargal,
2012). Some of the structural factors within group dynamics include the norms, roles, and status
and some of the functional factors include cohesiveness and conflict, whether it is group or
interpersonal (Bargal, 2012). The conflict factor is common within organizations and, at times,
best seen within athlete programs or professional sport franchises considering there are different
goals by different members, whether the athletes or front office personnel.
An example of the group dynamics theory is the conspiracy that took place with the
Chicago White Sox during the 1919 Baseball World Series (Palmer, 2012). The Chicago White
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Sox team possessed eight players willing to purposely lose games in order to receive money
from gamblers (Palmer, 2012). The players that engaged in the wrongdoing are known as the
“Black Sox” and their actions were completely separate of the remaining players on the White
Sox team. The members of the Black Sox were banned from the sport of baseball for life, but
when administering sanctions, the governing official, Judge Kenesaw Landis, needed to
understand the group dynamic within the team. Landis needed to recognize that the actions and
behaviors of a few players were not a sole representation of the entire team (Palmer, 2012).
A key issue with social-control agents is the amount of power distributed to those making
the decisions. When the agents are the sole decision-makers in determining what conduct should
be labeled as wrongful; the enforcement committee or individual could utilize this power and
engage in wrongdoing. Palmer (2012) addressed the behavior as social-control agents and
suggested they are just as “responsible for creating wrongdoing as are the perpetrators of
wrongdoing, albeit in a fundamentally different way than the perpetrators of wrongdoing create
wrongdoing” (p. 33). Social-control agents are presented with the ability to determine whether
the behavior of those affiliated with their organization is acceptable. However, by making
decisions, the social-control agent decides what is considered as the right behavior and the wrong
behavior (Palmer, 2012). The member organizations that are assessed by the social-control agent
attempt to avoid discipline by social-control agents, yet are willing to do as much as possible
without crossing the line set by the agents (Palmer, 2012).
In today’s society, social control is simply defined as the efforts by leaders to ensure
conformity to the norms (Goode, 2015). The reason is due to the fact that society is not selfgoverning or self-regulating, but there are governing bodies and enforcement groups that exist in
order to ensure that members of society attempt to conform to the norms (Goode, 2015). Goode
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(2015) referenced that social control as:
“the guiding concept in the field of deviance; it is on the foundation of the
concept of social control that everything that is important about deviance and how
it operates in social collectivities and, more generally, the society itself, rests” (p.
31).
Deviance is referenced as a disruption to the norm in society. Goode (2015) identified the
occurrence of deviant behavior can weaken norms, create divide within communities, and create
disorder. However, deviance does more than expected and can, at times, leave a lasting impact
on society. For example, one key component of deviance is the impact on social change.
Consider that the individuals in a community may allow for deviant acts to become more
accepted; by allowing the act to occur, the opportunity for the behavior to be considered
legitimate rises (Goode, 2015). Deviance also helps members of society adapt to change since
alternative lifestyles and methods exist. The presence of deviance would allow for the
individuals considered in the norm to properly adjust to a style of living different from their own.
Deviance also permits for social cohesion in society. Social cohesion occurs when social
boundaries are created within communities and input is presented from the current members of
the community in order to determine what behavior will be characterized as acceptable (Goode,
2015).
The acceptance of deviance could be beneficial or harmful depends on the type of
deviance taking place and also where the deviant behavior is occurring. If the deviance is mild in
nature and observed in a casual setting, the resulting enforcement would be a method of informal
social control. However, if the deviant act occurs within a school or a workplace, the resulting
sanction would be a form of formal social control. Workplace deviance is researched heavily due
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to the possible effects that could impact the industry of the organization and relies on effective
leadership by executives in order to keep deviant behavior at a minimum (Goode, 2015).
Workplace Deviance. Prior to the literature provided by Warren (2003), the attention on
workplace deviant behavior focused on theft by members within the organization, absenteeism,
injustice, and unethical decision making (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Robinson and Bennett
(1995) defined workplace deviant behavior as “voluntary behavior that violates significant
organizational norms and in so doing threatens the well-being of an organization, its members or
both” (p. 557). When workplace deviant behavior exists, the behavior is classified into one of
four categories: constructive conformity, destructive conformity, constructive deviance, and
destructive deviance (Warren, 2003). The concepts of constructive conformity and destructive
conformity both deal with the relationship between norms and hypernorms, which are
universally known principles (Warren, 2003). Constructive conformity occurs when the group
norms are aligned with the hypernorms and destructive conformity occurs when the group norms
differ from the hypernorms. Constructive deviance is when wrongful behavior occurs within
organizations (according to the hypernorms), but is productive in the development of the
organization (according to the group norms). Destructive deviance contrasts from constructive
deviance since the behavior does not meet the group norms or the hypernorms (Warren, 2003).
The literature on constructive and destructive workplace deviance is essential in fully
understanding how deviance exists within any establishment. Constructive workplace deviance
includes all of the behaviors that violate the norms of an organization, yet attempts to improve
the standing of an organization as well (Robbins & Galperin, 2010). Constructive deviance is
much more common in organizations and firms throughout society today because of individuals
that commit the deviant acts striving to bring about progressive modifications. The concept of
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constructive deviance is quite different from other subjects within organizational behavior
because the focus is directly on presenting change within the organization (Robbins & Galperin,
2010).
Constructive deviance is connected with other principles that occur within companies,
such as organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), whistleblowing, and voice. Organizational
citizenship behaviors describe “employee acts that support the broader social and psychological
environment in which tasks are carried out in organizations” (Bolino, Klotz, Turnley, & Harvey,
2012, p. 542). OCB and constructive deviance are similar in structure because both concepts
strive to build positive performance within the organization, but the concepts are different
considering that OCB does not deviate from the norms set by an organization (Vadera, Pratt, &
Mishra, 2013).
Most literature still utilizes the original definition of whistle-blowing, which is defined by
Near and Miceli (1985) as: “disclosure by organizational members (current or former) of illegal,
immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers to persons or
organizations who may be able to effect action” (p. 4). As with OCB, whistle-blowing has
similarities and differences with constructive deviance. For example, the difference is that many
cases of whistle-blowing occur as a form of revenge or looking out for one’s self instead of
shielding others in the community, including citizens, other employees, and key stakeholders.
Constructive deviance and whistle-blowing are similar because when both occur internally, the
outcome could provide insight and produce growth within the organization (Vadera et al., 2013).
The last principle that connects with constructive deviance is the role of voice within
organizations. Walumbwa, Morrison, and Christensen (2012) stated that voice “is often defined
as a kind of intentional, speaking-up behavior by employees to deliver constructive opinions and
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ideas on work-related issues that facilitate organizations to achieve better effectiveness or avoid
potential crises” (p. 17). Understanding voice is essential to constructive deviance because voice
could possibly lead to confrontation within organizations, while constructive deviance is the
behaviors that do implement change and imply more action rather than providing suggestions
(Vadera et al., 2013).
Destructive Deviance. Robinson and Bennett (1995) originally defined destructive
deviance as a “voluntary behavior that violates significant organizational norms and in so doing
threatens the well-being of an organization and its members or both” (p. 556). Participation in
destructive deviance can be labeled as organizational misbehavior, counterproductive workplace
behavior, deviance, antisocial behavior, and dysfunctional work behavior (Griffin & Lopez,
2005). Destructive deviance is divided into two categories: interpersonal and organizational.
Interpersonal deviance is the type of destructive deviance that is a negative behavior expressed
towards another member of the organization. An example of interpersonal deviance is making a
hurtful comment or exhibiting rude behavior. Organizational deviance is a negative behavior
towards the organization as a whole, such as stealing or exhibiting minimal effort (Griffin &
Lopez, 2005).
Organizational Deviance. Organizational deviance is defined as the “intentional
behaviors engaged in by organizational members that are contrary to the norms of the
organization, and which carry the potential to harm the organization” (Ferris, Brown, & Heller,
2009, p. 280). From problems between employees to issues regarding practices of companies,
organizational deviance emerged to become a frequent issue all over the world (Ferris et al.,
2009). There are four scenarios in which are examples of when organizational deviance has
occurred: 1) the deviant act must be contrary to norms outside of the organization; 2) the deviant
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act must find support in norms of a given level or division of the organization; 3) the deviant
behavior must be known to the dominant coalition of the organization; and 4) new members
must be socialized to participate in the deviant action (Santomier, Howard, Piltz, & Romance,
1980).
Individuals that participate in organizational deviance choose to do so after affiliating
themselves with those who have previously engaged in deviant behavior and also the
opportunities to engage in deviant behavior are readily available. In organizational deviance,
when people initially notice the deviant behavior of others, they assume that the conduct being
displayed is customary. Within businesses, the previous statement becomes vital considering the
relationship that may or may not exist between upper level management and their employees,
along with the large amount of communication that takes place between peers (Biron, 2010). The
leadership within an organization needs to be fully informed on the impact of organizational
deviance, thus applying different tactics in order to promote conformity and restrain unwanted
conduct (Avey, Palanski, & Walumbwa, 2011; Biron, 2010). Prior research noted the previous
consequences of organizational deviance and how negative behavior, such as theft, falsification
of documents, and neglect of supervision, could lead to many unwanted costs and revenue losses
(Balducci, Schaufeli, & Fraccaroli, 2011; Biron, 2010; Lian, Ferris, & Brown, 2012).
Previous research also referred to three different items that cause organizational deviance
in businesses: ethical ideology, ethical leadership, and perceptions of unfairness (Avey et al.,
2011; Hastings & Finegan, 2011; Zoghbi-Manrique-de-Lara, 2010). Ethical ideology references
to the overall concern shown by someone in regards to what occurs in their surroundings,
especially the events that could result in a negative impact on an organization (Hastings &
Finegan, 2011). Ethical leadership involves leader consideration, interactional fairness, leader
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honesty, and idealized influence within an organization (Avey et al., 2011; Walumbwa, Avolio,
Gardner, Wernsing, & Peterson, 2008). Previous research further suggested that in order for
organizations to operate in an ethical setting, there needs to be ethical leadership along with
interactional justice, which is the level of respect presented to individuals that are affected by
decisions (Avey et al., 2011). Perceptions of unfairness indicate that many of the individuals
believe that others, whether within the same organization or outside, are treated with more
respect from management. Employees within the organization would feel more likely to
participate in organizational deviance to gain more respect and ultimately, more notoriety to
higher officials within the company (Zoghbi-Manrique-de-Lara, 2010).
When organizations engage in deviant behavior, the reaction provided by those outside of
the firm is taken into consideration as well. Generally, when deviance takes place there is a
negative perspective that is given to organizations, no matter what may or may not have
occurred. With the influence of social media on the community, all that is needed is an incident
to transpire and then reaction of many will be evidenced through social media platforms, such as
Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram (Dixon, Martinez, & Martin, 2015). One topic area that is
commonly discussed on social media platforms in deviant behavior committed within sport,
specifically at the intercollegiate and professional level (Dixon et al., 2015).
Organizational Deviance in Sport. The NCAA established the primary mission of the
organization is to “be an integral part of higher education and to focus on the development of
student-athletes” (NCAA, 2014, n.p.). By educating athletic departments across the country,
whether through administration, coaches, and/or student-athletes, the NCAA holds each
institution accountable for their actions. As the financial investment and revenues continue to
increase in intercollegiate athletes, there is a direct correlation with the growing number of
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violations committed by NCAA-affiliated athletic departments (Winfree, 2012). These violations
include, but are not limited to, issues with recruiting, impermissible benefits, amateurism, and
institutional control (Winfree, 2012). In many cases of the violations being committed, the
NCAA member institutions are seeking a competitive advantage to secure a limited pool of
money through tournament or bowl appearances (Smith, 2015). Competitive advantage is the
ability gained through the utilization of resources to perform at a higher level than others in the
same industry. One of the main responsibilities of the NCAA is to reprimand the violating
institutions and educate them to prevent further misconduct (Winfree, 2012). The process of
disciplining the athletic departments is, at times, a complex procedure and as Rogers and Ryan
(2011) stated, “the NCAA enforcement process is, to use a fancy Latin phrase, sui generis –
meaning of its own kind” (p.752).
In the history of the NCAA, there have been different efforts in order to provide guidance
and integrity to intercollegiate sports as a whole. President Theodore Roosevelt first created the
Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States (IAAUS) due to the rising number of
injuries and deaths resulting from intercollegiate football competition (Lewis, 1969). The
IAAUS was originally created to reform and provide regulation of all college sports, yet the
group focused on just reforming college football (Lewis, 1969). When the NCAA was first
created from the IAAUS in 1910, the influence of the organization was minimal and still solely
fixated on the development of intercollegiate football (Smith, 2000). However, as additional
sports other than football began to grow in popularity, the presence of a diverse governing body
was essential and changes needed to be made from the current organization (Smith, 2000).
The Carnegie Report, released by Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Education, conducted research on the current state of college athletics at that time and the
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problems that existed due to the lack of structure (Savage, 1929). The study referenced the
negative components that were evident in college sports and the absence of leadership by the
NCAA and heads of athletic departments (Savage, 1929). Even though there was much
disagreement and indifference to the results of the study, ultimately, there was enough indication
that there needed to be a change on how the NCAA operates. The report offered the
recommendation that in order for the NCAA to be more structured and provide a better overall
experience for all, college presidents and administrators need to be more involved and assist with
the direction of intercollegiate sport programs (Savage, 1929; Smith, 2000). Even though the
NCAA attempted to make changes in order to improve the culture, there was a challenge of
trying to keep pace with commercialization (Savage, 1929).
After the release of the Carnegie Report, the NCAA attempted to provide a better method
for regulating member institutions. In the late 1940s, there were issues in intercollegiate athletics
regarding regulation (e.g., recruiting, scholarships, compensation of student-athletes) considering
that prior to World War II (WWII) many institutions were self-regulating (Smith, 2000). After
WWII, the number of recruiting violations grew and there was a growing problem of how to
establish uniformity within the member institutions (Smith, 2000). In 1948, the NCAA approved
the sanity codes, which provided a set of guidelines for recruiting, permitted scholarships based
on financial need, and regulated the compensation of student-athletes (Edleman, 2014). The
sanity codes were regulated strictly and many institutions were found in violation of the codes.
However, in 1951 under new President Walter Byers, the codes were lifted because, if not, then
there would be no members left in the NCAA since the only sanction for violating the codes was
expulsion (Edleman, 2014). Shortly after sanity codes were no longer being used, the NCAA
created the Committee of Infractions, which is a group that works separate of the NCAA and
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administers sanctions to member institutions. The University of Kentucky committed the first
major violation in 1953 when athletes on their basketball team received compensation for fixing
games and participating in competition while deemed ineligible (Smith, 2000).
In 1973, a special committee was created in order to study the NCAA enforcement
process (Edleman, 2014). The committee recommended for a deeper investigation into the role
of the Committee of Infractions. NCAA member institutions began to question the decisionmaking abilities of the Committee of Infractions specifically regarding unfairness in the rules
and enforcement process. Shortly after, the NCAA was presented additional power to enforce the
rules by directly penalizing the schools and at the same time, indirectly punishing the students,
coaches, and administration (Smith, 2000). In 1979, at the NCAA Convention, there was a vote
regarding major revisions to the NCAA’s enforcement system, which was rejected (NCAA,
1979). Although the proposal to transform the NCAA’s enforcement policies was denied, the
council did approve seven additional proposals which would implement smaller alterations to the
NCAA enforcement structure (NCAA, 1979). For example, the Committee of Infractions would
no longer be permitted to review an infractions case and then determine if further investigation is
needed (NCAA, 1979). The delegates of the convention created a four year statute of limitations
for infractions cases, established new standards for the evidence regarding accessibility, and
would continue to investigate the current enforcement procedures (NCAA, 1979).
As a result of the investigation completed, the Presidents’ Commission was formed,
which was focused on improving intercollegiate athletics and the betterment of the studentathlete experience (Edleman, 2014). The Presidents’ Commission was in charge of implementing
one of the biggest moments in NCAA enforcement when the seven-point plan that was
established in June 1985. The key point in the plan was the administering of the “death penalty”
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to athletic departments and/or teams when repeatedly violating rules (Edleman, 2014). The
“death penalty” allowed the Committee of Infractions to have the power to suspend any
member’s athletic program for up to two year for the engagement in repeat, major violations of
the NCAA bylaws (Smith, 2000). The “death penalty” strongly impacts the financial success of
an athletic department, especially in the revenue-generating sports, such as football and
basketball (Smith, 2000). Considering that previous research refers to the NCAA as a business,
by not having revenue from the primary sources, the likelihood of being successful decreases
(Carson, 2010).
The business aspect of intercollegiate sport is evident; however, there have been many
issues dealing with how the business aspect of intercollegiate sport is negatively affecting the
student-athlete and community experience (Carson, 2010). Carson (2010) stated college sports
developed into a sophisticated, yet complicated business and there is more focus on revenue and
the pursuit of championships, rather than student-athlete development and education. As college
athletic departments throughout the country are shifting their focus towards obtaining more
revenue, there are a higher number of cases involving organizational wrongdoing, which leads to
major and secondary violations being committed by NCAA member institutions (Winfree,
2012).
Prior to August 2013, the (NCAA) separated violations into two different categories:
secondary and major (NCAA, 2015). The NCAA categorized major violations as those that
provide “an extensive recruiting or competitive advantage” (NCAA, 2015, n.p.). Secondary
violations were defined as violations that “isolated or inadvertent in nature, provides or is
intended to provide only a minimal recruiting, competitive, or other advantage and does not
include any significant impermissible benefit” (NCAA, 2015, n.p.). As of August 2013,
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violations are now categorized into four different levels: Level I, Level II, Level III, and Level
IV (NCAA, 2015). Level I and level II violations are evaluated on the same scale as major
violations and levels III and IV are familiar to secondary violations (NCAA, 2015). Whether
major or secondary, the participation in misbehavior by NCAA member institutions is an
example of organizational deviance.
In athletic departments, organizational deviance could take place in a number of ways
and with anyone affiliated with any sports team or individual department. The behavior of the
violating individual or group must be egregious enough to report to the governing body of their
respective athletic department (e.g. NCAA) (Parkinson, 2012). The report of deviant behavior
could essentially be directly from the violating athletic department (self-report) or from insight
provided by other individuals or athletic departments. No matter the method of reporting, the
behavior can only be labeled as deviant if the NCAA is notified and makes a decision regarding
possible sanctions (Parkinson, 2012). The NCAA appoints a group of individuals that serve as
the Committee of Infractions (COI), which is in charge of utilizing proper judgment in regards to
deciding on cases of organizational deviance within NCAA member institutions (NCAA, 2015).
The committee must work independently of the involved institutions and also separately from the
NCAA (NCAA, 2015).
If the wrongful behavior committed by the violating institution goes unpunished by the
Committee of Infractions, the leaders within the organization may feel as participation in the
improper action could provide a possible loophole (Parkinson, 2012). Coaches and
administrators may proceed to continue in participating in the deviant behavior, which could
eventually become a norm within the athletic department. The participation in the behavior
would occur with or without the knowledge of the NCAA and could lead to organizational
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deviance. The problem that is presented regarding the engagement in organizational deviance
without the NCAA’s consent is the pressure regarding possible consequences of participating.
Individual teams and/or athletic departments may view the behavior on a risk/reward scale that
would possibly provide immediate success and deal with the possible repercussions administered
from the Committee of Infractions at a later date (Parkinson, 2012).
Previous literature references how the construction of the NCAA is problematic and
enhances engagement in organizational deviance (Humphreys & Ruseski, 2006; Santomier et al.,
1980). The negative behavior seen in athletic departments results from the lack of proper ethical
decision-making that occurs at the university level. When individuals within the university place
more value on the individual success rather than the integrity expected by those affiliated with
the university, then organizational deviance could result (Agle & Kelley, 2001; Kelley & Chang,
2007). Organizational deviance is presented in the NCAA as several types of violations that
include a breach of contract, such as lack of institutional control, academic fraud, failure to
cooperate with the NCAA, unethical conduct, recruitment of student-athletes, failure to monitor
(Clark & Batista, 2009).
One of the common violations committed by NCAA member institutions involves the
recruitment of student-athletes. Recruiting violations occurred for decades and regularly ensue
without the knowledge of any higher level administration, whether at the university-level or
athletic-level (Clark & Batista, 2009). Clark and Batista (2009) conducted a study on the amount
of recruiting violations that occurred at Division-I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) institutions.
The resulting literature concluded that recruiting violations may take place for numerous reasons
including: the prospective student-athlete’s race, the prospective student-athlete’s socioeconomic status, the geographic region that the student-athlete is from, and the conference
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affiliation that the institution participates in (Clark & Batista, 2009). In the FBS, 76.4% of the
documented recruiting violations were committed by Bowl Championship Series (BCS) teams
and 63% of the aforementioned violations took place in the South and Midwest region (Clark &
Batista, 2009). The aforementioned literature discusses the different examples of deviance that
occurs in intercollegiate athletics; however, in professional sports, the examples given discuss
more regarding the deviance that occurs during competition.
When professional athletes partake in competition, their main purposes are to win and
strive to be the best player or apart of the best franchise in their respective league (Yates &
Gillespie, 2002). Even though some professional sports contain many violent aspects, the acts of
violence are seen as acceptable and are often immune to criminal charges (Yates & Gillespie,
2002). Athletes will, at times, cross the line of what is acceptable behavior and blatantly attempt
to harm other athletes (Yates & Gillespie, 2002). Yet, fans tend to embrace the situation and
cheer for the individual engaging in deviance during a sporting event. The fans feel emotionally
and physically engaged to their preferred sports teams. In contact sports, such as football and
basketball, some fans prefer for their favorite teams to be overly physical because the action is
seen as an act of toughness and durability (Yates & Gillespie, 2002).
The intensity shown during competition is well appreciated by fans and athletes, yet some
question the reasoning of why the high level of intensity is deemed acceptable in today’s society.
From the beginning of athletic competition, there has always been an aspect of violence
involved. Whether the event was either combat rituals held by the Greeks and Romans or the
early stages of college football held under President Theodore Roosevelt, spectators are willing
to attend violent sporting events (Yates & Gillespie, 2002). For example, attendance at football
games continued to rise between 1933 and 1976, despite the fact there were 1,198 participants in
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college football that died from game-related injuries (Yates & Gillespie, 2002).
Previous research referenced how violence occurring in sports produces little impact on
society as some fans purely enjoy sports as entertainment, not as a way of life (Guttmann, 1998;
Jewell, Moti, & Coates, 2012; Smith, 1988). In our society, there is a deep appreciation for
athletes and their skillsets. Many fans are motivated to attend athletic events, whether
professional, amateur, intercollegiate, interscholastic, or youth, because sport has become a
critical component of society (Yoshida, Gordon, James, & Heere, 2015). The value of athletic
events and the popularity of athletes in the community demonstrate that athletes are also
celebrities. The influence of athletes on those who deem themselves as fans is strong, but at
times, can be described as excessive (Yoshida et al., 2015). Many fans feel as they may have a
direct relationship with athletes and through social media, have a platform to provide feedback
regarding athlete behavior and performance (Yoshida et al., 2015).
When sport governing bodies have athletes or departments that participate in misconduct,
the punishment that is imposed is sometimes made public (Lee & McFarlin, 2015). However, at
times, the punishment that is given is private and the only individuals that are made aware of the
full sanctions are those who commit the wrongdoing and those who administer (Lee & McFarlin,
2015). A professional athlete engaging in deviance is quite common and for example, in
February 2009, Kim & Parlow (2009) determined that in 22 out of 28 days in the month, a
professional athlete was reported engaging in some type of deviant behavior. Wilson (2010)
concluded the likelihood of criminal behavior is higher for athletes that participate in sports that
consist with the most contact, such as Football and Hockey. Some alternative research has
explored that the likelihood of engaging in deviant behavior is higher in professional sports
where athletes may make more revenue (Kim & Parlow, 2009).
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The power that someone may have in an organization, whether as an athlete or an
administrator, is critical in defining deviant behavior. In professional sports, power is seen at all
levels of the organization (Pacifici, 2014). In some sports, owner or the general manager would
possess the majority of the power in a franchise. Yet, in some other instances, the best player or
most influential player can enjoy the most power (Pacifici, 2014). Commissioners tend to retain
the most power in all professional sports leagues considering that their position is primarily
focused on overseeing the entire league and making sure that rules are being properly enforced
(Abrams, 2013). At times, some believe commissioners can have too much power and allow for
personal bias and favoritism to become instrumental factors (Abrams, 2013).
Much of the power presented in professional sports leagues comes from the idea of those
with the most influence are working within the best interest of the organization (Pacifici, 2014.
Commissioners and Presidents need to be in sync with the franchises that make up their leagues
because their input is valuable in creating cohesion and conformity throughout. When there is a
common belief that the leadership of a league is not exhibiting good standards and also is not
working in the best interest of an organization, then the result is disconnect that could ultimately
lead to negative experiences, such as league strikes and boycotts (Pacifici, 2014).
When commissioners administer punishments to individual athletes, fairness is vital, but
the commissioner should also be consistent (Lam, 2014). Many leagues established guidelines on
how to deal with deviant behavior, with respect to procedural and substantive due process (Lam,
2014). Take for example how domestic violence is handled by the different organizations within
sports leagues. League-sanctioned organizations produced inconsistent punishments for athletes
that engaged in acts of domestic violence. However, instead of the league implementing a
sanction, the punishment was left in the hands of the individual teams (Lucido, 2013; Withers,
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2010). However, if the commissioner can provide genuine reasoning and show that the process
of determining the sanctions was indeed fair, then the owners of the organization will likely be
supportive of decision making (Lam, 2014; Lucido, 2013). In professional sports, if one
participates in wrongdoing, commissioners and presidents may attempt to make an example out
of athletes in order to discourage that type of behavior in the respective league (Pacifici, 2014).
One recent change in professional sports is the inclusion of the NFL’s Personal Conduct
Policy (PCP) in 2007 (Kim & Parlow, 2009). The strictly followed policy was developed in
order for “all persons associated with the NFL to avoid conduct detrimental to the integrity and
public confidence in the National Football League” (Kim & Parlow, 2009, p. 578). The policy is
not only for those who are arrested and charged in criminal conduct, but also penalizes deviant
behavior that damages the league’s name and branding, whether on or off the field. Prior to
2007, the NFL Commissioner was not permitted to make any decisions regarding the punishment
of a player unless there was a conviction or plea made (Kim & Parlow, 2009). Now due to usage
of the PCP, however, “specifics of the disciplinary response will be based on the nature of the
incident, the actual threatened risk to the participant and others, any prior or additional
misconduct (whether or not criminal charges were filed), and other relevant factors” (Kim &
Parlow, 2009, p. 578). The existence of the policy provides expectation of professional athletes
and presents the notion that NFL players need to be great representatives of their organization,
both on and off the field.
Corruption
Deviant behavior that occurs within organizations will be classified as either examples of
corruption or misconduct. Corruption is best understood as an overall betrayal of trust from one
person to another. There is a direct link between trust and corruption meaning that when
individuals or groups do not necessarily trust the leadership and direction of a company, then
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there will likely be corruption as a result (Uslaner, 2012). The lack of trust in an organization is
not uncommon, but can attribute to a number of different factors. Entitlement is commonly
described as one of the main causes of corruption within organizations because of the role of
many lower level employees (Rosenblatt, 2012). Workplace entitlement refers to the employees
within an organization that feel as they deserve praise, recognition, and rewards that are not
consistent with their actual ability (Harvey, Harris, Gillis, & Martinko, 2014). Employees feel as
they work entirely too rigorous of a schedule and receive little to no benefits or recognition from
the commitment (Rosenblatt, 2012).
Putnam (1995) believed both trust and social capital were both critical in determining the
success within an organization. Further, multiple studies demonstrate that if there is a lack of
trust in an organization, then corruption is likely to occur (Soot & Rootalu, 2012; Uslaner, 2000).
There are advantages for higher officials in organizations to strive towards earning the trust of all
and leading the company as a captain of team, such as uniformity and lack of questioning (Soot
& Rootalu, 2012). Through engaging in better leadership techniques, trust could be rebuilt or
earned, thus leading to the absence of corruption in an organization, but in some cases, the
relationship is beyond repair and leads to a moral collapse (Putnam, 1995; Soot & Rootalu,
2012).
Moral Collapse. The concept of moral collapse is similar to organizational corruption,
but corruption is only considered as one form of moral collapse. The key difference between the
two terms is that moral collapse does not require any deliberate corruption (Hamilton, 2014). To
understand moral collapse, one must recognize institutional theory as the concept provides the
framework of the concept. Institutional theory provides a view of organizations from a social and
cultural perspective rather than the task perspective. Current literature determines that
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institutional theory offers an understanding of how organizations operate, specifically centering
on employees, management, and communities (Hamilton, 2014). In order for organizations to be
considered as authentic, the entire company must be willing to conform to the ideas, rules, and
regulations that already exist in the community (Hamilton, 2014).
Shadnam and Lawrence (2011) developed three propositions in regards to moral collapse
and its impact in organizations. Their first proposition stated that moral collapse is likely to
happen in organizations that exist in areas that the exchanging of ideas and thoughts in
nonexistent. The lack of leadership and communication shown by community leaders essentially
leads to moral collapse. When organizations lack communication, whether with employees or
stakeholders, there is little chance to achieve success (Shadnam & Lawrence, 2011). Part of the
reason for a lack of communication is due to dissimilarity in ideologies. The differing
perspective shows that the moral community, organization, and individuals all need to make
adjustments in order to accomplish any tasks. The key aspect that needs to be included is that the
organization needs to understand and better gauge the moral community (Shadnam & Lawrence,
2011).
Their second proposition offered that moral collapse is likely to occur in organizations
that the behavior of the organization minimizes the values and ethical beliefs that were
established previously. The second proposition discussed development and how organizations
may refuse change, which leads to moral collapse and also misconduct. Organizations tend to be
set in their habits and methods, thus an issue would arise when the moral community has major
differences that could alter the outlook of the organization. Their third proposition argued that
moral collapse is likely to occur in organizations that the misconduct of employees could lead to
larger negative effects within the moral community the organization exists. The creation of a
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moral community is needed in organizations, but must be established early in the development
stages of a company (Shadnam & Lawrence, 2011).
Moral community is known as a “network of organizational actors in which relationships
are based principally around issues of morality, and for which there exist some set of rules,
formal or informal, that govern community membership” (Shadnam & Lawrence, 2011, p. 385).
The concept of moral community should teach the individuals about the ideology, goals, and
regulation that are within the company. The belief in moral community builds a relationship
between the organization and the individual because dialogue occurs on how each individual is
expected to contribute. The individual will be permitted to give ideas, provide influence, and also
deliver constructive feedback to the organization, which will allow constant communication and
satisfaction for all (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994).
Organizational culture and moral communities should be linked through similar cultural
and social norms. Organizational culture is the values, norms, and behaviors that exist in a
workplace which as a result, produce a pattern of behavior that is unique to an organization
(Alvesson, 2013). When individuals enter organizations, they already possess their own personal
beliefs, norms, and values system; however, being comfortable with conforming to the beliefs of
the hiring organization is necessary (Alvesson, 2013). Furthermore, an organization should be
fully engaged in their own beliefs and make sure that there are concepts implemented that
promote growth, development, and positivity in order to achieve success (Alvesson, 2013).
Organizational Corruption. Aguilera and Vadera (2008) referenced the role of
misconduct when analyzing organizational corruption, and described it as the situation when an
authority figure abuses their power in order to achieve personal gain. In comparison, Ashforth,
Gioia, Robinson, and Treviño (2008) classified organizational corruption as “a willful perversion
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of order, ideals, and, perhaps most important, trust” (p. 671). Organizational corruption is the act
of an individual or group that is striving for an advantage in some capacity and is willing to
violate company policies and procedures (Aguilera & Vadera, 2008). The ‘bad apple’ theory is
applicable to individuals that show “pathological traits, certain personality characteristics, low
level of moral development, or little belief in a just world” (Gross, 2011, p. 25). Previous
literature mentioned the value of determining these traits in individuals before their entry into an
organization because once they are in, the impact could be detrimental (Gorta, 1998). If a
member of an organization participates in corrupt behavior, but does not receive any reprimands
or the proper punishment from higher officials, then that may signal to other employees that
engaging in misconduct is tolerable (Gross, 2011).
The leadership by higher officials and lower level managers is significant to reducing the
amount of organizational corruption occurring in a company. If there is a lack of leadership
demonstrated in an organization, then that missing component will likely produce a negative
impact on the company’s structure and culture (Gross, 2011). Lack of leadership could lead to a
lack of respect from the higher officials to the employees and vice versa. Gross (2011) described
a lack of communication between all levels of an organization as organizational silence.
Organizational silence creates a damaging atmosphere in the workplace because there is an
environment of discomfort and fear, which limits employees in having meaningful discussions
(Tan, 2014). Organizational silence also eliminates learning and the suitable education of the
company for all members, including stakeholders (Tan, 2014).
There are three types of organizational corruption (refer to Table A4): procedural,
schematic, and categorical, in the Opportunity-Motivation-Justification (OMJ) model of crime
(McKendell & Wagner, 1997; Weber, 1978;). In the OMJ model, the focus is on the
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opportunities provided through corruption, what motivates the individuals to participate in
corrupt activities, and what items may justify their actions (Albrecht, Howe, & Romey, 1984).
Procedural corruption is recognized as “either the lack of formalized procedures or formal ‘rules’
of business conduct in the organization, or from the violation of existing formal procedures, for
personal gain” (Aguilera & Vadera, 2008, p. 441; Lind, 1988). When procedural corruption
occurs, some employees within the organization do not follow the rules or regulations that are set
by leadership or management. These individuals are well aware of the guidelines established by
the business or firm, yet still feel as the rules are not mandatory to follow (Aguilera & Vadera,
2008; Lind, 1988). The issue with procedural corruption is the role of accountability by
managers or other leaders within the group. In some situations, there is pressure to perform and
exceed expectations and some leaders would rather disregard the established regulations if that
means that the organization would be successful (Trice & Beyer, 1993).
Schematic corruption occurs when “structures are present uniformly throughout the
organization” (Aguilera & Vadera, 2008, p. 442; Luo, 2004). Schematic corruption starts with
the upper leadership positions and their willingness to engage in corruption in order to seek an
advantage over other competitor organizations. Schematic corruption is taught at an early stage
of the training process, in which lower employees follow the example provided by managers,
managers follow the examples of supervisors, etc. Schematic corruption is tough to detect
internally considering that just all of the members within the organization accepted the behavior
as the norm. If the upper leadership in an organization show charisma and the employees are all
showing uniformity, then the likelihood that an organization could be participating in schematic
corruption is highly conceivable (Aguilera & Vadera, 2008).
Categorical corruption is “the result of concentrated and delimited acts of corruption
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within the organization” (Aguilera & Vadera, 2008, p. 443). Categorical corruption, in
comparison to schematic and procedural, is much easier to detect and specific to a sub-group of
the organization. The aspect of pressure is included with the other types of corruption, but is
more frequent in categorical corruption. If a sub-group of the company has been found guilty of
committing categorical corruption, then that specific sub-group would receive the blame rather
than the entire organization (Aguilera & Vadera, 2008). When organizations are led by those
who give their supervisors large amounts of responsibility and do not have a direct relationship
with all levels of the organization, then categorical corruption to taking place is expected. The
three types of corruption are essential in determining the type of misconduct that takes place in
organizations. Leadership and involvement by higher officials in organizations is a common
element in determining what type of corruption occurs. The likelihood of organizational
corruption decreases when there are leaders that build strong, constructive relationships with
their staff. The higher ranking officials also need to place more value into training and
developing the staff because a lack thereof could contribute to corruption.
OCI & CO. In addition to these three types of corruption, Pinto, Leana, and Pil (2008):
added an organization of corrupt individuals (OCI) and a corrupt organization (CO) to the
corruption literature. An organization of corrupt individuals’ (OCI) is best described as the
majority of members in an organization that choose to act in a corrupt manner to receive personal
gain (Pinto et al., 2008). A corrupt organization (CO) is identified as where the entire group
chooses to engage themselves in corruption, in order for all to receive benefits from wrongdoing
(Pinto et al., 2008).
OCI is specifically expressed as “an emergent, bottom-up phenomenon in which one or
more meso-level processes facilitate the contagion of personally corrupt behaviors that cross a

182

critical threshold such that the organization can be characterized as corrupt” (Pinto et al., 2008,
p. 688). OCI spotlights on how the action of few could be detrimental to an entire organization.
An organization of corrupt individuals is considered an organization-level issue due to how the
corrupt behavior expands to others in the organization. The other reason is the lack of
recognition of OCI by upper level executives. If those in higher levels were aware or more
involved on what was taking place, then there could be an end to the misconduct.
CO is considered as a “top-down phenomenon in which a group of organization
members--- typically, the dominant coalition, organizational elites, or top management team--undertake, directly or through their subordinates, collective and coordinated corrupt actions that
primarily benefit the organization” (Pinto et al., 2008, p. 689). In comparison to OCI, CO strictly
spotlights the behavior and corruption committed by the organization as a whole. There is no
separation between the individual committing misconduct and the entire organization (Pinto et
al., 2008). Past research did not always reference the involvement of upper executives in
corruption, but previous findings show that the behaviors shown in CO are representative
throughout the entire organization (Vardi & Wiener, 1996).
In assessing the differences between the two types of organizational corruption, four
subcategories divide the two categories and assess their differences (refer to Table A5):
organizational structure, result orientation, environmental scarcity, and industry structure/norms
(Pinto et al., 2008). In organizational structure, when there are greater individual-level structural
opportunities in an organization, then there is likely a OCI rather than a CO. Precisely, if the
organization has larger opportunities for jobs and is extremely challenging to monitor the
behavior of all employees in the company, then the organization could contain corrupt
individuals (OCI). However, if the organization has groupings or departments that are loosely
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watched, then the organization is probably corrupt (CO) (Pinto et al., 2008).
Result orientation describes the motivation of the employees and their willingness to
commit corruption whether the choice was an individual decision or one that is shared
throughout the organization (Pinto et al., 1998). Other literature describes result orientation as
incentive systems and the pressure for performance/output (Baucus & Baucus, 1997; Hill et al.,
1992). In the usage of incentive systems, there is a correlation between organizational corruption,
business results, and compensation. If an employee receives compensation based off of the
business itself and the amount of revenue being made, then the organization is likely corrupt
(Pinto et al., 1998). Yet, if an employee’s salary is not determined based upon the success of the
business and there is corruption, then an organization of corrupt individuals could be the result
(Pinto et al., 1998).
The third subcategory is environmental scarcity and competitive pressures presented to
organizations. Competitiveness between companies is common and in some cases, drives
individuals or organization to partake in corruption. As previously noted, success is the goal for
companies and there is added pressure to meet high standards if a competitor is currently
excelling. However, Pinto et al. (2008) determined that if there is an organization that is
competing and facing pressure from other organizations, then corruption could exist throughout
the entire organization rather than on an individual basis.
The final subcategory examines the likelihood of organizational corruption in certain
industries. Previous literature referenced that in certain industries there is a higher probability of
corruption (Baucus & Near, 1991; Daboub, Rasheed, Priem, & Gray, 1995; Simpson, 1986).
Certain industries have different structures, standards, bylaws, and expectations when addressing
corruption, but as specified in Pinto et al. (2008), “in higher regulated industries, regulators may
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be bribed to look the other way or an agency might drift into protecting the industries and
organizations it was mandated to oversee” (p. 698). When organizations are classified in
industries that are more cohesive and are all likely to engage in wrongdoing, then there would
possibly be a corrupt organization (CO). However, if the corrupt organization is located in an
industry that has strong values and participation in misconduct is rare, then there would be
corrupt individuals (OCI) (Pinto et al., 2008).
Sport Corruption. In sports, corruption has always existed and in various forms
(Maennig, 2005). For example, illegal substances used to doctor baseball equipment, blood
doping in cycling, match fixing in soccer, free agency ‘blackballing’, and/or ticket fraud
corruption is prevalent and effects athletes, officials, executives, and fans (Maennig, 2005). The
growth of sport through commercialization is a primary cause of why corruption has grown and
why many believe that corruption is acceptable. Klitgaard (1988) believed that corruption is a
function of monopoly power plus the discretion by officials minus the costs of accountability.
Yet, individual corrupt behavior occurs when athletes overconform to the sport through striving
to do whatever is necessary to be the best (Klitgaard, 1988). However, Maennig (2005) stated
that
“Corruption may take the form of behavior by athletes who refrain from achieving
the level of performance normally required in the sport in question to win the
competition and instead intentionally permit others to win, or behaviour by
sporting officials who consciously perform their allocated tasks in a manner at
variance with the objectives and moral values of the relevant club, association,
competitive sports in general and/or society at large” (p. 189).
The concepts of corruption and deviance differ in the perspective that corruption tends to
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focus more on the possible ruin of an organization, compared to deviance, where in some cases,
there is more of an attempt to improve organizational standing. Even though the utilization of
both deviance and corruption can yield positive results, corruption is constantly mentioned
through literature in a negative perspective. Organizational deviance and organizational
corruption are two theories that tend to be on opposite ends of the deviance spectrum. Yet, the
concept of organizational misconduct has similarities to both and can be viewed as being in the
middle of deviance and corruption.
Organizational Misconduct
As characterized by Greve, Palmer, and Pozner (2010), organizational misconduct is
“behavior in or by an organization that a social-control agent judges to transgress a line
separating right from wrong; where such a line can separate legal, ethical, and social responsible
behavior from their antithesis” (p. 56). In comparison, Barnett (2012) defined misconduct as
“any publicized disclosed firm action that, under some set of conditions, a stakeholder would
deem illegal, unethical, or social irresponsible and take action to punish” (p. 7). Two benefits
from these definitions of organizational misconduct include: the ability to make the identification
of misconduct empirical and having the ability to analyze environmental variables, which may be
vital to managers.
Szwajkowski (1992) classified organizational misconduct into different subheadings,
such as white collar, corporate/occupational crime, unethical behavior, and rule violations.
Further, Vaughan (1999) also suggested organizational misconduct consists of “acts of omission
or commission committed by individuals or groups of individuals acting in their organizational
roles who violate internal rules, laws, or administrative regulations on behalf of organizational
goals” (p.4). Other examples considered as organizational misconduct include illegal
organizational behavior and organizational deviance, both which MacLean (2008) stated as
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overlapping concepts of misconduct. One prominent issue with the term misconduct is how
broad the term tends to be. For instance, considering that many organizations and governing
bodies to have differing opinions of what misconduct entails, if the definition is not clearly
articulated, then there may be an opportunity for an offender to take advantage (Thorpe, 2011).
Organizational misconduct can be classified in two different categories: normal and
abnormal (Palmer, 2012). Normal organizational misconduct is the result of wrongdoing from
individuals that are considered normal, being as he or she does not have any uncommon human
qualities (Palmer, 2012). Normal organizational misconduct takes place within many daily
activities within companies, yet rarely addressed if the result of the wrongful behavior leads to
success (Palmer, 2012). Durkheim (1895) believed that societies need to create and participate in
wrongful behavior in order to survive. The reason being is that in order to gauge what is
acceptable behavior within society, society should also be able to determine what is considered
as incorrect also (Palmer, 2012).
The culture that surrounds an organization performs an instrumental role in facilitating
organizational misconduct. The employees of the organization, along with their training and
ethical beliefs is vital in evaluating the organizational culture of a business or firm. Even though
some organizational cultures disapprove of misconduct, there are moments that the culture may
actually endorse misconduct. The three ways involve: varying degrees of explicitness,
extenuating circumstances, and the rise of cultures overemphasizing success (Thorpe, 2011). If
the culture of the organization includes any of the previous three items, then misconduct can be
prevalent in its surroundings, yet the higher officials are responsible for recognizing and ending
misconduct prior to the behavior becoming known as acceptable (Thorpe, 2011).
The pressure of an organization and the opportunities presented through success are
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additional reasons of why organizational misconduct occurs. MacLean (2008) discussed the
pressure/opportunity model that examines the atmosphere within a business environment and
how organizations unify in order to eliminate opportunities to obtain necessary resources, which
would pressure other organizations to participate in misconduct in order access the blocked
resource. The pressure/opportunity model proposed that if organizations are presented with
enough pressure and opportunity, then organizations could partake in misconduct in order to earn
assets (MacLean, 2008). The three factors identified that influence the pressure sensed by an
organization include environmental scarcity, environmental heterogeneity, and the overall
organizational financial performance (MacLean, 2008). Two factors influencing the opportunity
presented to the organizations to engage in misconduct are: the structure of the industry and the
size/structure of the organization (MacLean, 2008). Eventually, when organizations make
decisions regarding misconduct and the opportunities prevail over the obstacles, the odds are that
organizations will feel inclined to opt in. Prior quantitative research conducted by Andreoli and
Lefkowitz (2009) reviewed how organizational misconduct and the pressure to possibly
participate effected employee workplace experience. Individuals that were employed by
companies with a poor ethical climate and felt pressure to compromise their beliefs, essentially
did so for the success of the company, even though their job satisfaction levels were low
(Andreoli & Lefkowitz, 2009).
An additional reason companies engage in misconduct is due to attempting to meet high
aspirations or attempting to maintain high results in their respective industry (Mishina, Dykes,
Block, & Pollock, 2010). Competition is a key component in some industries that have wellestablished organizations or a group of organizations pursuing to become the leader (Schwieren
& Weichselbaumer, 2010; Shleifer, 2004). However when many companies struggle or feel no
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other options exist, Mishina et al. (2010) specified that companies will commit organizational
misconduct in order to better themselves. Many businesses are searching for advantages by
commonly partake in corporate illegality, which is “an illegal act primarily meant to benefit a
firm by potentially increasing revenues or decreasing costs” (Mishina et al., 2010, p. 702).
Corporate illegality occurred in many organizations, yet is most common in those organizations
that have a successful past but not currently or in organizations that never experienced significant
success (Mishina et al., 2010).
Successful organizations are likely engaging in organizational misconduct, due to three
possible reasons including: loss aversion, the house money effect, and executive hubris (Mishina
et al., 2010). Loss aversion is when the “potential gains and losses are of similar magnitude, the
negative consequences of losses will loom larger than the potential positive consequence of gains
and will therefore dominate decision making” (Mishina et al., 2010, p. 704). Loss aversion
occurs mainly due to the fear that successful organizations endure when projections are not as
positive or competitors begin to improve their stance in the industry (Mishina et al., 2010).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) stated that during loss aversion, the negative feedback gets the
attention of the higher executives of an organization, not the positive. The positive feedback is
expected considering the previous achievements of the company. However, whenever negative
feedback is provided, then there is more aspiration and in some cases desperation, to improve
immediately (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
When organizations are in the midst of success and have the resources to take a few more
chances within their decision making, some may consider participating in misconduct in order to
seek additional ‘buffer’ advantages. The aforementioned behavior is referenced as the “house
money” effect, which suggests:
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“When prior gains and prior losses could influence risk taking in such a way that
prior gains tended to lead to higher levels of risk seeking. The individuals with
prior gains perceive themselves to be gambling with “the house’s money” (the
profits from prior winning bets) rather than with their own capital” (Mishina et
al., 2010, p. 705).
Organizations choose to venture with “house money” because they have the support (executive
and financial) to do so and the risk is limited. Risk taking when utilizing the “house money”
effect has its advantages, but if an organization partakes in a risk that can be detrimental to the
organization and places the company in a worse situation than previously, further misconduct
could result (Mishina et al., 2010).
When companies become comfortable in their setting, then, at times, the leadership
would decide to take more risk, if there is minimal negative impact that could result. In some
cases, the prior success produced hubris, also known as arrogance (Mishina et al., 2010). Firms
begin to feel resolute and believe that the past is indicative of the future, so success will be
continued (Mishina et al., 2010). The leaders in organizations believe that the success of the
company would mask any indiscretions and failure would not be possible (Mishina et al., 2010).
A vital component in determining sanctions after engaging in misconduct is the moral
behavior of the CEO or Owner. The “personal value system” that the executives or ownership
may have could determine whether a decision is made due to an immediate reaction or the result
of full thought out process (Thorpe, 2011). At times, owners make abrupt judgments without full
examination of what takes place. For instance, depending on the seriousness of the misconduct,
ownership will cut ties with a player because he or she does not want the actions of the athlete to
be representative of entire organization (Thorpe, 2011).
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When companies are experiencing success and are reaching the goals set by upper
management levels, then there is minimal focus on the negative behavior. However,
organizational rule violations are much more likely to take place when the overall performance
of a company is not meeting expectations (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Some scholars believe
organizational scandals and rule breaking has become the norm and is an expected aspect of
organizational life (Martin et al., 2013, p. 550). The problem is attempting to understand when
and why governing bodies or management officials choose to be selective when dealing with
misconduct. As Vaughan (1999) noted, ‘when do organizational conditions produce conduct and
when do they produce misconduct (p. 292)?
Lehman and Ramanujam (2009) produced a framework that attempted to explain why
organizations choose to be selective when they bestow punishments to those who participate in
misconduct. The three characteristics taken into consideration include: the secrecy of compliance
structures, coupling between violation and outcomes, and enforceability (Lehman &
Ramanujam, 2009). When misconduct has been committed, the details regarding how the
governing body operates is very unlikely to become public information, which is also known as
structural secrecy. Structural secrecy is the “way that patterns of information, organizational
structures, processes, and transactions, and the structure of regulatory relations systematically
undermine the attempt to know and interpret situations in organizations” (Lehman &
Ramanujam, 2009, p. 647). Structural secrecy exists in compliance structures because if the
process was known, then individuals in the organizations would learn how to violate rules.
The relationship between the violations and the outcomes in a company also has an
impact when an organization chooses to be selective in deciding how to handle misconduct. The
way that the organization is structured may influence outcomes/violations and determine how a
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rule will be violated (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Preceding literature concluded rules were
likely to be violated in integrated organizations when the prior violations produced positive
outcomes, in comparison to when the violations produces negative outcomes (Vaughan, 1999).
In organizations that include departments that work separately, however, rules are presumably
going to be violated regardless of previous results (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). With some
departments isolating themselves from other areas of an organization, along with a lack of
supervision from management, there is a development of an individual mindset that focuses only
on the goals of the department, rather than the goals of the organization.
Enforcing of the rules and regulations differs from organization to organization, yet
enforcement needs to be consistent and meaningful (Werden, 2013). Enforceability is “the extent
to which regulatory agencies are able to monitor compliance with the rule and pursue justice for
violations, as well as the extent to which such pursuit is likely to occur” (Lehman & Ramanujam,
2009, p. 649). In order for enforcement to be applied properly when organizations commit rule
violations, the enforcement or governing agency should function as a separate entity (Werden,
2013). When enforcing rules for organizations, an issue for some governing bodies that consider
other factors, such as value and prestige, is to properly apply the standards are in place.
Organizations that achieved success and notoriety in previous years may sometimes have an
advantage of not receiving the maximum penalty (Werden, 2013). However, when governing
bodies are able to enforce rules and regulations easily and provide stern, but fair sanctions, then
the rule being violated again becomes uncommon (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
Misconduct Consequences. When determining punishment for misconduct, stakeholders
are commonly given the role of enforcer. The stakeholders of an organization decide whether or
not there should be punishment for misconduct and in those cases that deserve punishment, what
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the discipline should actually entail (Godfrey, 2005). Godfrey (2005) stated:
“When bad acts occur, it is reasonable to assume that stakeholders invoke the
cognitive template suggested by the mens rea doctrine to help determine
appropriate sanctions. As stakeholders consider possible punishments and
sanctions, positive moral capital acts as character evidence on behalf of the firm.
Positive moral capital provides counterfactual evidence to mitigate assessments of
a bad mind; it reduces the probability that the firm possessed the evil state of
mind that justifies harsh sanctions. Positive moral capital encourages stakeholders
to give the firm the benefit of the doubt regarding intentionality, knowledge,
negligence, or recklessness” (p. 788).
Moral capital is expressed as a resource that can help build morale in a community
(Godfrey, 2005). These resources can assist with growth by creating values, norms, and
providing positive experiences for those who are physically or emotionally invested in the
community (Godfrey, 2005). Stakeholders utilize moral capital in decision making regarding
misconduct because of the positive role that an organization could have in a community.
Through severe sanctions handed down from stakeholders, the organization could change their
vision and reassess the value of community involvement when trying to recover from sanctions
(Godfrey, 2005).
Even though stakeholders develop moral capital, there are limitations to their influence,
which includes not being permitted to administer sanctions. Preliminary research conducted by
March and Simon (1958) referenced how individuals have limited attention and tend to be
irrational in the decision making process. The only way that a stakeholder could accurately
punish an organization for participating in misconduct is if the stakeholder’s full attention is
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solely on the organization (March & Simon, 1958). Under Barnett’s (2012) definition of
organizational misconduct, the process of determining adequate punishment is comprised of
three stages: noticing, assessing, and acting. The noticing stage is the most problematic
considering, in some cases, the personal investment of stakeholders to the organization is
substantial (Barrett, 2012). Some stakeholders may not feel as punishing the organization is
necessary because the result could negatively affect the stakeholder’s influence in the firm.
Penalizing organizations for engaging in misconduct is common and well researched, but
analyzing the punishments administered from Chief Executive Officers (CEO’s) or Presidents to
athletes is still new (Greve et. al, 2010; Trevino, 1992; Vaughan, 1999). Thorpe (2011) reviewed
the challenges franchises may face when an athlete engages in misconduct and how one situation
may transform an entire organization. The construction of contracts and the terminology used in
statements is essential and should be fully understood by both parties before signing (Thorpe,
2011). Athletes should be well aware of what is expected from them on and off their respective
field of play; however, the contract should clearly state how the athlete ought to be representing
the organization.
The contract gives much power to CEO’s and permits them to terminate, for example, the
contract of another in management or on the front-line staff member that does not share the
values of the team or organization (Thorpe, 2011). Further, once an individual agrees or signs the
contract, he or she has allowed themselves to be penalized for any behavior that is deemed as
misconduct. Conversely, in most cases, the misconduct needs to be directly located in the
contract to be valid for punishment. Thorpe (2011) specifically stated:
“Whilst specific terms, such as ‘commit a criminal offence’, are readily
incorporated into a sports contract, these terms possess the disadvantage of being
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so specific that many forms of misbehaviour, perhaps beyond the imagination of
the parties at the time of contracting, will lie outside the contractual authority to
penalise. As such, words of broad application are usually favoured to capture all
possible forms of misbehaviour. For example, the term ‘misconduct’ has a wide
locus of operation to apply to a broad range of wrongs” (p. 271).
The above statement demonstrates that the contract must be clear and expectations should be
specified in writing. The CEO must create a committee to provide feedback and constructive
criticism on how contracts are built, as well as, the terminology used in the documents (Thorpe,
2011). For example, good behavior clauses located in the contracts of professional athletes, as
well as, the coaching staffs of professional teams (Kim & Parlow, 2009). Many contracts of
professional athletes in the National Basketball Association (NBA) contain a “good moral
character” clause (Kim & Parlow, 2009, p. 577). The good moral character clause presents the
opportunity for executives of the team to terminate an athlete’s contract for conduct that does not
represent the standards of the league (Kim & Parlow, 2009).
If the CEO is not using proper judgment, following the proper protocol set in the
organizational bylaws, or showing bias when dismissing an employee, then the employee could
take legal action against the organization for wrongful termination (Thorpe, 2011). Importantly,
one should understand that a CEO can only present a punishment to an employee when the
employee engaged in misconduct, according to their contract (Thorpe, 2011). The value of the
terms used in contracts is significant and if misperception or a lack of clarity in the structure
occurs, then the contract loses its usefulness (Thorpe, 2011).
Thorpe (2011) also referenced that in many cases where an employee has committed
misconduct, his or her actions does result in a breach of his/her contract. Specifically, within
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contracts, employees would have the concept of just cause, which is the rule that management
must have a reason in disciplining an employee, in addition to the reason must be just and fair.
CEO’s will now have opportunity to present proper sanctions to the employee, which could
ultimately result in termination, but should be a fair and just process (McKendall & Wagner,
1997; Thorpe, 2011). However, no matter the severity of a level of misconduct, the higher
officials or governing bodies have the final say in decision making. CEO’s or owners could
terminate an employee for an occurrence of misconduct and would be allowed to legally as long
as the incident falls under the distinguished guidelines of misconduct (McKendall & Wagner,
1997; Thorpe, 2011). At times, high-level executives present sanctions to other employees that
participate in misconduct, however, the executives are engaging in misconduct simultaneously
(McKendall & Wagner, 1997). When CEO’s and owners of companies engage in an agreement
that would reduce or eliminate competition, then their organizations are functioning as cartels
and engaging in organizational misconduct.
Cartel
Stigler (1964) established that the most prosperous cartels were able to detect and
rightfully punish those that cheated. However, understanding the differences between a buyer’s
cartel and seller’s cartel, along with the methods used when enforcing, is critical. When
organizations begin to collude and decide to stop attracting opposing customers, the behavior is
representative of a seller’s cartel (Stigler, 1964). The primary intention of a sellers’ cartel is to
increase the consistency of the market share (Stigler, 1964). In comparison, the buyer’s cartel,
also known as a monopsony, has similar enforcement structure, but emphasizes that breaking the
cartel agreement means pursuit of better contributions that can enhance the output market
performance (Stigler, 1964). The NFL player entry draft is representative of a monopsony
considering that the athlete being drafted can only negotiate with one potential employer and the
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lack of leverage for player means a reduction in salary (Maxcy, 2011). An example of a sellers’
cartel is the relationship between Major League Baseball (MLB) and the Negro Leagues in the
early 1940’s. The franchises of MLB colluded in order to prohibit the entry of Negro League
baseball players onto MLB rosters (Sullivan, 1998). The MLB franchise owners believed that the
operation of a separate Negro League would be financially lucrative (Sullivan, 1998). Eckard
(1998) described the behavior of the NCAA and established the precedent that the NCAA serves
as a buyers’ cartel, especially in the sport of college football. In this instance, the NCAA appears
to be a buyers’ cartel since the organization prevents normal supply and demand to take place
(Stigler, 1964). Through maximizing the profits, the NCAA seeks to control competitive balance
through the organization’s regulations (Eckard, 1998).
The creation and development of cartels is challenging in the three main areas: the
selection and coordinating of all cartel participants, monitoring the behavior of cartel
participants, and restricting entry into the cartel by non-cartel firms (Levenstein & Suslow,
2006). Depending on the industry that the cartel exists in, overcoming the challenges could be
less problematic. As an illustration, if the number of organizations within a cartel is minimal,
then collusion would be harder to perform because with a smaller number of organizations, the
cartel would be easier to detect (Levenstein & Suslow, 2006). However, even cartels that
previously encountered collusion have been successful considering the industry that the
organization operates in, as well as the prior experience of higher executives. The industry that
the cartel exists in may be the single most important attribute in finding organizations that
participate in cartel behavior. The success of cartels relies on the type of industry, the
competitiveness within the industry, and the amount of competitors that exist in the industry
(Levenstein & Suslow, 2006).
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The most utilized method of determining whether or not a cartel would be successful is
the cartel duration. Zimmerman and Connor (2005) defined cartel duration as “the total life span
of an effective illegal agreement from its formation to abandonment, a period that may span
multiple episodes” (p. 3). Cartel duration is easy to determine, yet the overall impact is not easily
perceptible and requires more insight into the organization itself (Nikodym, 2014). There have
been previous cases where cartels exist within the industry without any lasting effects
(Levenstein & Suslow, 2006). One example of an undetected cartel is Organic Peroxides cartel,
which existed from 1971 to 1999. (Veljanovski, 2009). The cartel focused on the prices and
market of organic peroxides in Europe and is the longest lasting hidden cartel ever in the
European Commission (Veljanovski, 2009).In these aforementioned cases, the cartels lasted
longer considering that enforcement did not notice any differences in company results during
that time (Levenstein & Suslow, 2006)
The United States Department of Justice introduced a leniency program in 1993, titled the
“Corporate Leniency Policy”, which grants tolerance to a business or firm that reports illegal
cartel activity (Leslie, 2011). As a result of reporting wrongful behavior, the reporting company
would receive amnesty that provides forgiveness for any previous unauthorized acts committed,
as long as, there is immediate action to eliminate the behavior (Leslie, 2011). The organizations
that report the illegal behavior would need to be fully accessible and able to assist the
Department of Justice in learning about the history and reasoning behind their behaviors (Leslie,
2011). Once the violating firms admitted fault and participation in cartel activity, the leniency
policy would protect them, only if their admission was forthcoming and rapid (Leslie, 2011). If
organizations were caught acting as a cartel or performing cartel behavior, fines and
imprisonment would result (Werden, 2013).
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The activity of a cartel is determined when competitors collaborate on how to work to
each other’s strengths and improve each other’s weaknesses (Werden, 2009). The competitors
tend to develop an agreement on what will be competed on, such as prices and location of
customer competition (Werden, 2009). The agreement between the entrants would focus on the
probability of competing and the integration of both organizations in working towards collusion.
The compromise between the two adversaries would result in eventually deciding whether or not
competition would take place, but also focusing on building the best strategies, so consumers can
receive the most benefits (Werden, 2009). However, if the challengers are no longer working in
the best interest of the consumers and solely focusing on the betterment of self, then the behavior
would be an example of cartel activity and a violation of antitrust law (Werden, 2009).
Competition is the motivation by antitrust (Gundlach, 2014). Antitrust includes the
assessment of commercial conduct and then analyzing the purposes to determine whether
conduct can be assessed as being either pro-competitive or anti-competitive (Gundlach, 2014).
Harrington (2012) stated the purpose of antitrust law is to value the liberties and abilities
available in economics through encouraging competition through all members of the industry. In
order to fairly investigate whether or not a company is partaking in anti- or pro-competitive
behavior, the resulting activity would either harm, or needs to harm, how the marketplace
operates (Gundlach, 2014). The principal focus of antitrust law is “not on the outcome nor the
strategies that sustain an outcome but rather the means by which a collusive arrangement is
achieved” (Harrington, 2012, p.2). Antitrust law is understood from the lessons presented from
industrial organization economics (IO), so organizations should understand the theoretical
framework surrounding how markets operate and the knowledge of strategies that can measure
the competitive effects of the industry (Harrington, 2012).
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The Sherman Act was implemented in 1890 and with its introduction; participation in
cartel activity in the United States became a punishable offense (Werden, Hammond, & Barnett,
2011). The Sherman Antitrust Act was developed to concentrate on the prosperity of consumers
(Seifried, 2012). The first two sections of the Sherman Antitrust Act are critical in connecting the
NCAA as a cartel. In the first section of the Sherman Act, regulations are established that
prohibits conduct that minimizes competition, limits trade, and/or restricts interstate commerce
between organizations (Seifried, 2012). The second section refers to any participation in a
monopoly and how any attempt to monopolize is considered an illegal act. If an individual was
found guilty of participating in a cartel, then he or she could possibly be administered a jail
sentence for up to a year (Seifried, 2012; Werden et al., 2011). However, cases involving cartels
or cartel activity were scarce and the only exceptions were cases found in 1921 and 1959
(Werden et al., 2011). Previous literature questioned the seriousness of cartel activity and why
governing agencies felt sternly about ending cartel behavior (Flynn, 1967; Gallo, Craycraft, &
Bush, 1985).
Collusion. Collusion is defined economically as a general agreement between
competitors that is based on communication in order to minimize rivalry (Green, Marshall, &
Marx, 2013). In the first section of the Sherman Act, collusion is identified as illegal and any
type of document that restricts competition or interrupts interstate commerce is restricted as well
(Green et al., 2013). Stigler (1964) acknowledged a concern that firms have while colluding is
attempting to discourage secret plans made by opposing organizations. In collusion,
organizations are made aware of the secret plans by withholding rivalry, unnecessarily raising
prices, and preventing output (Stigler, 1964). Yet, the organizations that want to collude
understand that importance of implementing effective strategies and integrate governing
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structures between colluding firms and other participants in the market (Stigler, 1964).
Antitrust law is divided into three different types of collusion (refer to Table A6): explicit
collusion, conscious parallelism, and concerted action. Explicit collusion refers to extremely
competitive, yet illegal, pricing being presented as a result of communication between
organizations. In explicit collusion, there is direct communication between one firm and the other
regarding the expectations of how both will work uniformly (Harrington, 2012). Conscious
parallelism is the legal, but direct opposite variation of explicit collusion and indicates how
competitive prices are achieved without communication between companies (Harrington, 2012).
Concerted action is an integration of the previous two mentioned collusions and centers on when
extremely competitive prices are presented with minimal direct communication, but there is
proposition and agreement being reached (Page, 2007). Conscious parallelism and concerted
action both are forms of tacit collusion, in which alludes to the majority of collusive
arrangements that are completed with direct communication (Hylton, 2003).
Tacit collusion is formulated from the organization of price leadership and mild
understanding of strategy (Fonseca & Normann, 2012). The concept of tacit collusion is not
discussed in antitrust law, but occurs when cartels are considered illegal or explicit collusion is
absent (Harrington, 2012). In comparison, MacLeod (1985) believed that tacit collusion is
derived from organizations publicizing price changes, yet not actually completing an actual price
change. The one constant between the two definitions is the role of communication, which is
minimal at best, but essential in order to achieve tacit collusion (Fonseca & Normann, 2012,
2012). In essence, determining the objective of each type of collusion is crucial, but also when
each will be used. For example, if the goal is to observe and prosecute cartels, then use explicit
collusion (Harrington, 2012; Rees, 1993). However, if the goal is to prevent mergers with
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organizations on the same level, then use tacit collusion (Harrington, 2012; Rees, 1993).
Even though building collusion between organizations is desired, there is still a
challenging process of agreeing on and determining what collusive structure will be necessary in
order to ensure fairness (Green et al., 2013). Communication and honesty regarding expectations
is necessary in collusion because both organizations can be connected and informed while
competing. Some of the items that are communicated include: methods regarding price
adjustments, how income will be split, and most importantly, how irregular behavior will be
handled (Green et al., 2013). An issue regarding the application of collusion is how will the
collusion process, including the structuring, be monitored since the two organizations are
competitors (Green et al., 2013). For example, if the pricing structure, allocation structures, and
enforcement structures need additional development simultaneously, how can each be properly
examined with care?
When attempting to solve the initiation and implementation of collusion between
companies, precise communication is crucial. Isaac and Plott (1981) maintained that “markets
have two sides, and those on the other side and not a party to the conspiracy, may passively
acquiesce to the establishment of such a conspiracy. The market reactions might be such that the
efforts of the conspirators are rendered ineffectual” (p. 449). The absence of communication
during collusion could be problematic, which hinges on the level of value that the product,
market, or industry may have. In more complex environments, proper usage of collusion may be
too difficult to implement without communication, however, that is not representative for all.
In order to keep collusion between organizations, the dependency on proper enforcement
of firms regarding cartel behavior is essential. The three reasons include: 1) cartels being more
likely to exist in companies in which there is better information being presented and participants
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can differentiate between cheating behavior and demand; 2) firms attempt to be patient before
applying punishments to organizations engaging in wrongdoing; 3) cartels attempt to examine
the behaviors of other competition in order to be able to separate events that are representative of
demand and the general change in pricing (Green at al., 2013; Rigdon & D’Esterre, 2015).
Cartels & Organizational Misconduct/Deviance. The existence of cartels within
organizations is illegal and company participation in cartels is an example of organizational
misconduct. Previous research on organizational misconduct tends to review cases of fraud and
other white-collar crimes, such as insider trading, that occur within companies. Past literature on
organizational misconduct discusses individuals and their own cases, but not much focuses on
the overall misconduct presented by entire organizations or firms (Andreoli & Lefkowitz, 2009;
Vaughan, 1999). When investigating cases of misconduct, researchers need to review the
demographics of the organization in order to better understand the environment that the company
operates in. Cartels are investigated as examples of collective misconduct within an organization
due to the need of cooperation from multiple departments. When investigating a cartel as a
group, result entail the collective behavior, yet does not gather information regarding how the
individual employees interact with one another and complete tasks (Levenstein & Suslow, 2006).
Bertrand & Lumineau (2015) stated that in order to fully understand how cartels conduct
business, potential researchers should be prepared to review the structure and diversity of the
members within a cartel.
As previously noted, most prior research on organizational misconduct concentrates on
the negative behavior of individuals or companies. The research conducted on individuals
concludes that there are certain behaviors that ultimately lead to engagement in organizational
misconduct (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Trevino, 2010; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008). The
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other research is concentrated on organizational misconduct that occurs within an entire
organization (Palmer, 2012; Pierce & Snyder, 2008). Misconduct within an organization can, at
times, just being at the individual-level, but throughout time, an increase in job status, and an
increase of knowledge of how the organization is operated, the misconduct to could spread
throughout the entire company (Shadnam & Lawrence, 2011). The impact of organizational
misconduct within an organization relies on the influence and guidance from top-level executives
within the organization. The managers can create an environment that accepts misconduct and
provide leadership that educates lower-level employees to participate in wrongful behavior in
order to achieve success (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005).
The connection between organizational misconduct and cartels stems from organizations
willing to engage in misconduct activities. In both circumstances, the organization and the
employees tend to be secretive regarding their behavior considering the possible discipline that
would follow engagement in cartels or misconduct. Also, previous literature referenced how
organizational misconduct may take place within companies that serve as cartels (Bertrand &
Lumineau, 2015; Fleisher et al., 1992). When individuals or organizations participate in
misconduct, then the group or individuals, takes full responsibility, but in cartels, there is more
reliance on other organizations within the group. For example, if one company within the cartel
decides to reveal their engagement of misconduct, the impact could effectively reveal the
behavior of the entire group rather than just the one firm.
Palmer (2012) referenced how cartels interact socially, but lack formal structures between
organizations. The previous statement differs from organizational misconduct considering that
the existence of rules and regulations are critical in understanding how organizations operate and
formal structures exist in the organizations that participate in misconduct (Palmer, 2012). The
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critical component of a cartel is being able to maintain secrecy by all the members and since
cartels, as a whole, represent deviance from law or society, concealing member identities and
activities completed become vital for success.
NCAA as a Cartel. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is the one of
governing bodies that presides over intercollegiate athletics in the United States. Some of the
regulations that the NCAA oversees include: recruiting, institutional control, eligibility,
amateurism, and student-athlete compensation (Koch, 1973). Originally, the NCAA was
developed in order to promote safety for college athletics, chiefly football, in the early 1900’s
(Koch, 1973). However, previous literature reflected upon the activity shown by the NCAA to
maximize profits. (DeSchriver & Stotlar, 1996; Fleisher, Goff, & Tollison, 1992; Kahn, 2007).
For instance, Kahn (2007) presented the NCAA as an economic cartel because the organization
attempts to control the inputs (athletes) that come into intercollegiate athletics and attempts to
maximize profits from the institution. Humphreys (2012) stated that in the NCAA, the cartel
arrangement is established when the NCAA member institutions are competing for the
commitment of athletes; however, the institutions have not agreed to compete in regards to the
pricing (e.g. scholarship amount).
The NCAA would also qualify as a business cartel for several other reasons such as:
setting of input prices, regulation of the amount of student-athletes in the department at a given
time, regulation of student-athletes involvement, regulation of athletic contests, pools and
distributes the profits earned from television football packages, distributes information regarding
business that occurs in the headquarters, and polices the behavior of member institutions (Koch,
1973; Van Rheenen, 2013). The recruiting process in the NCAA is critical and competitive
because in most cases, multiple universities are potentially pursuing the same athlete
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(Chelladurai & Riemer, 1997). Chelladurai and Riemer (1997) specified that “athletes are the
most essential human resource involved in the production of intercollegiate athletics” (p. 134).
The success of one student-athlete could provide large amounts of revenue for the athletic
department and institution as a whole, yet will not result in an increase in income for the studentathlete (Johnson & Acquaviva, 2012). How the NCAA limits the output of their member
institutions whether through experiencing more success than other intercollegiate athletic
governing bodies or imposing constraints regarding the collusion of payments for production,
such as student-athlete compensation, is an example of the cartel theory (Johnson & Acquaviva,
2012).
Due to some of the principles, Eckard (1998) characterized the NCAA as being an
example of a cartel, in which “members collude to exercise joint monopoly power over college
football” (p. 347). In terms of Division I-FBS football players at member institutions of the
NCAA, some players are compensated much lower than their marginal revenue products
(Becker, 1987). Furthermore, the income that is generated by the player abilities is also
controlled by the institution and NCAA (Becker, 1987). Marginal revenue products are the
changes in a company’s total revenue by adding one addition unit, in this case: one additional
football player, when all other factors are held equal (Lane, Nagel, & Netz, 2014). The existing
regulations of the NCAA deny all forms of monetary competition for future student-athletes and
deny current student-athletes to receive any form of compensation while attending their
respective institution (Humphreys, 2012). In some cases, the amount of a scholarship distributed
to student-athletes is not a direct representation of the revenue being generated and could lead to
rule-breaking (Fleisher et al., 1992; Becker, 1987). Considering that the NCAA is solely in
control of the rules and regulations regarding financial capabilities of student-athletes, member
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institutions could feel incentive to cheat, which is common as in any other cartel (Becker, 1987;
Fleisher et al., 1992). As member institutions start breaking rules, the NCAA enforced their
regulations and administered sanctions in order to hold their affiliates accountable for violating
behaviors.
In intercollegiate athletics, institutions openly collude with each other to achieve their
goals that may go much further than the standard rules of the game. Humphreys and Ruseski
(2009) presented that collusion between institutions is best seen in conference affiliations. The
conference office does the negotiations with television stations regarding possible network deals
and represents every institution in the respective conference (Weston, 2011). The previously
mentioned statement is an example of collusion among the competing producers attempting to
earn profits for all teams. As a group, the deal configured will produce more revenue for all of
the members rather that which could be had by negotiating independent deals (Weston, 2011).
The return that many student-athletes received while participating in intercollegiate
athletics stayed the same in the form of full scholarships (Davis & Malagrino, 2012; Sutter &
Winler, 2003). NCAA Bylaw 15.1 states that a student-athlete’s full athletic scholarship is
valued as full grant-in-aid, which includes the cost of tuition, additional fees administered by the
college or university, room and board, and required course textbooks (NCAA, 2015). Also,
student-athletes, mostly at the Division-I level, receive advantages that many other students to do
receive, such as lower admission standards, priority class registration, and enhanced living
quarters (Saffici & Pellegrino, 2012). However, the salaries of coaches, revenues earned by
athletic departments, and funding spent by athletic departments rapidly increased, which is
another example of collusion. A problem and potential area for discussion is how the NCAA
kept student-athlete funding at a constant and below the value of what the organization actually
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generated from their participation in sport (Fleisher et al., 1992). Recently, funding for studentathletes has changed considering the implementation of the cost of attendance stipend that is
presented to student-athletes as an added revenue source to assist with the everyday costs of
attending their respective college or university (Jones, 2015). However, the current amount that
student-athletes receive is determined by the institution regarding the real costs needed to attend
the university (Jones, 2015). The future problem could potentially be that larger athletic
departments could collude because they have more revenue could provide more money to
student-athletes and present it as cost of attendance.
Collusion is also noted in the lack of restriction of school names, mascots, and logos on
assets. NCAA member institutions are permitted to place their name and logo on all major assets
available to them, including stadiums, arenas, training facilities, living quarters, dormitories, and
uniforms (Fleisher et al., 1992). Fleisher et al. (1992) specified that, “if a quest for education,
amateurism, and standardized rules were at the heart of NCAA behavior, these inputs would be
regulated along with labor inputs” (p. 8-9). The previous quote is in reference to the recruiting
tools that stadiums and uniforms have become. NCAA member institutions are now
implementing strategies to bring in additional revenue, but also provide additional incentive for
bigger name recruits to attend their institution (Fleisher et al., 1992).
The fourth aspect is student-athlete value in comparison to how much is earned by
competing within the NCAA. Student-athletes that are on full scholarship are paid their full
grant-in-aid at their respective institution for one academic year (Sutter & Winkler, 2003).
However, the amount of revenue that is received in athletic departments from student-athlete
competition is much more, especially in high revenue sports, such as basketball and football
(Fleischer et al., 1992). The marginal revenue products are much higher, which means that
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universities are largely benefitting from the work of student-athletes (Fleischer et al., 1992).
The fifth aspect that provides for the potentiality of the NCAA to be seen as an acting
cartel involve the willingness of the member institutions to engage in unfair behavior. The most
common act is for student-athletes to receive additional, unauthorized payments that provide
more than the full grant-in-aid (Davis & Malgrino, 2013). The last aspect declares the NCAA’s
willingness to set prices for college sports and controlling the production, and not controlling
relevant inputs such as uniforms and stadiums, along with underpaying student-athletes
(Sanderson & Siegfried, 2015). The NCAA, as a cartel, is designed to benefit from the member
institutions, but the workers (student-athletes) are potentially exploited as a result (Davis &
Malagrino, 2013).
College athletic departments at the Division-I level are competing and searching for
advantages at any opportune moment. Through the recruitment of highly touted athletes, the
athletic department can improve in areas, such as: competition results, game attendance,
television appearances, merchandising, sponsorships, and possible postseason competition. All
of the previous items would provide an immediate increase in revenue for the institution and
athletic department, but also an unplanned increase in the reputation of the institution
(Hunsberger & Gitter, 2015). The impact of a high-quality college football player is great,
similarly Hunsberger & Gitter (2015) projected that a blue chip football quarterback’s marginal
revenue product is $2.3 million dollars and in comparison, a premiere college basketball player
has marginal revenue product between $1 to $1.4 million dollars at high revenue basketball
programs (Lane, Nagel, & Netz, 2014). However, the player wage is not the only discussion
point regarding marginal revenue. The coaches and their wages also provide incentive to cheat
on the cartel agreement. For example, head coaches of all NCAA sports that are exhibiting

209

success by winning conference and national championships are earning more than those who are
not (Humphreys, 2000). Through the pursuit of winning and higher winning percentages,
coaches can begin to make their plea to their athletic directors regarding a salary increase.
Previous literature researched the distribution of wins in college football, which can be
directly correlated to cartel implications (Depken & Wilson, 2004; Depken & Wilson, 2006;
Eckard, 1998). Eckard (1998) revealed the cartel agreement that NCAA developed, enriched
competitive balance in five out of seven Division-I football conferences. Competitive balance, in
the previous example, is the notion that no team in the conference is too big or has an unfair
advantage (Eckard, 1998). Depken and Wilson (2004) discovered institutional change in the
NCAA regarding enforcement of the cartel agreement and noticed that the change led to a
decrease in competitive balance in Division-I college football. Depken and Wilson (2006)
determined that there is a direct relationship between competitive balance and enforcement in
Division-I football conferences. The greater the level of enforcement, then the better the
competitive balance; however, Depken and Wilson (2006) also found harsher punishments led to
worse competitive balance. The results from the research exemplify the impact that cartel
enforcement has on output and minimizes the value of understanding how the NCAA football
cartel monitors (Depken & Wilson, 2006).
The NCAA gains monopsony and monopoly power by functioning as a facilitator to
promote collusion. Monopsony refers to a single buyer in the market, in comparison to a
monopoly, which represents a single seller in the market. Lemons (2014) declared “the NCAA
operates as a collusive monopsony when “purchasing” student-athletes and a collusive monopoly
when selling college sports. In fact, the NCAA promotes explicit collusion because its members
openly cooperate to make mutually beneficial pricing and production decision” (p. 31). When
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referencing the NCAA, explicit collusion alludes to how institutions all work together to make
decision that can be profitable for all.
Even though much literature focused on the NCAA and athletic departments acting like a
cartel looking to expand profits, the academic offices do the same when attempting to acquire
prestige. Through the increasing of revenues brought about by athletic success, the institution
capitalizes and utilizes the resources in order to enhance the overall perspective of the university,
both academic and athletic (DePalma, 1991). In the late 1980’s, the Ivy League institutions (i.e.,
Brown University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Harvard
University, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton University, and Yale University) were all
accused of collusion on their financial aid presented to their students (DePalma, 1991). The
institutions engaged in wrongdoing when prospective students were deciding on which
university to attend and each institution would adjust their financial packages to achieve an
advantage over the other competitors (DePalma, 1991). The governing body refused the families
to negotiate other packages, which was believed to common because the schools should be
competing on the level that are equal to their placement (DePalma, 1991). The issue that arose
from the decision made by the governing body was the students that needed much of the
financial aid were at a disadvantage since the institutions were no longer permitted to adjust their
packages to compete with one another (DePalma, 1991).
When a harsh sanction is administered from a violation of the cartel agreement, the
members of the cartel will be more aware to follow the rules and regulations set in place.
However, if the sanction tends to be lenient, then the likelihood of the violating firm re-engaging
in the same acts is higher (DeSchriver & Stotlar, 1996). For example, previous literature
discussed the financial advantages of violating NCAA policies and how the incentives come in
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forms of increased postseason revenues, increased ticket revenues, and the recruitment of high
caliber athletes (Brown, 1994; Padilla & Baumer, 1994). The NCAA decided to increase the
harshness of their sanctions in order to instill reluctance in member institutions that consider
participating in the wrong behavior (Humphreys & Ruseski, 2006). Fleisher et al. (1992)
concluded violations administered by the NCAA would decrease as the number of sanctions
increased, but the sanctioning process presented by the NCAA comes in question. NCAA
violations are distributed to mostly football and basketball teams and since the NCAA acts as a
cartel, the two highest revenue sports would have the most difficulties when maintaining policies
(Clark & Batista, 2009).
Previous literature references how the role and structure of the NCAA resembles an
economic cartel and how violations of NCAA rules occur as a result (DeSchriver & Stotlar,
1996; Fleisher et al., 1992; Grant, Leady, & Zygmont, 2008; Kahn, 200;). Athletic directors and
other high level athletic department executives within NCAA member institutions try to direct
their departments similar to others (Davis & Hairston, 2014). NCAA member institutions
implemented instruments that make sure that the actions of the athletic departments match the
expectations and expected social outcomes of the institution as a whole (e.g., more community
involvement and input from academic sources) (Davis & Hairston, 2014).
The NCAA uses mandates to regulate behavior by member institutions and attempt to
create uniformity at all levels (Sawyer, Bodey, & Judge, 2008). Mandates are “the fundamental
policy instrument utilized in the NCAA and determine which of the policy instruments are
permissible” (Clark, 2010, p.52). The mandates used by the NCAA attempt to create cohesion
with the other rules of the governing organization, which is common from organizations that
function as cartels (Fleisher et al., 1992; Grant et al., 2008). Although the NCAA has the rules is
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place to attempt and minimize cases of misconduct, NCAA violations tended to increase in
frequency, which led to the Committee of Infractions administering harsher sanctions on
violating institutions (Davis & Hairston, 2014). Even as the COI began to delegate tougher
punishments to athletic teams and/or departments that violated regulations, there was still
financial incentive to cheat and seek an advantage, especially in sports such as football and
basketball, where postseason play could lead to addition revenue and ticket sales (Humphreys &
Ruseski, 2006).
Conclusion
In the development of this literature review, establishing the relationship between the
concepts of deviance, organizational misconduct, and cartels proved to be challenging
considering the gaps in literature specifically with organizational misconduct and organizational
deviance. Deviance serves as the all-encompassing concept; however, the minor differences
presented in the definitions of organizational deviance and organizational misconduct, provide a
perspective that they are in fact different. The problem arises when certain literature references
to misconduct and wrongdoing as synonyms of deviance, thus leading the reader to believe that
the terms are similar. Through further analysis of the examples used when discussing behavior as
misconduct, deviance, and even, wrongdoing, there is an opportunity to designate how each term
should be used.
The participation in organizational deviance by NCAA member institutions provides a
complicated situation for both the participants in deviant behavior and also the NCAA as a
social-control agent. When member institutions engage in wrongful behavior, there could be a
damaging sanction as a result, either to the specific individual, specific team, athletic department,
or even the institution. However, if the NCAA is reducing competition of their member
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institutions, for example through restriction of scholarships, then the organization is functioning
as a cartel, which is an example of organizational misconduct. There would be an issue with the
NCAA functioning as an illegal cartel because the organization is also serving as a social-control
agent determining the line of right and wrong to their member institutions.
Future research on the topic presents opportunities to better define the relationship
between organizational deviance and organizational misconduct. Potential areas of further
development include: a content analysis of major sport organizations participating in wrongdoing
and determining how the terms misconduct and deviance are used; determining the
organizational deviance of major Division-I athletic programs; student-athlete corruption,
specifically at the Division-I FBS level; the effect of organizational misconduct within athletic
departments on academic applications; consumer behavior in terms of stakeholder resiliency and
consequences of misconduct; psychological antecedents and behavior consequences of
organizational misconduct; and the effect of sanctions of student-athlete recruitment at the
Division-I level.
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Table A1
Differences Between Organizational Deviance, Corruption, and Organizational Misconduct
Terms
Organizational Deviance

Definition
Intentional behaviors engaged in by organizational
members that are contrary to the norms of the
organization, and which carry the potential to harm the
organization (Ferris, Brown, & Heller, 2009).

Corruption

The use of authority for personal gain (Aguilera &
Vadera, 2008).

Organizational Misconduct

Behavior in or by an organization that a social-control
agent judges to transgress a line separating right from
wrong; where such a line can separate legal, ethical, and
social responsible behavior from their antithesis (Greve,
Palmer, Pozner, 2010).
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Table A2
Definitions of the Four Subheadings of Deviance
Subheadings
Positive Deviance

Definition
The approval for behavior that goes above
and beyond what is expected.

Negative Deviance

Any type of behavior or condition that the
majority of a given group regards as
unacceptable.

Rate-Busting

Those who overconform to certain situations
and are negatively seen in the eyes of others.

Deviance Admiration

The appreciation of those who may not obey
the rules and follows their own path.

Note. (Heckert & Heckert, 2015)
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Table A3
Four Subheadings of Deviance classified by the Three Concepts of Deviance
Organizational Deviance
Deviance within an
organization that has a positive
impact, but different from
regular behavior.

Organizational Misconduct
----

-----

Negative Deviance

Intentional deviant behavior
that differs from the norms of
an organization.

Intentional deviant behavior
that violates the regulations of
the organization.

Forbidden behavior that
involves the wrongful use of
the organization for gain.

Rate-Busting

Intentional deviant behavior
that overconforms to the norms
of an organization, which leads
to being seen negatively.

Intentional deviant behavior
that overconforms to the
regulations of an organization,
which leads to being seen
negatively.

----

Deviance Admiration

The appreciation of someone
in an organization who does
not adhere to the norms of an
organization.

----

The appreciation of someone
in an organization that
participates in forbidden
behavior that involves the
wrongful use of the
organization for gain.

Positive Deviance
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Corruption

Table A4
Five Theories of Deviance
Theories

Developer

Definition
Theory that focuses on how members of
society can be pressured to conform to the
behaviors that previously exist (Agnew et
al., 2009).

Strain Theory

Robert Merton

Symbolic Interactionist Theory

Edwin Sutherland

Theory that focuses on reliance on the
members of society creating their own
circumstances and making their own
decisions that has a lasting impact on their
life (Conyers & Calhoun, 2015).

Social Identity Theory

Howard Becker

Theory that acknowledges groups which
people belonged to were an important
source of pride and self-esteem (Tse &
Chiu, 2014).

Societal Reaction Theory
(Labeling Theory)

Erwin Lemert

The response of others that defines (labels)
the behavior as deviant and impacts further
deviance (Sykes & Matza, 1957).

Control Theory

Walter Reckless

When an individual’s inner control and
outer control work against their
motivations to deviate (Reckless, 1967).
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Table A5
Five Types of Organizational Corruption
Types
Procedural Corruption

Definition
Either the lack of formalized procedures or
formal ‘rules’ of business conduct in the
organization, or from the violation of existing
formal procedures, for personal gain
(Aguilera & Vadera, 2008).

Schematic Corruption

Occurs when structures are present uniformly
throughout the organization (Aguilera &
Vadera, 2008).

Categorical Corruption

The result of concentrated and delimited acts
of corruption within the organization”
(Aguilera & Vadera, 2008).

Organization of Corrupt Individuals

The majority of members in an organization
that choose to act in a corrupt manner to
receive personal gain (Pinto et al., 2008).

Corrupt Organization

The entire group chooses to engage
themselves in corruption, in order for all to
receive benefits from wrongdoing (Pinto et
al., 2008).
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Table A6
Four Subcategories of Organizational Corruption
Types
Organizational Structure

Category
Organization of Corrupt Individuals (OCI)

Corrupt Organizations (CO)

Result Orientation

Organization of Corrupt Individuals (OCI)

Corrupt Organizations (CO)

Environmental Scarcity

Industry Structure/Norms

Example
There are greater individual-level
structural opportunities in an organization.
The organization has groupings or
departments that are loosely watched.
An employee’s salary is not determined
based upon the success of the business and
there is corruption.
An employee receives compensation
based off of the business itself and the
amount of revenue being made.

Organization of Corrupt Individuals (OCI)

There is an organization that is not
competing nor facing pressure from other
organizations.

Corrupt Organizations (CO)

There is an organization that is competing
and facing pressure from other
organizations.

Organization of Corrupt Individuals (OCI)

Corrupt Organizations (CO)

Note. (Pinto et al., 2008)
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A corrupt organization is located in an
industry that has strong values and
participation in misconduct is rare.
Organizations are classified in industries
that are more cohesive and are all likely to
engage in wrongdoing.

Table A7
Types of Collusion
Types
Tacit Collusion

Present in Antitrust Law?
No

Definition
Occurs when cartels are considered illegal
or explicit collusion is absent.

Explicit Collusion

Yes

Occurs when extremely competitive, yet
illegal, pricing is being presented as a
result of communication between
organizations.

Conscious Parallelism

Yes

Legal, but direct opposite variation of
explicit collusion and indicates how
competitive prices are achieved without
communication between companies.

Concerted Action

Yes

Integration of explicit collusion and
conscious parallelism and centers on when
extremely competitive prices are presented
with minimal direct communication, but
there is proposition and agreement being
reached.

Note. (Harrington, 2012)
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